The Role of Social Structure and Financial Incentives in Individual and Organizational Performance by Gubler, Timothy
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations Arts & Sciences
Summer 8-15-2015
The Role of Social Structure and Financial
Incentives in Individual and Organizational
Performance
Timothy Gubler
Washington University in St. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
Part of the Business Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For
more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gubler, Timothy, "The Role of Social Structure and Financial Incentives in Individual and Organizational Performance" (2015). Arts &
Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 551.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/551
  
 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS 
Olin Business School 
 
 
Dissertation Examination Committee: 
Lamar Pierce, Chair  
Nick Argyres 
Daniel Elfenbein 
Adina Sterling 
Todd Zenger 
 
 
 
The Role of Social Structure and Financial Incentives in Individual and  
Organizational Performance 
by 
Timothy Gubler 
 
 
A dissertation presented to the  
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences 
of Washington University in 
partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
August 2015 
St. Louis, Missouri 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015, Timothy Gubler
 ii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi 
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ viii 
Abstract of the Dissertation ........................................................................................................... xi 
Preface............................................................................................................................................. 1 
Statement of Contribution ............................................................................................................... 7 
Chapter 1: It’s Who You Know ...................................................................................................... 8 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 9 
1.2  General Theory ............................................................................................................... 14 
1.2.1  The Organizational Challenge of Experts ............................................................... 14 
1.2.2  Social Structures and Social Motivations ............................................................... 15 
1.3  Empirical Setting ............................................................................................................ 21 
1.3.1  Formal Social Structure in Utah: LDS Congregation Boundaries .......................... 24 
1.4  Setting-Specific Predictions from the General Hypotheses ........................................... 27 
1.4.1  Listing Agent Effort and Performance .................................................................... 27 
1.4.2  Tactics to Appropriate Value in Transactions ........................................................ 30 
1.4.3  Impact on Firm Performance .................................................................................. 32 
1.5  Data ................................................................................................................................ 32 
1.5.1  LDS Church Boundary Data ................................................................................... 34 
1.5.2  Data Construction and Cleaning Process ................................................................ 35 
1.5.3  Interview Data ......................................................................................................... 38 
1.6  Empirical Model ............................................................................................................. 39 
1.7  Results ............................................................................................................................ 40 
1.7.1  Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................... 40 
1.7.2  Listing Agent Effort and Performance .................................................................... 40 
1.7.3  Tactics to Appropriate Value in Transactions ........................................................ 42 
1.7.4  Impact on Firm Performance .................................................................................. 44 
1.8  Robustness and Identifying Mechanisms ....................................................................... 45 
 iii 
 
1.8.1  Geographic Proximity vs Social Affiliations .......................................................... 45 
1.8.2  Strength of Affiliation ............................................................................................. 45 
1.8.3  Unexpected Changes to Congregation Boundaries................................................. 47 
1.9  Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................ 48 
1.10  References ...................................................................................................................... 54 
1.11  Figures and Tables ......................................................................................................... 59 
Chapter 2: Favored in Selection .................................................................................................... 71 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 72 
2.2  Theoretical Background ................................................................................................. 76 
2.2.1  Defining Social Affiliations .................................................................................... 76 
2.2.2  Affiliations and Access to Valuable Transactions .................................................. 78 
2.2.3  A Distinct Selection Process Imposed by Affiliations ............................................ 79 
2.2.4  Creation of an Affiliation Feedback Loop .............................................................. 81 
2.3  Empirical Setting ............................................................................................................ 82 
2.3.1  Selection in Real Estate and Acquiring More Valuable Listings ........................... 85 
2.4  Data ................................................................................................................................ 86 
2.5  Empirical Approach ....................................................................................................... 87 
2.6  Results ............................................................................................................................ 91 
2.6.1  Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................... 91 
2.6.2  Acquiring More Valuable Listings ......................................................................... 92 
2.6.3  A Different Selection Process ................................................................................. 93 
2.2.4  Creation of a Feedback Loop .................................................................................. 95 
2.7  Robustness and Identifying Mechanisms ....................................................................... 96 
2.8  Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................ 97 
2.9  References .................................................................................................................... 100 
2.10  Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................... 104 
Chapter 3: Motivational Spillovers from Awards ....................................................................... 115 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 116 
3.2  Theoretical Development ............................................................................................. 121 
3.2.1  A Taxonomy on Motivation from Awards ........................................................... 121 
3.2.2  Direct Effects of Awards on Motivation ............................................................... 122 
 iv 
 
3.2.3  The Indirect Effect of Awards .............................................................................. 126 
3.2.3  Summary of Theory and Hypotheses .................................................................... 133 
3.3  Empirical Setting .......................................................................................................... 133 
3.3.1  Attendance Award Program .................................................................................. 136 
3.4  Methods ........................................................................................................................ 138 
3.4.1  Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................ 138 
3.4.2  Data ....................................................................................................................... 139 
3.4.3  Dependent Variables ............................................................................................. 140 
3.4.4  Validity of Difference-in-Differences Approach .................................................. 140 
3.4.5  Empirical Specification ......................................................................................... 141 
3.5  Results .......................................................................................................................... 142 
3.5.1  Basic Treatment Effects ........................................................................................ 142 
3.5.2  Heterogeneous Employee Response: The Direct Effect of Awards ..................... 143 
3.5.3  Motivation Reversion after Loss of Eligibility ..................................................... 146 
3.5.4  Crowding Out Internal Motivation ....................................................................... 147 
3.5.5  Negative Motivational Spillovers on Nonawarded Tasks .................................... 147 
3.6  Discussion and Conclusion .......................................................................................... 149 
3.6.1  Limitations ............................................................................................................ 151 
3.6.2  Theoretical Implications ....................................................................................... 153 
3.7  References .................................................................................................................... 156 
3.8  Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................... 162 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 167 
Introduction and Conclusion References .................................................................................... 170 
Appendix 1: Appendix to Chapter 1 ........................................................................................... 172 
Appendix 2: Appendix to Chapter 3 ........................................................................................... 175 
 
 
 
  
 v 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework ...............................................................................................59 
Figure 1.2: Boundaries for a Representative Stake in Utah County with Seven Wards ................59 
Figure 1.3: Setting-specific Predictions Corresponding to the General Hypotheses .....................60 
Figure 1.4: Agents Sell Homes Higher Above Predicted Sold Price when Listing for Affiliates .60 
Figure 1.5: Impact of Social Affiliations on the Flow of Value in Transactions ...........................61 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of Potential Feedback Loop Created by Social Affiliations ...................104 
Figure 2.2: Affiliations Correlated with Higher List Prices ........................................................104 
Figure 2.3: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Listing Low Quality Homes ......................105 
Figure 2.4: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Brokerage Size ..........................................105 
Figure 2.5: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Agent Experience ......................................106 
Figure 2.6: Correlation between Original List Price and Agent Experience, by Affiliation .......106 
Figure 3.1: Study Taxonomy and Summary of Hypotheses ........................................................165 
Figure 3.2: Monthly Treatment Effect on Minutes Late ..............................................................166 
Figure 3.3: Change in Minutes Late After Award Implementation for “High Tardy” Group .....166 
Figure A1.1: Flow Chart of a Typical Real Estate Transaction for Listing Agents ....................173 
Figure A1.2: Map of Utah County with Listing Agent Home Addresses ...................................174 
Figure A2.1: Plant Process Flow Chart........................................................................................178 
Figure A2.2: Histogram of Daily Efficiency for All Workers .....................................................179 
Figure A2.3: Eligible Months by Worker ....................................................................................179 
Figure A2.4: Placebo Regressions for Minutes Late ...................................................................180 
Figure A2.5: Change in Minutes Late After Award Disqualification .........................................181 
 
  
 vi 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Typical Interactions in LDS Church Wards and Stakes .............................................61 
 
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Specifications: Dependent and Independent 
Variables  ....................................................................................................................................62 
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Specifications: Control Variables ........................64 
 
Table 1.4: Listing Agents Exert More Care and Effort when Listing for Affiliates ...................64 
 
Table 1.5: Agents Create More Value when Listing for Affiliates .............................................65 
 
Table 1.6: Increased Flexibility and Access to Value Appropriation Tactics when Listing for 
Affiliates  ....................................................................................................................................66 
 
Table 1.7: Evidence of Increased Flexibility that Aids in Engaging in Dual Agency ................67 
 
Table 1.8: Listing for Affiliates Improves Firm Performance .....................................................67 
 
Table 1.9: Agent Value Creation Largest at the Ward Level (Strongest Affiliation) .................68 
 
Table 1.10: Value Appropriation And Flexibility Largest at Ward Level (Strongest Affiliation) 69 
 
Table 1.11: Less Effort and Value Created when Agents List for Previous Affiliates .................70 
 
Table 1.12: Value Creation and Appropriation Reduced when Listing for Previous Affiliates ...70 
 
Table 2.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................107 
 
Table 2.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Affiliation ...........................................................107 
 
Table 2.3: Difference between House Quality Indicators for Affiliates and Non-Affiliates ....108 
 
Table 2.4: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality Homes 109 
  
Table 2.5: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality Homes 
(Within Brokerage) ...................................................................................................110 
 
 vii 
 
Table 2.6: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality Homes 
(Within Agent and Brokerage) .................................................................................111 
 
Table 2.7: Investigating how Affiliations Impact the Selection Process—Conditional Logit 
Models ......................................................................................................................112 
 
Table 2.8: Social Affiliations and Relationship with Experience or Reputation .......................113 
 
Table 2.9: Feedback Loop Generated by Listing for Affiliates .................................................114 
 
Table 2.10: Selection Effects Largest with Strong Affiliations and Disappears with Affiliations 114 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics at Worker/Day Level .............................................................162 
 
Table 3.2: Basic Treatment Effect .............................................................................................163 
 
Table 3.3: Sub-sample Analysis on “Tardy” and “Minutes Late” ............................................163 
 
Table 3.4: Sub-sample Analysis on “Absence” and “Single Absence” ....................................164 
 
Table 3.5: Effect of Losing Award Eligibility on Tardiness .....................................................164 
 
Table 3.6: Treatment Effect on Efficiency by Employee Type .................................................165 
 
Table A1.1 House Description and Quality Indicator Dummies from Public Remarks .............171 
 
Table A2.1 Descriptive Statistics at the Worker/Month Level ...................................................176 
 
Table A2.2 Placebo Tests ............................................................................................................177 
 
Table A2.1 Pre- and Post-Fail for Minutes Late .........................................................................177 
 
 
 
  
 viii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
There are many individuals that have helped make this dissertation a possibility. First, 
and foremost, I would like to thank my family for their love, patience, and support. Thank you 
Cynthia for being such a superb companion and friend. Every day I get to spend with you is a 
priceless gift, and without your support this dissertation and my PhD would not have been 
possible. Thanks also to my children—Peter, Samuel, Michael, and Maggie—for being my 
greatest fans, and for being patient with me when I needed to spend long hours at work.  
I would also like to thank my parents for providing the opportunities needed to bring me 
to this point. Without their lessons on hard work, diligence, and perseverance I would not have 
been able to finish this project. I am also grateful for their love, encouragement, and support. 
Thanks also to my siblings for helpful encouragement and advice during my PhD, and for their 
thoughts on my dissertation. 
I am impossibly indebted to my dissertation chair, Lamar Pierce, for his mentorship, 
guidance, encouragement, and patience in helping me develop as a scholar. A student could hope 
for no better adviser and mentor. I also thank my dissertation committee for their invaluable 
comments, guidance, and encouragement: Nick Argyres, Dan Elfenbein, Adina Sterling, and 
Todd Zenger. Finally, I wish to thank many others at Washington University that have made 
important contributions to this dissertation, and to myself as a scholar. In particular, Jackson 
Nickerson, Phech Colatat, Anne Marie Knott, Ryan Cooper, and the Strategy and Organizational 
Behavior PhD students at Washington University.  
I am grateful to the Olin Business School for providing me with the resources needed to 
complete my PhD, and to Sarah Grantham, Erin Murdock, and Donna Cerame for their support.   
 ix 
 
I also thank the Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Service for providing access to 
the residential real estate data, Graton Gathright for generously sharing essential LDS church 
boundary data, and the managers and individuals at LaundryCo for providing the laundry data. 
Without their generosity, support, and contributions this project would not have been possible. 
Finally, I would like to thank the many colleagues across the world that have provided 
thoughts on this project. This includes seminar participants at Brigham Young University and the 
University of California, Riverside. It also includes conference participants at the 2013 Academy 
of Management Annual Meeting, the 2013 SMS Annual Meeting, the 2014 Consortium on 
Competitiveness and Cooperation, the 2013 Atlanta Competitive Advantage Conference, and the 
2014 Midwestern Strategy Meeting.  
 
Timothy Gubler 
Washington University in St. Louis 
May 2015 
 
  
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to my family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The Role of Social Structure and Financial Incentives in Individual and  
Organizational Performance  
by 
Timothy Gubler 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015 
Professor Lamar Pierce, Chair 
 
This dissertation investigates the role of individuals in firm strategy and performance by 
exploring how social factors at the individual-level combine with financial incentives to 
influence individual behaviors and performance. By drawing on unique proprietary datasets from 
two service settings, I investigate 1) how social affiliations between real estate listing agents and 
clients influence value creation, appropriation, and the types of transactions agents engage in, 
and 2) how corporate awards, which primarily reward individuals based off non-pecuniary social 
factors, are influenced by individual heterogeneity. The results of this dissertation suggest that a 
more nuanced view of the impact of social structures on individual and firm performance is 
needed. Moreover, the results suggest that focusing on the micro-macro links is important to both 
managers and to future theory in strategic management. 
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PREFACE 
Strategy scholars are fundamentally interested in investigating the determinants of firm 
profitability and performance. In approaching this question, however, scholars have historically 
tended to ascribe much of the variation in performance outcomes to industry or firm-level 
variables (e.g., Rumelt 1974; Wernerfelt & Montgomery 1988; Porter 1980; Rumelt 1991; 
McGahan & Porter 1997; Barney 1991; Teece et al. 1997). Surprisingly, significantly less work 
has focused on the role of individuals, or the intersection of individuals and organizations, in 
determining firm performance. Indeed, many scholars have recently called for a more thorough 
investigation of the micro-macro links of strategy, sometimes called the “microfoundations of 
strategy”, in an effort to address this gap (e.g., Felin & Foss 2005; Felin & Hesterly 2007; 
Barney & Felin 2013). While some progress has been made to date, there remains much debate 
about the value of microfoundational research to strategy theory and practice. Moreover, debates 
continue about how to define micro-macro links, and around which micro-macro links are worth 
investigating.  
This is surprising, given the fact that labor is frequently the largest resource cost to 
organizations, and is often cited as the key resource underlying a firm’s competitive advantage 
(e.g., Barney & Wright 1998). Indeed, in many service industries, which now represent nearly 
70% of US GDP (USTR, 2014), labor is the primary competitive resource. This is likewise 
surprising because scholars have long noted the potential importance of exploring the role of 
individuals in firm strategy and performance. For instance, Arrow argued that “There is really no 
need for the firm to be the fundamental unit of organization…there is plenty of reason to suppose 
that individual talents count for a good deal more than the firm as an organization” (1962, 
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p.624). Similarly, Barnard argued that “The individual is always the basic strategic factor of 
organization” (1968, p.139). Yet, despite the potential importance of individual-level research to 
strategy, there has been significantly less work focused at this level that links the micro with the 
macro.  
This dissertation seeks in part to fill this gap by investigating the role of social structure 
and financial incentives in individual productivity and organizational performance. I explore how 
heterogeneity in individuals, including in their social affiliations and motivations, influence their 
productivity and behaviors in the face of financial incentives and career concerns. Financial 
incentives have long been studied as key determinants of individual productivity, behavior, and 
sorting (e.g., Prendergast 1999; Lazear 2000). Similarly, social structures have been argued and 
found to significantly impact individual choices and behaviors (e.g., Granovetter 1985; 2005; 
Coleman 1988; Burt 1997). However, significantly less research has investigated the intersection 
of these factors, and particularly how social factors at the individual level combine with financial 
incentives and other organizational variables to influence firm-level outcomes.  
To approach this question I use two hand-collected proprietary datasets that link 
individual-level variables surrounding productivity and social structures with organizational-
level variables and performance measures. Both of these datasets are derived from service 
settings—one from the residential real estate industry, and the other from a commercial laundry 
cleaning company—where individual productivity is of paramount importance to firm success. 
Using data from these settings, I investigate 1) how social affiliations between employee-experts 
and clients impact value creation and appropriation in real estate transactions, 2) how these 
affiliations influence the selection process and the types of transactions agents engage in, and 3) 
how non-pecuniary incentives, which primary draw on social factors to motivate employees, 
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influence individual behaviors and productivity. While the granularity of the data allow me to 
study individual outcomes and behaviors in each setting, I also explore the impact of individual-
level behaviors and productivity on organizational outcomes. 
The first chapter investigates how social affiliations between real estate listing agents and 
home sellers impact value creation and appropriation in transactions. While many studies have 
emphasized the potential efficiency and costs benefits from transacting within social structures, it 
remains unclear how transacting with socially-affiliated clients impacts the performance of 
experts and firms. Using a novel dataset that pairs elements from the Wasatch Front Regional 
Multiple Listing Service with data on geographically-assigned LDS congregation boundaries in 
Utah, I identify listings for which listing agents and home sellers share a social affiliation 
through the formal structure of the church. I then investigate the impact of this affiliation on the 
value that is created in the transaction, in terms of final sale price, probability of sale, and days 
on market, and the value appropriation tactics used by agents in transactions, including dual 
agency. Finally, I investigate the impact of transacting with affiliates on overall firm revenues 
over time. 
The results from this chapter suggest that agents create and appropriate more value in 
transactions, and significantly improve performance, by engaging in transactions with socially-
affiliated clients. First, I find agents sell comparable homes for 2% more when listing for 
affiliates without increasing time of market, and increase the probability that a home will sale. 
My results suggest that one avenue through which this occurs is increased marketing efforts. 
Second, I find that agents increase their use of dual agency by 17% when listing for affiliates, 
suggesting that affiliations allow agents to employ additional tactics to appropriate value in 
transactions. Finally, I find that firms significantly improve revenues as the percentage of homes 
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sold to affiliates increases—A 10% increase in the number of yearly transactions with affiliates 
leads to an approximately 2% increase in total yearly firm revenues. Overall, these results 
suggest that firms and employee-experts can significantly improve performance on transactions 
by leveraging social affiliations between employees and clients. 
The second chapter builds on and extends the first chapter, and explores how social 
affiliations influence the type of transactions listing agents are able to secure, as well as the 
underlying selection process. In many industries access to valuable transactions is critical to firm 
performance and survival. However, it is still not well understood how social affiliations 
influence the selection process, and the types of transactions available to firms. Indeed, the 
literature argues they could either lead to selection benefits (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998) or to 
the firm becoming a “relief organization” (Uzzi 1997). Similarly, it is still not well understood 
how social affiliations interact with observables commonly used to select transaction partners, 
such as previous experience, reputation, or status. This chapter investigates these questions using 
the residential real estate data from Utah. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that agents list more valuable homes when listing for 
affiliates, and that the underlying selection process differs when affiliations are present. I find 
that agents list 14% more expensive homes, 11% larger homes, and are significantly less likely 
to list low quality homes when listing for affiliates. I also find that while experience, previous 
performance, fit, and working for a franchise brokerage all typically increase the odds of being 
chosen by a client to list a home, social affiliations substitute for these variables. Similarly, my 
results suggest that agents are able to list more expensive homes at lower levels of experience 
when listing for social affiliates. This creates a feedback loop where agents are able to gain 
valuable experience listing expensive homes through listing for affiliates. Added experience and 
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reputation then results in more valuable future sales for agents with non-affiliates. Taken 
together these results suggest that in addition to the performance benefits found in chapter 1 from 
transacting with social affiliates, there are also significant selection benefits. Moreover, these 
selection benefits significantly improve agent and firm performance, and imply important entry 
and competition benefits.  
The final chapter investigates the impact of a corporate award program on employee 
motivation, productivity, and plant performance. Awards are a commonly used method to 
incentivize employee behaviors, and today more than 80% of organizations use some type of 
award program (Garr 2012). In contrast to financial incentives, awards reward primarily through 
non-pecuniary methods, such as through social or psychological mechanisms. While awards are 
commonly used in the workplace, surprisingly, we still have only a limited understanding of how 
awards impact employee motivation and productivity, and particularly when they result in 
unanticipated outcomes. Indeed, the current literature primarily focuses on the benefits of 
awards, often viewing awards as cheap subtle motivation that avoids many of the unintended 
consequences of monetary incentives.  
 In this chapter my co-authors and I propose and test a theoretical framework of how 
workplace awards affect employee motivation and performance. Using a proprietary dataset from 
multiple plants of a commercial laundry cleaning company, we investigate how the 
implementation of an attendance award program influenced employee attendance behaviors, as 
well as individual productivity. We find that while the implementation of the award had a 
positive impact on the intended dimension, significantly decreasing tardy and late behaviors by 
plant workers, it also led to a host of unintended consequences. First our results suggest it led to 
employee gaming, where employees used sick days to strategically preserve eligibility. Second, 
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we find that the award only led to positive attendance impacts when employees were eligible for 
the award, and that workers reverted to previous behaviors once ineligible. Finally, and most 
importantly, we find the award led to a significant decrease in daily productivity for employees 
with high pre-award task motivation, likely out of fairness concerns or because of a violation of 
psychological contracts. Overall these findings suggest that the implementation of this program 
led to a 1.4-3.1% decrease in total plant efficiency. Thus, the results of this chapter suggest that 
awards can be far more costly than anticipated, and do not always function as cheap subtle 
motivation. Moreover, our results suggest further research is needed to understand when awards 
are beneficial, and when they may lead to unintended consequences and costs.  
 Taken together, the results of this dissertation suggest that focusing on micro-macro links 
is a fruitful avenue for future research. The key idea underpinning the recent push to investigate 
micro-macro links in strategy is that individual-level factors are responsible for a significant 
portion of the observed variance in organizational performance, and that scholars have perhaps 
over focused on firm or industry-level factors in explaining the variation in organizational 
performance. In each chapter of this dissertation I have found that micro individual-level factors 
dramatically influence macro organizational-level outcomes. Moreover, the results imply that 
managing the micro correctly, either through hiring and staffing policies, or through 
implementing proper policies to manage social factors, are critical to organizational success. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
It’s Who You Know: How Transacting with 
Socially-Affiliated Clients Impacts Expert and 
Firm Performance 
 
CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
While many studies have emphasized the efficiency and cost benefits from transacting within 
social structures, it remains unclear the extent to which experts and firms can create and 
appropriate value when transacting with socially-affiliated clients, especially in the absence of 
repeat transactions. I investigate this question using a novel approach that pairs data from the 
Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Service in Utah with hand-collected data on 
geographically assigned LDS (Mormon) congregation boundaries. By identifying listings for 
which real estate agents and home sellers share a common church congregation affiliation, I 
explore the impact of affiliations on the value listing agents create and appropriate in real estate 
transactions. I find that agents sell comparable homes for 2% more when listing for affiliates 
without significantly increasing time on market, and exert more care and effort on transactions. 
Moreover, agents increase use of dual agency by 17% when listing for affiliates, suggesting 
affiliations provide agents increased flexibility and access to value appropriation tactics. Data on 
exogenous shocks to congregation boundaries suggest all results are driven by current social 
affiliations, and not simply by proximity. Overall my results show firms increase revenues 
significantly as the percentage of listings with affiliated clients increases. This suggests that a 
more nuanced view of social structures is needed that incorporates individual choice, the context, 
and the opportunity space created for value appropriation by information advantages and 
assumed trust. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Professional service industries account for four out of five US jobs and 68% of US GDP 
(USTR, 2014). Often critical to firm success in such industries are employee experts, or 
individuals given discretion over their time and firm resources in order to employ specialized 
skills or knowledge to generate value for the firm. A growing literature has focused on issues 
surrounding expert productivity, choices, and sorting in various service settings, including legal 
services (Carnahan et al. 2010; Campbell et al. 2011), science and engineering (Stern 2004; 
Sauermann & Cohen 2010; Elfenbein et al. 2010), medicine (Huckman & Pisano 2006), financial 
services (Mullainathan et al. 2012), emissions inspections (Gino & Pierce 2010), and enterprise 
sales (Larkin 2014). A key takeaway from this literature is that experts significantly impact 
organizational outcomes, but they often face conflicting incentives that lead to firm inefficiencies 
or problems of moral hazard.  
One important, yet understudied, set of factors that influence expert performance stem 
from social affiliations with clients (Granovetter 1985; 2005; Burt 1997; Bandiera et al. 2005; 
Charness & Rabin 2002; Uzzi & Lancaster 2004). When uncertainty is high, clients often choose 
to transact with socially-affiliated experts in service settings (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). 
However, such affiliations create a paradox for firms: While transacting with affiliates may 
provide trust, influence, and information benefits that allow experts to create additional value in 
the transaction, transacting with affiliates can also create obligations and pressures that limit the 
value experts appropriate in transactions, leading to ambiguous performance outcomes and 
potential moral hazard problems for the firm. Indeed, social affiliates often transact in a business 
setting in order to “get a good deal” or to extract favors (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Thus, an 
open question remains: When an employee expert transacts with a socially-affiliated client, what 
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impact will this have on the value created and appropriated by the expert in the transaction? 
Moreover, how will this impact firm performance?  
In this chapter I argue that in settings where information is incomplete and the shadow of 
the future is weak,1 experts can leverage social affiliations, defined as common memberships 
between experts and clients in formal social institutions, to both create and appropriate additional 
value in transactions. These advantages stem from information and solidarity benefits created by 
the social structure, which lead to greater levels of trust and added flexibility in the transaction. I 
argue that increased value creation and appropriation ultimately result in significant performance 
benefits for experts and firms. I test my argument using data from the residential real estate 
industry in Utah, which allows me to investigate how transacting with affiliated home sellers 
impacts listing agent and brokerage performance through value creation and appropriation. My 
goal is to show that future research and theory must continue to explore not only value creation 
from transacting with social affiliates, but also value appropriation through the opportunity space 
for opportunistic behaviors created by increased levels of information and trust.  
The idea that transacting with socially-affiliated clients could lead to opportunistic 
behavior and increased value appropriation by experts runs counter to extant theory. Theories in 
social network theory (e.g., Coleman 1990; Granovetter 2005), social identity theory and conflict 
theory (e.g., Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989), 
social capital (e.g., Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002), and social preferences (e.g., Bandiera et 
al. 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; Charness & Rabin 2002) all suggest that social affiliations 
generate trust and goodwill in transactions, and consequently lead individuals to behave more 
responsibly and eschew opportunistic behaviors. Consequently, the prescription is that when 
                                                          
1 For an example of work that focuses on transactions and relationships where the shadow of the future is strong, see 
Elfenbein and Zenger, 2013.  
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uncertainty and the risk of opportunism are high, value can be created by transacting with social 
affiliates (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998). This creates a dilemma for experts and firms, 
however, as they seek to generate profit in transactions. In order to generate the trust and 
goodwill that facilitates value creation in uncertain exchanges, experts and firms must be willing 
to accept the obligations and social pressures inherent in the social structure (Granovetter 1985). 
However, accepting these obligations and pressures makes it difficult for them to behave 
opportunistically or use affiliations to appropriate additional value, reducing the flexibility 
afforded by the increased levels of trust. Thus, while transacting with affiliates may lead to 
greater value creation in transactions, it is unclear the extent to which experts and firms can 
exploit social affiliations as a resource to appropriate value and improve firm performance.     
To address this gap, and test my argument, I pair rich transactional data from the Wasatch 
Front Regional Multiple Listing Service (MLS) with data on religious congregation boundaries 
in Utah County, Utah for 1998-2014. In Utah County nearly 90% of the approximately half-
million residents report belonging to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (ASARB 
2010).2 This church geographically assigns each home in the county to a congregation, which 
church members are required to attend to remain in good standing with the church. By collecting 
a panel of congregation boundaries, as well as home addresses for real estate agents and the 
homes being sold, I identify listings for which real estate agents share a common social 
affiliation with the home seller through the formal social structure of the church congregation. I 
then investigate the impact of these affiliations on 1) agent effort and performance on 
transactions, including original listing price, final selling price and time on market, 2) agent 
flexibility and use of tactics to appropriate additional value in transactions, such as dual agency, 
and 3) firm outcomes, in terms of brokerage yearly revenues. 
                                                          
2 This church is also often referred to as the LDS Church of the Mormon Church. 
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I find that agents exert more effort and increase revenues on transactions when listing for 
affiliates. After controlling for home vacancy, agents are 4% more likely to require buying 
agents call them prior to showings and 5% less likely to only use a key box to show the home 
when listing for affiliates. These results imply increased agent care and marketing effort. I also 
find agents list and sell comparable homes for 2% (~$4012) more when listing for affiliates, and 
do so without increasing days on market or decreasing probability of sale. Interestingly, I find 
these performance benefits increase in size with affiliation strength.  
In addition to these value creation benefits, I also find evidence suggesting that listing for 
affiliates provides agents additional flexibility and access to value appropriation tactics. First, I 
find agents are 17% more likely to act as dual agents when listing for affiliates, where they 
represent both the seller and the buyer, and sell homes cheaper and quicker as dual agents when 
listing for affiliates. This result suggests agents leverage social affiliations to engage in such 
deals, which effectively double commission revenues on transactions. Second, I find evidence 
suggesting agents use social affiliations to “break slumps” and relieve associated financial need. 
These results suggest listing for affiliates provides agents increased flexibility, which may be 
used to appropriate additional value in transactions.  
Finally, I find that these benefits of transacting with social affiliates significantly improve 
listing agent and brokerage performance. Agents increase commission revenues both through 
higher sale prices as well as through increased use of dual agency. Similarly, brokerages increase 
yearly revenues as the percentage of sales to affiliates in a year increases: A 10% increase in the 
percentage of yearly sales to affiliates increases brokerage revenues by approximately 2%. 
Multiple robustness checks, including analyses that explore the impact of unexpected changes to 
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congregation boundaries, add support to these findings and suggest all results are driven by 
current social affiliations, and not simply by geographic proximity.  
This study has important managerial implications and contributes to several important 
literatures. First, this study contributes to the literatures on incentives and motivation by showing 
that transacting with social affiliates can significantly increase expert effort, performance, and 
value appropriation, separate from financial incentives. Moreover, these outcomes do not require 
repeat economic transactions or transacting within the shadow of the future. My results also 
suggest that a potential alternative to attracting high-performing experts is to hire experts that can 
transact with social affiliates.  
Second, this study contributes to the literatures on social capital and network ties by 
presenting a more nuanced view of embeddedness that includes both value creation and 
appropriation. A constant criticism of many studies in these literatures is that they overlook 
human agency (Salancik 1995; Coleman 1988; Kilduff & Brass 2010). While actors are regularly 
characterized as being responsive to social pressures and concerns, relatively few studies have 
been able to examine the “engine of action” that drives individual choices in the face of 
numerous motivations (Coleman 1988, p.96). The results of this chapter suggest that experts 
make conscious choices surrounding value appropriation behaviors when transacting with 
affiliates that significantly impact transaction outcomes. Moreover, elements of the context, 
including the strength of affiliation, significantly impact their choices.  
Finally, this study contributes to recent calls to investigate micro-macro links in strategy 
(Felin & Foss 2005; Mollick 2012; Barney & Felin 2013). The results of this chapter suggest that 
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an important firm resource is embedded in the social affiliations of individual employees.3 Such 
affiliations make up an important component of human capital, which is often conceptualized as 
the knowledge, information, skills, abilities, and other resources of individuals (e.g., Ployhart & 
Moliterno 2011; Becker 2002; Wright et al. 2014). Deploying this resource in economic 
transactions can significantly improve firm outcomes. However, firms must understand how the 
context within which the transaction is embedded influences expert choices when dealing with 
social affiliates, and provide complimentary policies that support experts appropriating value for 
the firm. The results of my study also suggest that firms may experience persistent differential 
performance outcomes that are driven by the number and quality of social structures to which 
employee-experts belong. 
1.2 General Theory 
1.2.1 The Organizational Challenge of Experts  
A substantial literature has focused on the difficulty of motivating employees to act in the 
interests of the firm. Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that individuals respond to 
numerous factors, including financial incentives (see Prendergast 1999 for a review), social 
pressures and concerns (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; 2005; Charness & Rabin 2002; Fehr 
& Fischbacher 2002), identity (Ashforth & Mael 1989; Akerlof & Kranton 2005), and intrinsic 
motivations (Deci 1971; Amabile et al. 1994). Multiple interacting incentives make it difficult 
for firms to design effective incentive systems and policies (Kerr 1975), and may lead to 
unexpected outcomes that decrease productivity (e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Gubler et al. 
                                                          
3 Previous work has theorized on the potential benefit of personal relationships and other “intangible assets” to 
individual productivity and firm performance (e.g., Hall 1993). This study adds empirical evidence and additional 
theoretical insight to this literature.  
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2014). Moreover, individuals often face incentives outside the firm, which may lead to problems 
of moral hazard.  
Motivating individuals and avoiding moral hazard problems are particularly difficult 
when individuals are given discretion in their work. Such individuals may include experts (e.g., 
Jacob & Levitt 2003; Pierce & Snyder 2008; Snyder 2010), top management teams (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976), managers (e.g., Frank & Obloj 2014), salespeople (e.g., Larkin 2014), or 
independent contractors (e.g., Baker & Hubbard 2003). When individuals have unique skills or 
knowledge they often must be given discretion over the use of their time and firm resources, 
such as pricing, to generate value for the firm. While allowing discretion potentially creates 
benefits for the firm and allows flexibility by decentralizing organizational decisions (e.g., 
Garicano 2000), discretion can also lead to problems of moral hazard for two reasons. First, 
discretion usually exists with high levels of asymmetric information between experts and the 
firm. This results in increased opportunity for experts to act in ways counter to firm goals, but 
which benefit them personally, at low risk of punishment. Second, experts face incentives from 
both inside and outside the firm. In many cases incentives provided outside the firm, such as 
from social reputation, overwhelm incentives provided inside the firm, creating pressures for 
experts to use discretion for their own benefit to the detriment of the firm. Consequently, when 
experts are given discretion this can lead to moral hazard problems and performance decreases 
for the firm.  
1.2.2 Social Structures and Social Motivations 
A significant motivator of expert behavior stems from social affiliations between experts 
and clients. I define social affiliations as connections arising from common membership in 
formal social institutions that are external to the firm and the economic transaction. Such 
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institutions define the social structure, and may include churches, schools, the military, clubs, 
corporations, alumni groups, or charitable organizations. While social affiliations create potential 
benefits, they also impose obligations and social pressures that may impact expert choices and 
behaviors in ways important to the firm. Granovetter was among the first to articulate the 
importance of understanding the impact of social structures and affiliations on economic 
outcomes. He argued that economics had largely taken an “under socialized” view of individual 
behavior, and overlooked that “actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context”, 
but that “their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of 
social relations" (Granovetter 1985, p.487). Similarly, psychologists have long argued that social 
identities significantly impact individual behaviors, and that these identities are often constructed 
by social affiliations (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; Falk & Zehnder 2007). Consequently, 
scholars have argued and found that social structures significantly influence individuals in both 
positive and negative ways (Ben-Porath 1980; Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Greif 1993; 
Bandiera et al. 2005; Granovetter 2005; Yenkey 2014). 
Social structures may create benefits for experts that lead to value creation in 
transactions. This value creation can be thought of as either increased revenues or reduced costs 
in the transaction. There are two primary mechanisms through which this may occur. First, social 
structures facilitate the flow of quality information between affiliates, resulting in information 
advantages (Coleman 1988; Krackhardt & Hanson 1993; Uzzi 1997; Reagans & McEvily 2003; 
Granovetter 2005). Such information is more fine-grained and allows experts to better anticipate 
customer preferences (Uzzi 1997). Additionally, social structures provide experts increased 
access to private or tacit information. This comes both from increased observation and 
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interaction, which are more frequent in social structures, as well as from increased knowledge 
sharing by clients under weaker concerns of opportunism.  
Second, social structures create solidarity benefits. These benefits arise either from in-
group preferences (e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989) or from 
shared expectations, norms, and obligations between affiliates (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 
1985; Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002). Such benefits result in increased levels of confidence 
and trust from clients, as well as feelings of goodwill and reciprocity. Solidarity benefits are 
supported by a system of reward and punishment in the social structure, which creates pressure 
for members to behave responsibly to maintain reputation and avoid social punishments 
(Granovetter 1985; 2005). These features of the social structure may lead to decreased 
transaction costs (Uzzi & Lancaster 2004; Lancaster & Uzzi 2012), reduced problems from 
opportunism (Ben-Porath 1980; Greif 1993; Uzzi 1999), and improved transaction outcomes that 
increase expert performance.  
In addition to these two mechanisms, transacting with social affiliates may lead experts to 
exert additional effort to improve performance on transactions. First, external pressures from 
shared expectations, norms, and obligations provide incentives for experts to exert more effort 
when transacting with affiliates, regardless of the strength of financial incentives, in order to 
deliver a high quality service and avoid reputational losses or social punishments. Second, 
internal pressures from social preferences (e.g., Charness & Rabin 2002) as well as in-group 
preferences drive experts to increase effort to improve outcomes for affiliates. Third, solidarity 
benefits increase expert confidence that affiliates will deal fairly with them and fulfill their 
obligations, which may lead to improved motivation and additional expert effort. Overall I 
expect increased effort, improved information, and solidarity benefits to lead to value creation in 
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transactions when experts transact with affiliates. Such value creation leads to higher revenues 
and/or lower transaction costs for the transacting parties. This leads to my first hypothesis:  
H1: Experts will create more value in transactions with socially-affiliated clients, 
compared to transactions with non-affiliated clients 
In addition to simply creating value in the transaction, however, social affiliations may 
also influence how value is distributed between experts and clients. Such considerations have 
been underexplored in the literature to date. Yet, understanding this process, including the 
pressures influencing the split, is critical to explaining how transacting with affiliates impacts 
expert and firm performance. The literature has argued that the same obligations and social 
pressures that create trust and allow for value creation in transactions also necessarily tie the 
experts hands (Granovetter 1985). This results in reduced flexibility as it prohibits experts from 
acting in ways that could be perceived as opportunistic without damaging social reputation and 
future levels of trust. Consequently, the implication is that while value may be created by social 
affiliations, it may be difficult for experts to appropriate without harming social reputation.  
The literatures on social preferences and parochialism/in-group preferences provide 
similar predictions, suggesting that experts will be less likely to act opportunistically to 
appropriate value when transacting with affiliates. Social preferences are defined as concern by 
experts for the welfare and monetary outcomes of other parties in the transaction, which lead 
experts to take actions that decrease their own monetary gains but increase welfare for other 
parties. Social preferences may include many types of preferences including pure altruism 
(Andreoni & Miller 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels 2000), 
or reciprocal fairness (Fehr & Fischbacher 2002). Social preferences have been shown to be 
activated by social relationships (Bandiera et al. 2005; Bandiera et al. 2009), especially when 
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there is potential for inequity in monetary outcomes (Charness & Rabin 2002; Fehr & Schmidt 
1999; Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). Relatedly, psychologists have argued and found that 
individuals tend to act in ways that benefit in-group members (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 
1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Falk & Zehnder 2007). 
While the above literatures suggest social structures limit expert flexibility and 
opportunistic behaviors in transactions, paradoxically social structures may also provide experts 
increased flexibility and access to value appropriation tactics because of information benefits and 
the assumed trust and goodwill from clients. Granovetter, for instance, noted that increased trust 
“presents, by its very existence, enhanced opportunity for malfeasance” (1985, p.491). A related 
literature in criminology (e.g., NASAA 2001; Fairfax 2001) as well as more recent work in 
management (Yenkey 2014) have found evidence supporting this claim, showing that social 
similarity and affiliations lead individuals to exercise less vigilance when dealing with social 
connections, which may lead to increased victimization by socially-connected criminals. While 
Granovetter and these studies specifically reference unethical or criminal behaviors, the logic 
applies to opportunistic behaviors. Thus, while pressures exist for experts to avoid opportunistic 
tactics that can be used to appropriate additional value in transactions when transacting with 
affiliates, the opportunity space for opportunistic behaviors increases with information and trust.  
A key element underlying expert value appropriation from affiliates is individual choice. 
A consistent criticism of work in social capital and social networks is that these studies often 
overlook human agency (Salancik 1995; Coleman 1988; Kilduff & Brass 2010). For instance, 
Coleman argued that while actors are often characterized as being “shaped by the environment… 
there are no internal springs of action that give the actor purpose or direction” (Coleman 1988, 
p.96). Consequently, while many studies have emphasized that social structures impose social 
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pressures on individuals, few studies have focused on how individuals respond to such pressures. 
Yet, a robust literature in economics highlights that individuals are self-interested, and respond 
to incentives (see Prendergast 1999 for a review). Moreover, humans have proven remarkably 
adept in gaming incentive schemes (e.g., Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991). Consequently, when 
given the opportunity to do so, I expect that agents will sometimes leverage social affiliations to 
appropriate additional value in transactions, especially when the threat of punishment is low.  
In settings where information is incomplete, and the shadow of the future is weak, I argue 
that experts will leverage social affiliations for their own benefit and purposes. Incomplete 
information reduces the risk of social punishments, as performance evaluation becomes more 
difficult and costly. Similarly, when the shadow of the future is weak the potential harm to 
reputation is dramatically reduced. I expect that under such conditions experts will leverage the 
flexibility and information benefits afforded by the social structure to engage in tactics that can 
be used to appropriate additional value. Moreover, I expect that strong financial incentives will 
drive experts to engage in such behaviors. It is important to note that such appropriation 
behaviors need not necessarily result in inferior outcomes overall for clients, as appropriation 
may also flow from other parties in the transaction. Additionally, flexibility may allow experts to 
increase their use of tactics that may otherwise be unavailable because of inherent conflicts of 
interest, but which do not necessarily result in negative outcomes for clients. Finally, it is 
important to note that even if experts appropriate additional value from affiliated clients, clients 
may still be strictly better off transacting with affiliated experts compared to non-affiliated 
experts due to the value that is created by social affiliations in the transaction. My second 
hypothesis now follows: 
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H2: Experts will appropriate more value in transactions with socially-affiliated clients, 
compared to transactions with non-affiliated clients 
Finally, I expect that firms will improve performance, in terms of accounting profits, as 
the percentage of deals with social affiliates increases. This stems both from increased value 
creation in transactions when employee-experts transact with affiliates, as well as from increased 
value appropriation. While this result follows directly from the previous two hypotheses, the fact 
that experts exert differential levels of effort on transactions clouds the outcome, as experts only 
have a fixed amount of time and energy in a given day. Increased effort expended on affiliate 
transactions could thus result in experts exerting less effort on non-affiliate transactions, 
resulting in fewer overall transactions, lower performance on non-affiliated transactions, and 
consequently lower overall performance for the firm. However, because experts have increased 
flexibility when transacting with affiliates I expect them to manage transactions to avoid such 
outcomes. My final hypothesis now follows: 
H3: Ceteris Paribus, firms will improve performance as the percentage of total 
transactions between employee-experts and socially-affiliated clients increases 
Figure 1.1 provides a visual overview of the preceding three hypotheses, including the primary 
mechanisms theorized to be driving the results. 
1.3 Empirical Setting 
The setting for this study is the residential real estate industry, an economically 
significant industry in the United States that employs over 1 million workers and is roughly 
equal in size to the brand name pharmaceutical industry, the hotel and motels industry, and the 
single-location full service restaurants industry (IBISWorld 2014). Estimated revenues for real 
 22 
 
estate in the US were about $115 billion in 2013, down from $166 billion in 2005 (IBISWorld 
2014). Real estate is a labor-intensive industry where brokerages (firms) and real estate agents 
assist clients in finding, purchasing, or selling homes or other properties.  
At the core of the real estate industry is the real estate transaction, where listing agents 
assist sellers in selling a home and buyer agents assist buyers in finding and purchasing a home. 
Figure A1.1 (see Appendix) details the transaction for listing agents, which are the focus of this 
study. Sellers hire listing agents to assist them in the process of selling their home, including 
devising a selling strategy, listing the home on relevant databases, marketing the home and 
finding potential buyers, staging and managing home showings, negotiating offers, and filling 
out necessary contracts and paperwork to close the deal. For their services listing agents receive 
a fixed commission, typically 6% of the home selling price, which is then generally split in half 
with the buyer’s agent. Listing agents also split their commission with their sponsoring 
brokerage. Such broker-agent splits can range from a 50/50 split to as high as a 100/0 split where 
agents pay a fixed desk fee, but retain the full value of their commissions.4 When working for a 
franchised brokerage, agents may also pay a portion of their commission directly to the franchise 
owner as a franchise fee. Commission splits vary both between and within brokerages.  
To sell real estate in Utah agents and brokerages must be licensed by the state. To do 
business and employ agents, each brokerage must have a broker that is licensed with the state 
and that oversees the work of employed agents. Often brokers choose to franchise a national 
company (e.g., RE/MAX, Prudential, etc.) to take advantage of their national brand and other 
resources. Brokers may alternatively choose to form an independent brokerage and hire agents in 
an effort to gain market share in a regional or local market. Brokers may also choose to be self-
                                                          
4 Recently this traditional model has been challenged by the entrance of “discount brokerages.” These brokerages 
typically charge a flat fee for their services, regardless of the home price, but provide more limited services.  
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employed, perhaps working primarily out of their home or even remotely from their automobile. 
Agents are required to have a sponsoring brokerage in order to engage in any deals, unless they 
become brokers themselves. In Utah County, Utah there are approximately 1500 brokerages and 
6450 agents that sell at least one home during my data sample. Forty-three percent of listings are 
listed by brokerages, 49% by independents, and 8% by self-employed brokers.  
Brokerages in the real estate industry compete primarily on labor. Agents are typically 
hired as independent contractors and negotiate desk fees and commission splits based on 
experience and previous performance. Consequently, there is low cost to firms to hiring or firing 
agents, although attracting and retaining high quality agents is critical to firm performance. 
Brokerages use many different models to attract and retain quality agents. Some provide agents 
with significant resources, such as access to marketing resources, training programs, office 
space, office supplies (e.g., copier, telephone, voicemail), or lead generation tools. The cost of 
providing these resources is covered by fixed desk fees and smaller commission splits. Other 
brokerages furnish few resources but provide larger commission splits. Overall, financial 
incentives are relatively aligned between brokerages and listing agents, resulting in few problems 
of moral hazard from financial incentives. 
A primary tool brokers and agents use to list homes in Utah is the Multiple Listing 
Service (MLS), which is a database of property information operated by the Wasatch Front 
Regional Multiple Listing Service (WFRMLS). This database includes a wealth of information 
on sold properties, as well as information on current listings. Much of the information collected 
in this database, including final sold price, is not shared with government agencies or third party 
companies, such as Zillow. To gain access to and use the MLS, agents and brokers must pay a 
subscription fee and be members of the Utah Board of Realtors. This association prohibits 
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members from sharing confidential information about homes, historic sales, and other agents, 
and has strict rules surrounding access to the MLS, including the purposes for which it may be 
used. Agents, for instance, are expressly restricted from sharing their login and password with 
anyone. Consequently, access to the MLS provides brokerages and agents significant 
information advantages over clients.   
1.3.1 Formal Social Structure in Utah: LDS Congregation Boundaries 
In this chapter I focus on the real estate market in Utah County, Utah to take advantage of 
a setting where a single formal social institution significantly determines the social structure in 
which real estate transactions are embedded. This formal social institution is the LDS (Mormon) 
Church. Of the 516,564 Utah County residents (114,350 families/148,350 housing units) 
reported in the 2010 US Census (American FactFinder 2010), approximately 89% report being 
adherents to the LDS Church (ASARB 2010). Church members are assigned to congregations, 
called “wards”, with whom they attend church weekly. A collection of geographically proximate 
wards are assigned to a larger unit, called a “stake”, where members meet together less 
frequently, but often attend large conferences or training events. As of March 2014 there were 
147 stakes in Utah County and 961 wards. Thus, the average ward has approximately 450 
members, 118 families, and 154 housing units. The average stake has over 3000 members in 7 
wards, 826 families, and 1081 housing units.  
Each house in Utah County is assigned to an LDS ward and stake based on its geographic 
location. With few exceptions, homes are assigned to a single ward and a single stake where 
members are required to attend congregation services to remain in good standing with the 
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church.5 Indeed, to enter LDS temples, which represent a significant part of LDS church worship 
(Mormon.org 2014), it is required that members regularly attend the ward to which they are 
assigned. In rare instances a member will not attend the ward or stake to which they are assigned, 
such as if they are an interpreter for the deaf and are needed in a neighboring stake, but 
permission to do so requires consent from the leadership of the church. Discussions with church 
leaders indicated that such approval is rare.  
Ward and stake boundaries are comprised of a set of houses in a geographic area. Figure 
1.2 shows the boundaries for a representative stake in Utah County with seven wards. Because of 
the high density of LDS church members in Utah County, ward boundaries are quite small and 
do not line up with significant neighborhood boundaries. For instance, the average stake in 
Orem, Utah covers less than 1 square mile of land, and each stake contains on average seven 
wards. Consequently, it is quite common that single neighborhoods will be shared between 2-3 
wards, and perhaps even bridge stake boundaries. Thus, most homeowners in Utah County have 
many geographically proximate neighbors with similar homes and socio-demographic 
backgrounds, but that are members of different wards or stakes. This feature of the setting is 
important to my empirical identification strategy.  
Friendships and social interactions in Utah are directly influenced by congregation 
boundaries. Table 1.1 contains a list of the typical weekly and monthly activities church 
members engage in at the ward and stake levels. Given the large number of church events, 
church members often feel there is little time remaining to spend on maintaining friendships 
                                                          
5 There are some cases where homes are assigned to multiple wards. These include church wards designed for single 
individuals only (“singles wards”), wards for newly married couples who are students (“student married wards”), 
and wards that provide services for a specific ethnic group (e.g., “Spanish wards” or “Tongan wards”).  
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outside congregation boundaries.6 In addition to these events, the LDS Church employs a lay 
ministry, and each member is given a responsibility in the congregation called a “calling.” 
Examples of callings include Bishop, secretary to the Bishop, ward financial clerk, youth 
adviser, nursery teacher, sports director, and Scoutmaster. These callings often require a 
significant amount of time and facilitate high levels of interactions between individuals at the 
ward and stake levels. For instance, Scoutmasters and youth advisers take youth on a monthly 
overnight campout and hold weekly activities outside of church that are typically an hour and a 
half long. Moreover, youth leaders often frequently visit parents to discuss youth progress in 
Scouting or other programs. Bishops or Stake Presidents are responsible for giving callings, 
which may change at any time, and church members have limited input into the callings they 
receive.  
The significance of congregation boundaries on social interactions is most keenly 
observed when ward or stake boundaries change. Often boundaries are changed unexpectedly by 
church leaders due to congregation growth or to rebalance units. When boundaries shift it is quite 
common for members to lament the “loss” of friendships, as changes may put ward or stake 
members in different church units. While these individuals have not changed their geographic 
location, the limited time church members have to maintain relationships outside their 
congregation significantly affects future interactions. My informal discussions with church 
members revealed that members interact on a social level with other members outside their ward 
and stake infrequently. One church member, for instance, stated that he barely knew his 
neighbors across the street, as the neighbors attend a different stake. Another noted that their 
                                                          
6 The observations about church members in this section are based on informal discussions between the author and 
church members. 
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neighbor three doors down “might as well be in another universe,” as they are in a different 
stake. 
Overall, this setting has important benefits that make it suitable for addressing my 
research questions. First, the church social structure in Utah is the primary driver of social 
interactions and affiliations between individuals, and congregation boundaries are determined by 
geographic assignment that may change unexpectedly over time. This feature of the setting 
allows me to use home addresses for homes and agents to identify social affiliations. While still 
not completely random, using geographic boundaries to identify affiliations helps alleviate 
empirical concerns that stem from the tendency of individuals to affiliate with similar others 
(Mouw 2006). Second, strength of affiliation varies between wards and stakes, allowing me to 
investigate the impact of affiliation strength on transaction outcomes. Third, the real estate 
industry is characterized by agent discretion and incomplete information, which potentially 
creates tension when agents list for affiliates as they face financial incentives to leverage social 
affiliations for their own benefit. Finally, agent productivity on transactions is observed over 
time, and the link between agent choices, agent productivity, and firm performance is clear.  
1.4 Setting-Specific Predictions from the General Hypotheses 
In this section I lay out setting-specific predictions. These predictions are derived from 
the general hypotheses presented earlier, and explore the impact of a geographically-assigned 
social affiliation between listing agents and home sellers, through the formal social structure of 
the LDS Church, on agent performance, effort, flexibility, and the value appropriation tactics 
they employ. A summary of the setting-specific predictions and their corresponding hypotheses 
are found in Figure 1.3.  
1.4.1 Listing Agent Effort and Performance 
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The first hypothesis argues that experts will create more value in transactions when 
transacting with affiliates, compared to non-affiliates. This stems both from increased effort as 
well as from information and solidarity benefits from the social structure. In this setting, I expect 
that listing agents will increase care and effort on transactions when listing for affiliates through 
marketing. When listing a home agents can leave instructions for buyer agents on the procedure 
for showing a home. This may include instructions for how to access the home directly through a 
key box or electronic keypad, or instructions for how to schedule an appointment. If the home is 
vacant, agents often place a key box and insert the key box code into the confidential comments 
associated with the listing. While this allows buyer agents to easily show the home, it does not 
permit listing agents to actively manage and follow up on showings. Alternatively, agents may 
require buyer agents call them to schedule an appointment and receive the key or code. This 
allows agents more control over showings and provides opportunities for agents to receive 
valuable feedback about the showing, such as reactions to the list price or characteristics of the 
home that did or did not show well. If the home is not vacant, appointments usually must be 
made. In these cases listing agents may instruct buyers to call the owner directly to set an 
appointment or to call the listing agent. When listing agents request buyers call them directly, 
they are able to manage showings and ensure that the home is ready to be shown. Thus, I expect 
that listing agents increase marketing efforts and care by requesting buyer agents call them prior 
to showings when listing for affiliates.  
In addition to exerting more effort marketing the home, I expect agents will create value 
in transactions when listing for affiliates by selling homes at higher prices. Sellers have strong 
incentives to maximize home sale price. Brokerages and agents similarly desire to maximize 
selling prices to increase commission, although they also have incentives to underprice homes to 
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quickly turn inventory (e.g., Levitt & Syverson 2008; Rutherford et al. 2005). When listing for 
affiliates agents have increased access to private or tacit knowledge about the home, the client, 
and the neighborhood that allows them to better market and show the home, ultimately resulting 
in higher selling prices. Higher levels of effort and increased motivation from solidarity factors 
similarly lead to higher prices, as agents increase care and active management of showings when 
listing for affiliates. Finally, solidarity factors lead agents to advise sellers to not accept “low-
ball” offers, resulting in higher overall selling prices, and may result in sellers being more 
receptive to agent “coaching.” Consequently, I expect listing agents to list and sell comparable 
homes at higher prices when listing for affiliates.  
In addition to home selling price, however, time on market is also important as it 
influences costs. There is typically a positive correlation between time on market and the sold 
price premium paid for a home. If a home is priced high this typically increases time on market, 
as there are fewer potential buyers willing to pay the high price. Moreover, in order for sellers to 
receive a high price listing agents and sellers may need patience to avoid accepting early “low-
ball” offers. While listing for affiliates may consequently result in longer times on market if 
listing agents are listing and selling comparable homes at higher prices, increased agent effort, 
solidarity benefits, and information advantages offset this increase. Thus, the overall impact of 
transacting with affiliates on time on market is ambiguous, although I expect that these forces 
will offset each other, resulting in no significant difference on average in time on market, despite 
higher home selling prices.  
 Finally, I expect agents will be more likely to ultimately sell the home. Sellers and listing 
agents typically enter into a listing agreement that gives the agent the right to a commission if the 
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home sells during a specific time period.7 Interviews with agents revealed that the typical listing 
agreement in Utah lasts for 180 days. Listing agreements protect agent marketing investments 
and provide agents a reasonable time period to sell the home. Many factors influence the 
probability of home sale, including original list price, seller willingness to reduce price over 
time, characteristics of the home, agent knowledge, agent access to buyers, and agent effort. 
When listing for affiliates, agents have greater access to quality information, including tacit and 
private information, better access to potential buyers via the social structure, and exert more care 
and effort. In addition, decreased concerns of opportunism allow agents to better “coach” sellers 
on selling strategies and which offers to accept. Thus, I expect that these benefits will result in 
increased probability of home sale when agents list for affiliates, again reducing costs for agents 
and the brokerage. 
1.4.2 Tactics to Appropriate Value in Transactions  
 The second hypothesis argues that experts will appropriate more value when transacting 
with affiliates. This stems from increased flexibility, which allows agents to engage in additional 
tactics to appropriate value. In this setting one tactic often used to appropriate value is to engage 
in dual agency, where listing agents represent both the home seller and the home buyer.8 Dual 
agency allows firms and agents to capture both sides of the commission in a transaction, and thus 
significantly increases firm revenues and agent take-home pay. While dual agency may create 
efficiencies that benefit both the client and agent through information and matching benefits 
                                                          
7 There are two major types of listing contracts. “Exclusive Agent” listing agreements require sellers to pay a 
commission on the property if the property is sold through the efforts of any real estate broker. However, the seller 
is not obligated to pay the commission if the property is sold solely through the efforts of the seller. The “Exclusive 
Right to Sell” listing agreement requires the seller to pay a commission regardless of whose efforts resulted in a sale. 
These agreements may stipulate particular individuals that should the property be sold to them the agent is not 
required to pay the commission. 
8 Dual agency is also referred to as “limited agency.” These situations arise when a single agent or a single 
brokerage represent both the buyer and the seller. In this paper I focus on a single agent representing both the buyer 
and the seller.  
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(e.g., Brastow & Waller 2013),9 agents are limited in their ability to engage in this practice 
because of the significant potential for conflicts of interest. In a typical real estate transaction 
listing agents have fiduciary responsibility to sellers, which are seeking to maximize sold price, 
and buyer agents have fiduciary responsibility to buyers, which are seeking to minimize sold 
price. When agents represent both parties it becomes impossible for them to act with fiduciary 
responsibility to both parties. Moreover, dual agency creates incentives for agents to either sell 
homes at too high a price, because they are compensated by sellers based on the home’s sale 
price, or to sell homes too quickly and cheaply to create dual agency deals with existing buyers. 
Consequently, many sellers and buyers refuse to allow dual agency, and most states have passed 
laws restricting dual agency, or requiring agents to disclose dual agency to each party in writing 
prior to the deal.  
When listing for social affiliates I expect that solidarity and information benefits will 
provide agents increased opportunity to engage in dual agency deals. Solidarity benefits result in 
increased trust and lessened concerns of opportunism from home sellers. Increased trust results 
in clients accepting advice from listing agents more, such as advice on how to price the home, 
when to lower price, and which offers to accept. Such solidarity benefits aid agents in creating 
successful dual agency deals. Information advantages also provide agents increased opportunity 
to engage in dual agency. When listing for affiliates agents have increased access to private and 
tacit knowledge about the reservation prices of sellers and buyers, their financial situation, and 
their overall goals. Such knowledge allows them to structure the transaction to increase the 
                                                          
9 Dual agency may create conflicts of interest, but it does not always lead to adverse outcomes for sellers. It may 
also be used for its informational/matching benefits. For instance, if a listing agent procures a new listing, but 
already has an existing client-buyer searching for that type of home, dual agency may be used to quickly match 
sellers and buyers, resulting in benefits for both parties. In such cases agents use existing information about clients 
to improve matches.  
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probability that a dual agency deal occurs. It is important to note that while such factors may lead 
to an increase in dual agency deals for agents, dual agency does not necessarily result in negative 
outcomes for the seller.  
Finally, when agents transact with affiliates I expect that increased flexibility will also 
allow them to influence transaction outcomes in their favor. In this setting I investigate the extent 
to which agents reduce selling prices of affiliate homes to “break slumps” and relieve financial 
need. Financial need, measured as the number of days since the agent’s last listing went under 
contract, creates pressure for agents to earn payment from commission. This pressure pushes 
agents to use tactics that increase odds of a sale, and particularly of a quick sale. Such tactics 
may include convincing sellers to reduce home list price to attract more buyers, or convincing 
sellers to accept low offers instead of waiting for higher offers. I expect that agents can increase 
the use of such strategies because of information and solidarity benefits associated with social 
structures.  
1.4.3 Impact on Firm Performance 
 My final hypothesis argues that, ceteris paribus, firm performance will increase with the 
percentage of sales for affiliates. In this setting brokerage revenues, calculated as the total dollar 
amount of real estate sales, are the primary metric to evaluate performance. However, dual 
agency deals also significantly increase brokerage revenues. I measure overall brokerage 
performance as the dollar amount of real estate sold in a given year, with dual agency 
transactions counting as double the final sale price for that transaction. I calculate yearly 
brokerage revenues for each brokerage, and expect revenues to increase with the percentage of 
total transactions listed for affiliates in a given year. A summary of the above predictions are 
contained in Figure 1.3. 
 33 
 
1.5 DATA 
 The data for this study originate from numerous sources. The core dataset comes from the 
Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Services (WFRMLS) in Utah, and contains data on all 
MLS-listed residential properties in Utah County from 1995-2014. WFRMLS is the sole multiple 
listing service operating in Utah County, and is the largest MLS in the state. Its database contains 
data on more than 1 million real estate transactions since 1995. Most agents who list homes for 
sale in Utah County rely on this service, and at any given time there are usually around 3,000 
active listings in Utah County. Listing in the WFRMLS is only done by broker-subscribers, or by 
agents or assistants working for the broker-subscriber. Listings are required to be entered into the 
MLS within 5 days of the listing agreement, and information on sold houses, including sold 
price, commission amounts, loan terms, sale date, and seller concessions, is required to be 
updated within 10 days of closing (WFRMLS Policies, 2014). WFRMLS has many safeguards in 
place that require listing agents to enter complete and accurate information, and failure of agents 
to do their due diligence can result in fines and penalties.  
 The MLS data include transaction-level data on all MLS-listed transactions entered into 
by real estate agents and brokerages in Utah County. Each listing includes data on housing 
characteristics (e.g., street address, square footage, number of bedrooms, age of house, etc.), 
important dates (e.g., listing date, sold date, under contract date, listing expiration date, etc.), 
relevant brokerage and agent identities (listing agent, buying agent, and brokerage identities), 
price information (e.g., original listing price, final listing price, final sales price, amount of seller 
concessions, etc.), owner information (e.g., agent-owned, government-owned, bank-owned, etc.), 
show instructions, listing contract terms (e.g., commission offered, type of listing agreement, 
short sale indicator, etc.), and sold terms (e.g., type of loan, etc.). Table 1.3 details the primary 
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variables used in my analyses, as well as their summary statistics. The data also include public 
and confidential comments on each listing that describe the condition of the property and specific 
show instructions. Following Levitt and Syverson (2008), I analyze the text from the public 
comments to construct 81 dummy variables that control for house quality and differences 
unobserved in the other MLS variables. Table A1.1 (appendix) presents the list of these variables 
as well as their summary statistics.  
In addition to the MLS data, I also collected real estate-related data from a few other 
sources. First, I purchased data from the Utah Division of Real Estate. These data contain agent 
license information, home addresses, and current brokerage affiliations. Second, I downloaded 
information on each property from the County Assessor and Recorders offices. Finally, I added 
in geographic data by running each property address through the Census Bureau’s geocoding 
service.10 This allowed me to record longitude and latitude for many properties in my dataset, as 
well as census block and tract identifiers.  
1.5.1 LDS Church Boundary Data 
 LDS congregation boundary data were obtained for every property in Utah County at two 
points in time. This was done by running each property address through the LDS Church’s online 
“Meetinghouse Locator.”11 The Meetinghouse Locator returns the currently assigned ward and 
stake for any address in the world. I ran each home found in Utah County’s Assessor records 
through the locator in 2014 to determine the current ward/stake assignment. I then paired these 
data with 2008 data that were collected using the same procedure. These two snapshots allow me 
to identify church ward and stake boundaries for the majority of homes in Utah County for 2007-
2014. I then link these data with hand-collected dates from various online sources on stake 
                                                          
10 The geocoder can be found at http://geocoding.geo.census.gov/geocoder 
11 The meetinghouse locator can be found on the church’s website: www.lds.org. 
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creations and boundary changes. This procedure allows me to construct a panel of congregation 
boundaries for 1998-2014, including boundary changes, for many houses in my sample.  
 Real estate agent ward and stake boundaries are similarly identified by inputting agent 
home addresses into the Meetinghouse Locator.12 Each agent is required to provide a mailing 
address in order to be licensed in the state of Utah. When address changes occur, agents must 
update their address with the state within 14 days to avoid penalties. Most agents chose to 
provide a home address, although some agents provided office addresses. To minimize problems 
of agents reporting office addresses, I excluded agent addresses from my analysis that include 
names of major roads that are zoned for commercial purposes (e.g., State Street, Main Street, 
Center Street), or that reference a suite number. However, including these addresses does not 
significantly change my results.  
1.5.2 Data Construction and Cleaning Process 
I follow other major studies in cleaning and preparing the data for analysis. First, I 
restrict my analysis by dropping the top and bottom 1% of observations from my sample in terms 
of original list price.13 This removes homes that originally listed for more than $1,149,000 or for 
less than $60,000. I also restrict my analysis to homes that were on the market for less than 2 
years, and more than 0 days. This dropped approximately 1152 observations from my sample. 
Restricting my data in these ways removes outliers, such as luxury homes or uncommon short 
sales that are difficult to sale, and allows me to investigate the impact of social structure on 
common real estate transactions. Additionally, I drop from my analysis homes that sold for 
greater than 1.5X the original or final list price of the home as well as homes that sold for less 
than a quarter of the original or final list price, as these appeared to be errors. This dropped 63 
                                                          
12 These address lists were purchased from the Utah Division of Real Estate.  
13 Results are similar when dropping the top and bottom 1% of sold price. 
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observations from my sample. Including these observations does not significantly impact my 
results. Finally, following Levitt and Syverson (2008) I also dropped houses that reported the 
total number of bedrooms as zero, the total number of bathrooms as zero, or the total number of 
kitchens as zero. This dropped a total of 5577 observations from my sample. This cleaning 
procedure left me with a total of 82,739 home listings and 40,838 sold listings with social 
affiliation information.  
To construct the variable “predicted sold price to original list price”, which is used as 
either a control or dependent variable depending on the specification, I estimated sold price for 
each home in the sample by regressing the log of sold price on home observables, quality 
controls, transaction controls (short sale dummy and percentage of sold concessions), time 
controls (sold year and month dummies, as well as their interactions), and geographic controls. 
The R2 value on this regression was 0.87. I then predicted the selling price for each home using 
the estimates from this regression, and divided this predicted selling price by the original list 
price of the home. Final values were winsorized to 2.58 standard deviations above and below the 
mean (top and bottom one half of one percent). This variable measures the degree to which a 
home is overpriced at first time of listing. A value of 1 implies that the original list price is equal 
to the predicted sold price, and values above 1 indicate overpricing. A similar variable, “sold 
price to original list price”, was constructed by dividing the final actual sale price of the home by 
the original list price. Final values of this variable were winsorized following the same method as 
the previous variable. This variable measures the extent to which a home sells for close to the 
original list price.  
The limitations of these data are well known, and laid out in papers that have investigated 
the real estate industry. First, the information in the MLS is entered by real estate agents, and 
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there is not an independent verification system. While the MLS does actively monitor listings to 
ensure that information is complete, agents may make mistakes or enter estimates for some 
values, such as square footage. Second, to match up my datasets I had to rely on home addresses 
or tax ID numbers for each home. In some cases tax ID numbers were not included in the listing, 
and addresses did not match up between datasets, reducing my sample size. Finally, while these 
data do include substantial information about each home, there are still home characteristics that 
are unobserved. While this could lead to concerns about omitted variable bias, the high R2 on my 
hedonic regression (R2=0.87) suggests this is not a significant problem.  
There are also important limitations with the congregation boundary data. First, I do not 
observe when agents move their residence. The license data only include the agent’s current 
address, or the address they last listed before their license expired. Consequently, if agents move 
I may be incorrectly specifying congregation boundaries for that agent over time. Second, the 
congregation boundary data only include two snapshots of boundaries (one in 2008 and the other 
in 2014) for homes in Utah County, and not a panel of boundary changes. These two snapshots, 
in conjunction with stake boundary change dates gathered online, allow me to identify 
congregation boundaries and boundary changes for many homes in the sample. However, if 
multiple stake changes occurred between 2008 and 2014 it is impossible to reliably track 
congregation boundaries. Consequently, boundaries for these observations had to be coded as 
missing. Similarly, I am unable to reliably identify congregation boundaries beyond the first 
stake split event or the first stake creation event for each stake preceding 2008. Finally, I am 
unable to identify which agents and home sellers are church members in my sample. While 90% 
of the population in Utah County report being a member of the church (ASARB 2010), my data 
do not include data on church membership. 
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1.5.3 Interview Data 
In addition to collecting archival data, I carried out interviews with real estate agents and 
brokers in Utah. These interviews were informal in nature, and asked brokers and agents about 
their experiences selling real estate in Utah. During my interviews agents expressed feelings that, 
in general, they were able to be more productive when listing for congregation members. One 
agent attributed this to increased levels of trust. He noted that the “expectation is everyone is 
telling the truth, because [we are] all in the same ward. You don’t think, ‘Is this guy pulling my 
leg?’ You don’t get people always saying, ‘can you verify that?’” Similarly, another agent shared 
that information about the home and the financial situation of the seller is an important benefit to 
listing for affiliates. He stated, for instance, that when listing for affiliates it is easier to assess if 
individuals are upside down in their house, and to know what price sellers need to sell their home 
for.  
My interviews also uncovered evidence of external and internal social pressures 
experienced by agents when listing for social affiliates. One agent stated that he felt “more 
pressure to get the listing right” when working for church members in the ward or stake. He 
remarked that, “You want to make sure you sell the home for the highest possible value in the 
neighborhood, as this affects the social community, and you want to do it right.” He went on to 
express his frustration when one client in his ward accepted a low-ball offer, against his advice. 
He thought, “Oh crap, what do I do now? What will people think about this?” An agent also 
noted that “you really want to do a really good job for someone in your ward. Maybe less so than 
your best friend, or your mom, but much more than for the normal client.” He went on to 
emphasize the difference in social pressure experienced when listing for social affiliates: “the 
relationship is different though than when you list for a family member or your mom. [Your 
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mom or a family member] won’t blame you [if something doesn’t go well with the transaction] 
because they know you did your best. It won’t be awkward, and they will still love you.” He 
argued that this isn’t the case for congregation members, and that there can be significant 
pressure because of the social structure.  
1.6 Empirical Model 
 To investigate the impact of congregation boundaries on real estate performance 
outcomes, I use the following primary specification: 
Yih = αi + β1*Xh + β2*Affiliationih + εih 
where Yih is the dependent variable, such as the log of sold price, for listing agent i selling house 
h while employed in brokerage j. Xh represents a vector of house characteristics, transaction 
characteristics, quality controls (constructed using text analysis), time controls,14 and geographic 
controls. Geographical controls include zip code dummies, which control for heterogeneity in 
areas and the impact of distance between agents and listed homes.15 αi are listing agent fixed 
effects, and I include brokerage dummies to control for brokerage effects. “Affiliation” is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the home is listed in the same ward or stake as the 
listing agent’s home address, 0 otherwise, and εih is the error term. The unit of analysis is the 
agent/listing for the agent-level hypotheses and the brokerage/year for the firm performance 
hypothesis. Table 1.3 provides a list of all dependent, independent, and control variables used in 
my analyses, including their descriptive statistics. All regressions were estimated using ordinary 
                                                          
14 I use time fixed effects for list dates in instances where listing dates should influence outcomes, such as original 
list price and days on market, and fixed effects for sold dates in instances where sold dates should influence 
outcomes, such as for sold price, dual agency, and probability of default. Table notes specify which time controls are 
used in each model. 
15 The reported results use zip code dummies as geographic fixed effects. Alternative specifications using a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if an agent and home seller share a same zip code provide qualitatively similar 
results. 
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least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered at the listing agent level. Additional 
analyses are run using Cox hazard and logit models. For discrete choice models I present results 
from OLS as they avoid bias from the incidental parameters problem (Neyman & Scott 1948). 
However, logistic regression results for each specification provide similar results.  
1.7 Results 
1.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide a list of the variables used in my analyses, as well as the basic 
descriptive statistics for each variable. Table 1.2 lists the dependent and independent variables, 
and Table 1.3 the control variables. In my sample, the typical home sells for $200,579 and stays 
on the market 110 days. It is originally listed at a 5% price premium, based on the predicted sold 
price estimated using home observables, and sells for 96% of the original list price. The average 
home has 3.8 bedrooms, 2.5 bathrooms, and 2444 square feet. Approximately 9% of homes sold 
in Utah County are listed by agents that live in the same ward or stake as the home, and an 
additional 1 % are sold by agents that previously shared a ward or stake with the home. The 
average church ward has less than one agent actively listing homes, and approximately 7.5 
homes are sold in a ward every year. Agents use a key box as the only method of marketing a 
home 34% of the time, and request buyer agents call to schedule an appointment 56% of the 
time. Listing agents serve as dual agents approximately 25% of the time. Figure 1.4 shows the 
distribution of final sold price divided by the predicted sold price. This figure suggests agents 
sell homes at higher prices, compared to the home’s predicted selling price, when listing for 
affiliates. 
1.7.2 Listing Agent Effort and Performance 
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The first hypothesis argues that listing agents create more value in transactions when 
listing for affiliates. The results for this hypotheses are presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. Table 1.4 
investigates how agent marketing efforts change when listing for affiliates. Column 1 explores 
the use of a key box. I find that agents are 5% less likely (from a base rate of 34%) to use a key 
box as the only method for showing the home when listing for affiliates. Additionally, the results 
in column 2 show that listing agents are significantly more likely to request buyers’ agents call 
them to set an appointment for showings. After controlling for home vacancy and original list 
price, listing agents request a call nearly 4% more often (from a base rate of 56%) when listing 
for affiliates. Results using seemingly unrelated regressions or seemingly unrelated bivariate 
probit regressions provide similar results. This suggests agents exert greater care and effort when 
listing for affiliates.  
 Table 1.5 presents results for sale price, time on market, and probability of sale when 
listing for affiliates. The models in Panel A investigate the change in home list and sale price. 
Because these models include agent fixed effects, home characteristics, transaction controls, and 
quality controls, the results from these analyses should be interpreted as the within-agent change 
in selling prices of comparable homes when listing for affiliates. Overall I find that agents sell 
homes for significantly more when listing for affiliates. Models 1 and 2 show agents list and sell 
comparable homes for approximately 2% more. Moreover, as shown in model 3, agents list 
homes for much closer to the final home sale price. The results in model 4 provide further 
support, and show that agents list homes at higher prices when listing for affiliates, relative to the 
predicted selling price.16 These results suggests that agents are listing and selling comparable 
                                                          
16 I also ran the model in column 4 by constructing a variable that predicted the original list price, following the 
same procedure outlined earlier for the predicted sold price, and dividing this variable by the actual original list 
price. Results for this model were nearly identical to the results in column 4. 
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homes for significantly more when listing for social affiliates, providing additional support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
Finally, I investigate the impact of transacting with affiliates on time on market and the 
probability of home sale. Typically when homes are sold for higher prices it results in increased 
time on market and decreased probability of sale. However, I find that the probability of sale 
increases when agents list for affiliates, and time on market does not significantly change. The 
results for these analyses are presented in Panel B of Table 1.5. Model 1 shows that the 
probability of home sale increases by almost 3% when agents list for affiliates, and Model 2 
shows that agents are 6.4% more likely to complete the sale during the duration of a typical 
listing contract (180 days). Relatedly, model 3 shows that time on market does not increase when 
agents list for affiliates. After controlling for the original home list price compared to the 
projected selling price, I find that listing agents sell homes for slightly quicker when listing for 
affiliates. However, this result is not statistically significant at the 10% level (pval=0.13). Results 
are similar using a hazard model as an alternative specification. Similarly, including unsold 
houses in the regression and specifying time on market as either time to sale or time to 
expiration/withdrawal shows affiliate homes sell or expire 3 days quicker (pval=0.06) on 
average. Overall these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1, and suggest agents are 
selling homes at higher prices without increasing costs when listing for affiliates.  
1.7.3 Tactics to Appropriate Value in Transactions  
 My next hypothesis argues that listing agents will experience increased flexibility and 
engage in additional tactics to appropriate value from clients when transacting with social 
affiliates. In particular, I expect that agents will increase use of dual agency and decrease home 
selling prices in order to “break slumps.” Table 1.6 provides these results. First, as shown in 
 43 
 
model 1, I find that agents are 17% more likely to engage in dual agency when listing for 
affiliates, a significant increase from the base rate of approximately 25%. Moreover, I find that 
commission percentages charged to clients do not significantly decrease when agents act as dual 
agents for affiliates (pval=0.87), and sellers do not contractually negotiate rates significantly 
differently in anticipation of potential dual agency situations (pval=0.77). Because dual agency 
effectively doubles commission amounts, this provides strong support for Hypothesis 2. 
 Table 1.7 provides results on home sale price and time on market when agents engage in 
dual agency deals with affiliates. I find evidence suggesting that agents sell homes for cheaper 
and quicker when engaging in dual agency and listing for affiliates. Models 1 and 3 present 
results on sale price. While the results in model 1 are not quite significant at conventional levels, 
the results in model 3 suggest agents reduce home sale price when listing for affiliates by 
increasing seller concessions. These concessions are typically given to cover buyer closing costs, 
and ultimately decrease the amount paid by the buyer for the home. I find that agents typically 
have fewer concessions when listing for affiliates under single agency, or when listing as dual 
agents for non-affiliates. However, when listing for affiliates agents increase sold concessions by 
approximately 20% (base rate is 1% of the final home sale price). Relatedly, I find that listing 
agents sell affiliate homes 6 days quicker as dual agents. Overall these results suggest that listing 
agents may be using their influence with affiliates to reduce sale price prematurely in order to 
engage in dual agency deals, providing further support for Hypothesis 2. However, it is 
important to note that even with this decrease in sale price sellers are still receiving a higher 
price for their home using an affiliated agent compared to using a non-affiliated agent.  
 Second, I investigate whether agents leverage flexibility from affiliations to relieve 
financial need and “break slumps.” Models 2 and 3 of Table 1.6 present these results. I measure 
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financial need or “slumps” as the log of the number of days since the agent’s last listing went 
under contract (either as a listing or buyer agent).17 I then interact this variable with “Affiliation.” 
After controlling for the last sold home’s selling price, I find that agents typically sell homes for 
slightly more when not listing for affiliates and time since last sale increases. However, I find 
that when listing for affiliates the opposite occurs: agents decrease the selling prices of affiliate 
homes as time since last sale increases. This result suggests agents use different strategies to sell 
affiliate homes when experiencing “slumps”, and that they may be leveraging affiliations to 
“break slumps” by decreasing sold price. While my results in column 3 show that time on market 
is not significantly different as days since last sale increase and agents list for affiliates, agents 
may engage in this strategy in hopes that they can relieve pressures from financial need. Overall 
these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. Figure 1.5 provides a graphical 
representation of the creation and flow of value based on the results of these first two hypotheses  
1.7.4 Impact on Firm Performance 
 My final hypothesis argues that ceteris paribus, firm performance will increase with the 
proportion of total homes listed for affiliates. In particular, I expect the dollar amount of real 
estate sold in a year to increase for brokerages as the percentage of listings (compared to total 
number of listings) sold for affiliates increases. The results for these analyses are presented in 
Table 1.8. It is important to note that for these models the unit of analysis is the brokerage/year. 
Because these models include brokerage fixed effects, the results should be interpreted as the 
within-brokerage effect of increasing the percentage of yearly sales to affiliates on yearly 
brokerage revenues. Column 1 suggests that brokerage revenues increase approximately 2% for a 
10% increase in the yearly percentage of transactions with affiliated clients. This provides strong 
                                                          
17 I use contract date for my financial need measure because this is the date that an agent has confidence a home will 
be sold, and the approximate price it will sell for. Results using the number of days since last sale are qualitatively 
similar. 
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support for Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, the result in Column 2 suggests that brokerages do not 
list fewer homes when increasing the proportion of listings for affiliates. This result implies that 
while agents exert more effort when listing for affiliates, this does not result in brokerages listing 
fewer homes. These results are robust to using logs (instead of levels) or to using count models. 
Overall, these results suggest both agents and brokerages improve performance by listing for 
affiliated clients, and provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.   
1.8 Robustness and Identifying Mechanisms 
In this section I investigate potential alternative explanations and provide additional 
analyses that give insight into the mechanisms driving the main results.  
1.8.1 Geographic Proximity vs Social Affiliations 
A conspicuous alternative explanation is that geographic proximity is driving the 
observed effects, independent of social affiliations, and that the specifications do not adequately 
control for this using the 26 zip code dummies. To investigate this potential alternative 
explanation I collected data on census tracts and block groups for each home in my sample. I 
then re-estimated the models using 339 tract-block group dummies as geographic controls. My 
results for these analyses are qualitatively similar to the zip code results. Second, I ran additional 
analyses creating a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an agent and home seller share the 
same zip code. The results of these analyses are also qualitatively similar. As a final check, I 
geocoded each home in my sample to capture its latitude and longitude. I then constructed a 
measure of distance (in feet) between agents and homes. This analysis allows me to compare 
agent performance on homes that are more geographically proximate to their residence, but 
outside the social structure, to performance on homes that are more geographically distant but 
within the social structure. My results from these analyses are also qualitatively similar to the zip 
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code results. These additional analyses suggests that social affiliations, and not simply proximity, 
are driving my results. Because I am unable to accurately geocode all addresses, or to identify 
census tracts and block groups for all homes in my sample, my primary specifications present 
results from the zip code dummies. 
1.8.2 Strength of Affiliation 
As an additional robustness check, and to explore the mechanisms underlying the results, 
I exploit varying degrees of affiliation between members in church wards and stakes. As shown 
in Table 1.1, individuals in church wards interact significantly more frequently than members of 
church stakes. Given this high degree of interaction, and the fact that ward members live so close 
to each other, it is rare for ward members to not know each other’s names, or to have some 
experience interacting together through callings or activities. Consequently, ward affiliations are 
much closer to friendships than simple affiliations or arms-length transactions. In contrast, stake-
level interactions are much less frequent, as members meet together less frequently and live 
further apart. Thus, stake interactions are much more similar to affiliations than friendships, 
although still stronger than arms-length transactions.  
By exploiting these differences between wards and stakes, I investigate how affiliation 
strength influences value creation and value appropriation by agents. Solidarity benefits are 
strongest at the ward level, as ward members share common expectations, norms, and obligations 
with other ward members that are enforced through social pressures and the high degree of 
interaction. Information benefits are also largest at the ward level, due to the frequency of 
interaction, the short distances between member homes, and solidarity benefits that lead to 
increased sharing. At the stake level all these benefits are lessened due to reduced interactions 
and increased distance between member homes. I consequently expect that the value creation 
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benefits associated with listing for affiliates will be largest at the ward level. However, I also 
expect positive benefits when agents list for stake affiliates, compared to listing for non-
affiliates. Similarly, I expect that flexibility will be largest at the ward level and consequently 
lead to increased value appropriation, compared to the stake level or listing for non-affiliates.  
The results for these analyses are presented in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. First, shown in Table 
1.9, I find that strong affiliations lead to the greatest value creation improvements for agents. 
Listing agents sell comparable affiliate homes for 1.1% more in the ward than in the stake (T-test 
p-value<0.01), and sell comparable homes 4 days quicker when listing for ward affiliates. I do 
not find that agents increase effort when listing for ward affiliates, compared to stake affiliates 
(T-test p-value=0.59), or that they are more likely to complete the sale in 6 months. However, 
taken together these results provide additional support for the previous theory, and suggest that 
strong social affiliations positively impact value creation.  
Table 1.10 presents results on flexibility and value appropriation by affiliation strength. 
First, in column 1, I find that agents engage in dual agency 4% more often when listing for ward 
affiliates, compared to stake affiliates (T-test p-value<0.01). Moreover, as shown in columns 2-4, 
agents decrease home sale prices more and sell homes quicker under dual agency at the ward 
level. This suggests agents leverage the flexibility from strong social affiliations to increase their 
use of dual agency. Unreported results on the impact of days since last sale find that agents do 
not significantly change their use of affiliations to “break slumps” when listing for ward affiliates 
vs stake affiliates (T-test p-value=0.70). However, taken together these results provide additional 
support for the previous theory, and suggest value appropriation is largest when affiliations are 
strongest.  
1.8.3 Unexpected Changes to Congregation Boundaries 
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Finally, as an additional robustness check, and to investigate the mechanisms driving my 
primary results, I exploit unexpected changes to church congregation boundaries. This analysis 
allows me to explore the differential impact of previous affiliations, compared to current 
affiliations, on value creation and appropriation by agents in transactions. Congregation 
boundaries are occasionally unexpectedly changed by LDS Church headquarters due to growth 
or a desire to rebalance the membership between wards and stakes. When changes occur, this 
immediately impacts solidarity factors affecting agents. However, information advantages 
change much more slowly, as agents still have possession of private or tacit knowledge post-
change. It is important to note that agents do not change physical location post-boundary change. 
The changes, however, have significant impact on the social structure as it influences who 
individuals interact with through the church. 
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 present results for current and previous affiliations. Overall the 
evidence suggests that effort, price, time on market, probability of sale, and dual agency are all 
positively impacted by current affiliations, compared to previous affiliations. I find that agent 
effort is not significantly different when agents list for previous affiliates, compared to non-
affiliates, and time on market and probability that a listing will stay on the market more than six 
months increase significantly. While the home sale price and probability of sale are higher when 
agents list for previous affiliates, compared to listing for current affiliates, it appears that this is 
driven by the significant increase in time on market. I also find that agents are no more likely to 
engage in dual agency or to leverage social affiliations to “break slumps” when listing for 
previous affiliates, compared to non-affiliates, suggesting that current affiliations are driving the 
use of such tactics. Thus, taken together, these results suggest that the primary effects of this 
chapter are driven by strong current social affiliations. Moreover, solidarity benefits from the 
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social structure appear to be important to both value creation and appropriation in the 
transaction. 
1.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
 While many studies have emphasized the efficiency and cost benefits from transacting 
within social structures, it has remained unclear the extent to which experts and firms can create 
and appropriate value when transacting with social affiliates, especially in the absence of repeat 
transactions. This chapter has argued that information benefits, solidarity benefits, and increased 
effort lead to value creation in transactions when experts transact with social affiliates. 
Additionally, this chapter has argued that social structures create flexibility and expand the 
opportunity space for opportunistic behaviors by experts. When information is incomplete and 
the shadow of the future weak experts consequently have increased opportunities to leverage 
social affiliations in transactions to appropriate value.  
Overall my results suggest transacting with affiliates leads to an increase in firm and 
agent performance. I find that agents create and appropriate more value in transactions and exert 
more effort when listing for social affiliates. Agents sell comparable homes for 2% more without 
significantly increasing costs and are 17% more likely to serve as dual agents when listing for 
affiliates. This results in a 2% increase in commission amounts for the average transaction, and a 
~50% (~$6017) increase in commission amounts on dual agent transactions. Moreover, I find 
that improved expert performance significantly impacts brokerage revenues—a 1% increase in 
the percentage of yearly sales to affiliates increases brokerage revenues by approximately 1.5%. 
Finally, I find that clients, on average, are strictly better off using an affiliated agent, compared 
to a non-affiliated agent. However, some of the benefit of using an affiliated agent is mitigated 
through dual agency.  
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Theoretically, the results of this chapter imply that under conditions of incomplete 
information experts make choices about how to behave in social structures. A consistent 
criticism of studies investigating networks and social structures is that they overlook human 
agency (Salancik 1995; Coleman 1988; Kilduff & Brass 2010) and treat individuals in an “over 
socialized” way (Granovetter 1985). Consequently, actors are often theorized to be enabled or 
constrained by social structures, but are left with little choice regarding their own actions. The 
results of this chapter suggest that experts make conscious choices when dealing with social 
affiliates, and that these choices are influenced by other elements of the context. Moreover, 
experts sometimes behave in ways that do not lead to beneficial outcomes for clients. Thus, as 
argued by both Granovetter (2005) and Coleman (1988), understanding the impact of social 
structures on individuals requires understanding all dimensions of the context, as well as the 
other incentives provided.   
More practically, these results have important implications for firms. Apart from 
financial incentives, experts respond to social factors and in-group preferences that positively 
impact effort and performance in transactions. Consequently, firms may be able to improve 
expert productivity, and motivate experts at low cost, by hiring and staffing experts to take 
advantage of social affiliations. Moreover, heterogeneity in firm outcomes in many service 
industries may be driven by the number and quality of social structures to which employee-
experts belong. 
This study also has important implications for markets. My results suggest that social 
pressures and preferences can, on average, lead to efficiency benefits in transactions and reduce 
moral hazard problems in markets. Financial incentives and incomplete information in the real 
estate industry have been shown to lead to problems of moral hazard (Levitt & Syverson 2008; 
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Rutherford et al. 2005). Such problems contributed to an 8 trillion dollar housing bubble, the 
collapse of which resulted in the largest financial meltdown in recent history and the loss of 8.4 
million jobs (Economic Policy Institute 2014). My results suggest that agents experience 
increased motivation that leads to increased effort and performance when listing for socially-
affiliated clients.  
While this chapter has used a distinctive setting to investigate the impact of a social 
structures on expert performance and behaviors, the results of this chapter are likely 
generalizable to many settings. The key features of this setting include employee discretion over 
pricing and the use of firm resources, some degree of incomplete information, transactions 
embedded in a social structure, and transaction revenues shared between firms and experts, but 
paid by a social affiliate. Many settings share similar characteristics, and likely lead to similar 
outcomes. First, settings that involve sales with price discrimination, such as software sales (e.g., 
Larkin 2014) or car sales, are likely to experience similar results. In these settings salespeople 
are given discretion in pricing, and information surrounding the cost of the product and customer 
willingness to pay is incomplete. Thus, salespeople may leverage information and trust benefits 
to smooth transactions, leading to value creation. However, solidarity and information benefits 
also provide additional flexibility in transactions that may provide opportunities for salespeople 
to close more transactions and upsell affiliates.  
Second, settings involving service experts, advice, and incomplete information likely 
experience similar results. Doctors, for instance, are given discretion about when a cesarean 
section is needed during delivery (e.g., Gruber & Owings 1996). Because patients have limited 
information about their health status and the true need for a cesarean section, they often rely on 
the advice of doctors, particularly doctors they trust. However, doctors have incentives to engage 
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in cesarean sections to increase revenues and decrease risk from lawsuits. Caring for social 
affiliates may provide physicians increased opportunity to steer patients into cesarean sections. 
However, it may also create stronger obligations for physicians to minimize costs and avoid 
downside health complications from the procedure. Similarly, in the financial services industry 
clients often depend on the advice of financial advisers when deciding investment strategies. 
However, advisers face financial incentives to steer clients into certain products to increase their 
commission (e.g., Mullainathan et al. 2012). Sharing a social affiliation with clients may again 
provide increased opportunity to steer clients to higher-commission products. However, it also 
may lead to value creation if clients are more receptive to “coaching” and advisers use solidarity 
and knowledge benefits to more efficiently construct portfolios.  
 This study is not without limitations. First, while this setting provides an opportunity to 
improve upon the endogeneity problem encountered from individuals choosing affiliations, 
social affiliations in this study are still not completely exogenous. Real estate agents choose 
where to live, and agents and sellers choose who to transact with. Thus, it is difficult to 
extrapolate these results to all social affiliations. Second, this chapter has largely disregarded the 
impact of other important affiliations in the transaction, such as between buyers and buyer 
agents, as well as between real estate agents. This provides an opportunity for future research. 
Finally, I am unable to observe whether individuals are members of the church, and unable to 
measure the intensity of social relationships. Thus, this chapter has focused on the impact of 
“social affiliations” instead of friendships or social connections. Directly measuring the strength 
of these relationships would provide added insight into the mechanisms driving the observed 
outcomes and allow for a more detailed understanding of the factors influencing expert choices 
when dealing with social connections.  
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 Moving forward there is significant potential for expanding and extending this work. 
First, future work should focus on understanding how varying degrees of incomplete information 
influence social pressures and in-group preferences for experts, and how this in turn influences 
expert choices and performance. Second, future studies should extend this work by exploring 
affiliations between buyers and buyer agents, as well as between agents. Investigating these 
affiliations would allow additional insight into how professional and social affiliations interact, 
and how experts utilize professional affiliations when transacting with social affiliations. Third, 
future work should explore selection issues surrounding which firms and agents are most likely 
to secure transactions with affiliates. Such an investigation could yield valuable insights into firm 
entry and hiring decisions. Finally, future research could explore the extent to which survival at 
entry and subsequent growth is impacted by the quality of an expert’s social structure. For 
instance, it may be that superstars arise because of advantageous social structures at entry, which 
allow experts to quickly build reputation and experience. The results of this chapter suggest 
undertaking such research is important to enlarging our understanding of expert productivity and 
firm performance.  
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1.11 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework 
 
Figure 1.2: Boundaries for a Representative Stake in Utah County with Seven Wards 
 
Note: This figure shows a representative stake in Utah County with seven wards. The green boundaries (including the highlighted 
red boundary) represent stake boundaries, and the purple boundaries ward boundaries. This map covers approximately 2.5 square 
miles of Utah County.  
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Figure 1.3: Setting-specific Predictions Corresponding to the General Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Agents Sell Homes Higher Above Predicted Sold Price when Listing for 
Affiliates 
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Figure 1.5: Impact of Social Affiliations on the Flow of Value in Transactions 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Typical Interactions in LDS Church Wards and Stakes 
 
Ward Level – (~450 individuals, 188 families, 154 housing units) 
Weekly Interactions 
-Church services: 3 hours 
 -Two hours of interactive classes 
 -Responsibilities associated with callings (e.g., 
teaching, library, clerk, etc.) 
-Multiple leadership meetings for 
approximately 30 members  
-Weekday youth activities (youth and leaders) 
 
Other Interactions 
-Bi-monthly social activities 
-Monthly women’s organization gatherings 
-Monthly assigned visits to 2-4 families  
-Monthly temple days – members invited to 
come same day/time 
-Calling interactions 
-Sports league
Stake Level– (~3150 individuals, 826 families, 1081 housing units) 
Regular Interactions 
-Bi-annual church conference, all members 
-Bi-annual training meetings for leadership  
-Monthly scheduled temple days—members 
invited to come same day 
-Youth activities (youth, leaders, and parents) 
 *Multi-day annual event 
 *Full day events (~2/year) 
 *Youth dances (~6/year) 
 *Annual week long boys and girls camps for youth, 
leaders, and parents 
Weekly Interactions 
-Leadership meetings (5-15 people) 
  
Other Interactions 
-Monthly meetings between Stake and Ward 
clergy 
-Stake leadership visits to ward (~6X/year) 
-Stake-wide social activities (~2/year) 
-Service activities 
-Calling interactions 
-Sports league 
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Specifications: Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
     Sold 82739 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Original list price 40838 211679 119306 60000 1,149,000 
Sold price 40838 200571 106456 30000 1,500,000 
Days on mkt 40838 109.71 80.08 1 481 
Six months 82739 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Dual agent 40838 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Seller concessions % 40838 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 
Sold price/original list price 40838 0.96 0.08 0.62 1.19 
Predicted sold price/original list price 40838 1.05 0.18 0.66 1.90 
Brokerage revenue/yr 2789 3,820,214 8,216,161 71900 894,000,000 
Brokerage # sold/yr 2789 14.70 31.88 1 370 
 
     
Independent Variables 
     
Affiliation 40838 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Previous affiliation 40838 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Same ward agent/house 40838 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Same stake agent/house 39328 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Franchise brokerage 40838 0.46 0.50 0 1 
# sold to date, agent 40838 92.25 144.39 1 1138 
# list to date, agent 82739 162.39 272.00 1 1870 
# sold to date, brokerage 40838 620.07 694.26 1 3435 
Key box used 40838 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Key box used only 40838 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Call agent for appt. 40838 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Brokerage % sold to affiliation/yr 2789 11.49 22.54 0 100 
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Specifications: Control Variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Control Variables 
     Total # bedrooms 40838 3.79 1.22 1 16 
Total # bathrooms 40838 2.51 0.96 1 13 
Total # kitchens 40838 1.07 0.26 1 4 
Total # fireplaces 40838 0.55 0.73 0 5 
Total # laundry rooms 40838 1.00 0.34 0 5 
Total # dining rooms 40838 0.13 0.34 0 2 
Total # family rooms 40838 1.14 0.71 0 5 
% of basement finished 40838 41.14 45.37 0 100 
Garage capacity 40838 1.50 1.09 0 10 
Pool 40838 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Square feet 40838 2444 1204 500 18400 
Acres 40838 0.28 1.00 0 4.48 
Year built 40838 1985 24.63 1860 2014 
HOA fee 40838 23.68 70.34 0 10000 
Property type 
     
Condominium 40838 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Mobile 40838 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Recreational 40838 0.00 0.01 0 1 
Single Family 40838 0.79 0.40 0 1 
Townhouse 40838 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Twin 40838 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Short sale 40838 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Year 40838 2006 4.30 1998 2014 
Commission % offered buyer 40139 2.93 0.25 0 6 
Owner agent 40838 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Co-agent present 40838 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Immediate possession 40838 0.27 0.44 0 1 
      
Other       
# agents in ward 40838 0.86 1.17 0 8 
# houses sold in ward/yr 40838 7.45 7.27 0 51 
      
Note: Additional quality dummies were constructed for the following text strings, and their common variants: TLC, Needs Updating, 
Estate Sale, Foreclosure, Handyman, As-Is, Rehabber, Bank-Owned, Priced to Sell, Motivated, Potential, Close, !, New, Spacious, 
Elegance, Beautiful, Remodeled/Renovated, Historic/Vintage, Maintained/Well-Cared, Wonderful, Fantastic, Charming, Stunning, 
Amazing, Granite, Immaculate, Breathtaking, Neighborhood, Spectacular, Landscaped, Stained Glass/Art Glass, Built-in, Tasteful, 
Must See, Fabulous, Leaded, Delightful, Move-In, Gourmet, Corian, Custom, Unique, Maple, Newer, Hurry/Will Not Last, Pride, 
Clean, Quiet, Dream, Block, Huge, Deck, Mint, Hardwood, Views, New Roof/New Shingles, Upgraded/Updated, Vaulted, Floor 
plan, Award, Hot Tub, Tile, Cul-de-sac, Jetted Tub, Park, Brick, Value, Windows, Mother-in-law, Stainless, Theater, Surround Sound, 
Pickiest, Rare, Starter, Master, Cute, Warranty, Temple, and Fenced. Summary statistics are included in the appendix 
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Table 1.4: Listing Agents Exert More Care and Effort when Listing for Affiliates 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Pr(Key Box Only) Pr(Agent Appointment) 
Affiliation -0.017* 0.020** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
Vacant 0.406*** -0.327*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Log(original list price) -0.046*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.018) (0.016) 
   
Constant 1.288*** 0.194 
 
(0.270) (0.344) 
   House Controls Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y 
R2 0.429 0.422 
Observations 40838 40838 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction 
controls include dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, use of a 
dual/variable rate commission, and use of an EAL listing contract. Time controls include year and 
month dummies for when the house was listed, as well as their interaction. Significance levels: * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 1.5: Agents Create More Value when Listing for Affiliates 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log(List Price) Log(Sold Price) 
Sold to Original 
List 
Original list to 
predicted sold price 
Affiliation 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.003** 0.021*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
     
Constant 4.408*** 3.671*** 1.076*** 2.760*** 
 
(0.168) (0.186) (0.076) (0.180) 
     House Controls Y Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.894 0.898 0.404 0.257 
Observations 40838 40838 40838 40838 
 
Panel B 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Pr(Sold) Pr(Six Months) Days on Mkt 
Affiliation 0.014* -0.016** -2.323 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (1.490) 
    
Constant 3.849*** -0.668*** -67.179 
 
(0.265) (0.234) (57.761) 
   
 
House Controls Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y 
R2 0.225 0.193 0.282 
Observations 82739 82739 40838 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for 
immediate possession, owner agents, dual agency, dual brokerage, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as variables for the 
percentage of sold concessions (except models 1 and 2 of Panel B) and the original list price to predicted sold price (model 3 of Panel B 
only). House controls include the log of original list price for Panel A model 3 and Panel B models 1 and 2. Time controls include year 
and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was listed for Panel A models 1, 3 and 4 and Panel B models 1-3, 
and for when the house was sold for Panel A model 2. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 1.6: Increased Flexibility and Access to Value Appropriation Tactics when Listing 
for Affiliates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Pr(Dual Agent) Log(Sold Price) Days on Mkt 
Affiliation 0.040*** 0.036*** -0.674 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (3.585) 
Log(# days since last contract) 
 
0.001* 1.139*** 
  
(0.001) (0.391) 
Affiliation X Log(days since last contract) 
 
-0.005** -0.426 
  
(0.002) (1.056) 
Log(last home sold price)  0.003 0.986 
  (0.002) (0.975) 
    
Constant 0.772** 3.634*** -87.353 
 
(0.318) (0.189) (58.746) 
  
  
House Controls Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y 
R2 0.203 0.897 0.278 
Observations 40838 39899 39899 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include 
dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, dual agency and dual brokerage (models 2 
and 3 only), and short sales, as well as variables for percentage of sold concessions and the original list price to 
predicted sold price (model 3 only). Time controls include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for 
when the house was sold for models 1 and 2, and when the house was listed for model 3. Results for models 2 and 3 
are robust to excluding part time agents, defined multiple ways, and to excluding observations where # of days since 
last contract is high. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 1.7: Evidence of Increased Flexibility that Aids in Engaging in Dual Agency 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log(Sold Price) Days on Mkt Sold Concessions % 
Affiliation 0.023*** -0.781 -0.001** 
 
(0.005) (1.636) (0.0004) 
Dual agent 0.006 7.083*** -0.001*** 
 (0.004) (1.733) (0.0004) 
Affiliation X Dual agent -0.012 -5.554* 0.0013** 
 (0.008) (3.261) (0.001) 
    
Constant 3.671*** -67.809 0.080*** 
 
(0.187) (57.753) (0.014) 
 
   
House Controls Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y 
R2 0.898 0.282 0.244 
Observations 40838 40838 40591 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include 
dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, dual agency and dual brokerage (model 1 only), presence of a co-
agent, and short sales, as well as variables for the percentage of sold concessions (except for model 3) and the 
original list price to predicted sold price (model 2 only). Time controls include year and month dummies, as well as 
their interaction, for when the house was listed for model 2, and for when the house was sold for models 1, and 3. 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 1.8: Listing for Affiliates Improves Firm Performance 
 
(1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Log(Revenue/yr) Log(# Sold/yr) 
% Affiliation/yr 0.002*** -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log(# Agents in Brokerage/yr) 0.017 0.832*** 
 (0.022) (0.052) 
Log(# Listings Sold/yr) 1.026***  
 (0.015)  
   
Constant 12.282*** 0.887*** 
 
(0.050) (0.111) 
 
  
Time Controls Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y 
R2 0.963 0.836 
Observations 2789 2789 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are cluster by brokerage. Time trends 
include year dummies. Results using count models for model 2 or logged % of Affiliation/yr are 
similar. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 1.9: Agent Value Creation Largest at the Ward Level (Strongest Affiliation) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log(Sold Price) Pr(Six Months) Days on Mkt 
Same ward agent/house 0.026*** -0.015* -4.225* 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (2.252) 
Same stake agent/house 0.015*** -0.016** -0.190 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (1.951) 
    
Constant 3.713*** -0.646*** -85.715 
 
(0.188) (0.238) (58.341) 
 
 
  House Controls Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y 
R2 0.898 0.193 0.282 
Observations 39328 78017 39328 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction 
controls include dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, dual agency, dual brokerage, 
presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as variables for the percentage of sold concessions 
(except model 2) and the original list price to predicted sold price (except model 1). Time controls 
include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was listed for models 2 
and 3, and for when the house was sold for model 1. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table 1.10: Value Appropriation and Flexibility Largest at Ward Level (Strongest 
Affiliation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Pr(Dual Agent) Log(Sold Price) Days on Mkt Sold Concessions % 
Same ward agent/house 0.046*** 0.032*** -1.222 -0.001* 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (2.535) (0.0004) 
Dual agent 
 
0.006 7.333*** -0.001*** 
  
(0.004) (1.795) (0.0004) 
Same ward X dual agent 
 
-0.023** -11.273** 0.001 
  
(0.011) (4.656) (0.0008) 
Same stake agent/house 0.037*** 0.016*** -0.165 -0.001 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (2.203) (0.0005) 
Same stake X dual agent 
 
-0.004 -0.733 0.001* 
  
(0.010) (4.311) (0.0008) 
     
Constant 0.720*** 3.713*** -85.302 0.084*** 
 
(0.326) (0.188) (58.099) (0.014) 
     House Controls Y Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.202 0.898 0.283 0.246 
Observations 39328 39328 39328 39092 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for 
immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as variables for percentage of sold concessions 
(except for model 4) and the original list price to predicted sold price (model 3 only). Time controls include year and month 
dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was sold for models 1, 2, and 4, and when the house was listed for model 
3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 1.11: Less Effort and Value Created when Agents List for Previous Affiliates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log (Sold Price) Days on Mkt Pr(Key Box Only) Pr(Agent Appointment) 
Affiliation 0.020*** -2.222 -0.017* 0.020** 
 
(0.005) (1.487) (0.009) (0.010) 
Previous affiliation 0.039* 11.754* -0.020 -0.030 
 
(0.021) (6.504) (0.031) (0.047) 
     
Constant 3.673*** -66.782 1.287*** 0.192 
 
(0.186) (57.766) (0.269) (0.341) 
     House Controls Y Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.898 0.282 0.429 0.422 
Observations 40838 40838 40838 40838 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for 
immediate possession, dual agents and dual brokerage (models 1 and 2 only), owner agents, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as 
well as variables for percentage of sold concessions (except for models 3 and 4), and the original list price to predicted sold price 
(model 2 only). Models 3 and 4 include controls for home vacancy, original list price, and compensation contract terms. Time controls 
include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was sold for model 1, and when the house was listed 
for models 2-4. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Table 1.12: Value Creation and Appropriation Reduced when Listing for Previous 
Affiliates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Pr(Six Months) Pr(Sold) Pr(Dual Agent) 
Affiliation -0.016** 0.015* 0.040*** 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Previous affiliation 0.074*** 0.103*** 0.019 
 
(0.019) (0.039) (0.035) 
    
Constant -0.665*** 3.852*** 0.773*** 
 
(0.234) (0.264) (0.318) 
 
   House Controls Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y 
Listing Agent FE Y Y Y 
Listing Brokerage FE Y Y Y 
Experience Controls Y Y Y 
Quality Dummies Y Y Y 
Geographic Controls Y Y Y 
R2 0.193 0.225 0.203 
Observations 82739 82739 40838 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for 
immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as a variable controlling for the original list price 
of the home (except Model 3). Time controls include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was 
sold for model 3, and when the house was listed for models 1 and 2. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Favored in Selection: The Impact of Social 
Affiliations on Real Estate Agent Access to 
Valuable Transactions 
 
 
CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
This chapter investigates how social affiliations between real estate listing agents and home 
sellers impact the type of transactions agents engage in, as well as the selection process 
underlying agent selection. While many studies have argued that status and reputation act as 
entry barriers and create advantages for high status or high reputation firms, it remains unclear 
how social affiliations impact the selection process, particularly under conditions of incomplete 
information. Using a unique approach that pairs data from the Wasatch Front Regional Multiple 
Listing Services with data on LDS church congregation boundaries in Utah County, Utah for 
1998-2014, I explore how social affiliations between home sellers and agents through 
geographically-assigned Mormon church congregations influence the selection process and the 
type of transactions agents engage in. I find that affiliations allow agents to list more expensive, 
larger, and higher quality homes compared to when listing for non-affiliates, and to list such 
homes at low levels of experience. I also find that affiliations create a distinct selection process 
that substitutes for the positive selection impacts of previous performance, agent experience, and 
fit, and creates a feedback loop where listing for affiliates allows agents to gain valuable 
experience and reputation, which then positively impacts future listings with non-affiliates. 
Overall my results imply that social affiliations between firms and clients can lead to important 
selection benefits that increase firm performance, and that lead to important entry and 
competition benefits.  
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2.1 Introduction 
In many industries, access to valuable transactions directly impacts firm performance and 
survival. Such is the case for numerous service industries, which now are responsible for over 
two-thirds of US GDP and employ nearly 80% of the US workforce (USTR, 2014). Often critical 
to securing valuable transactions is overcoming agency problems, and recent studies have noted 
the potential for reputation (e.g., Shapiro 1983; Fombrun & Shanley 1990; Fombrun 1996), 
status (Podolny 1993; Benjamin & Podolny 1999), and social or professional networks (e.g., 
Merton 1968; Stuart et al. 1999) to reduce concerns of moral hazard and provide important 
signals of quality that aid firms in securing valuable transactions. When information in 
incomplete, however, and monitoring costly consumers in service settings often choose to 
transact with social affiliates (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998), as affiliations breed trust and 
status or reputational mechanisms provide only noisy information. While this may generate 
advantages for firms if they can leverage trust to reduce transaction costs and engage in more 
transactions (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Greif 1993; Barney & Hansen 1994), it remains unclear how 
affiliations influence the type of transactions firms engage in, as well as the underlying selection 
process. Do affiliations allow firms to secure more valuable transactions with clients? Or do they 
lead to the creation of a “relief organization” (Uzzi 1997) where firms are obligated to “help out” 
affiliates by engaging in less valuable transactions?  
In this chapter I explore the extent to which social affiliations, bred of common 
memberships between employee-experts and clients in formal social institutions, impact the 
types of transactions real estate agents engage in. Moreover, I investigate how the agent-
selection process differs when social affiliations are present, as well as how transacting with 
affiliates influences future agent transactions with non-affiliates through the building of 
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reputation and the acquiring of experience. My purpose is to build on previous work (Gubler, 
2015) to highlight the impact of social affiliations external to the economic transaction on firm 
performance through selection, and to provide insight into the selection process in non-repeated 
economic transactions where information is incomplete and social affiliations are present.18  
The literature has long noted the potential for reputation or status to confer performance 
benefits, to act as barriers to entry, and to serve as mechanisms that communicate firm quality 
(e.g., Shapiro 1983; Wilson 1985; Rao 1994; Podolny 1993; Benjamin & Podolny 1999). These 
factors have been argued to often lead to a “Matthew effect”, where more experienced and 
reputable firms engage in the most valuable transactions (e.g., Merton 1968). Such an effect can 
result in strong barriers to entry that disadvantage new and inexperienced firms, and lead to 
sustained performance differences between firms (Podolny & Phillips 1996; Roberts & Dowling 
2002). When information is incomplete, however, and the risk of opportunism high, scholars 
have found that consumers often prefer transacting with social affiliates (DiMaggio & Louch 
1998). This consequently imposes a difference selection process that erodes advantages from 
status or reputation, and allows less experienced and smaller firms to engage in more valuable 
transactions. However, because of data limitations and empirical challenges it has remained 
difficult to empirically estimate the impact of such affiliations on selection, and consequently on 
firm performance. This chapter seeks to fill this gap.  
My unique approach mirrors that of the prior chapter, and pairs novel data from 
geographically-assigned church congregations in Utah County, Utah with real estate transaction 
data from the Utah Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Services (MLS) for 1998-2014. In 
Utah County nearly 90% of its over half million residents report being members of the Church of 
                                                          
18 While the focus of this chapter is on non-repeated economic transactions, recent studies have also focused on the 
impact of social structures and relationships on transactions in non-repeated exchanges (e.g., Elfenbein and Zenger, 
2013).  
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Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (ASARB 2010). This church geographically assigns each home 
in the county to a congregation which church members are required to attend to stay in good 
standing with the church. These assignments significantly impact social interactions between 
individuals, and have been shown to impact both agent and brokerage performance in 
transactions (Gubler, 2015). By collecting a panel of congregation boundaries I explore the 
impact of social affiliations on the selection process and the types of listings real estate agents 
engage in.  
My results suggest that there is a strong and significant correlation between listing value 
and the presence of a social affiliation between listing agents and clients. I find that homes list at 
approximately 14% higher prices when affiliations are present, are 11% larger in terms of square 
footage, and are less likely to be low quality, as indicated by the presence of negative quality 
descriptors in the publically available listing comments. This suggests that higher quality and 
more expensive listings are being procured by agents with which home sellers share a social 
affiliation through a shared church congregation boundary.  
Similarly, using within-effects models, I find that agents list and sell higher quality, more 
valuable, and larger homes when listing for socially-affiliated clients. My results suggest agents 
list homes that will sell for nearly 14% more when listing for affiliates, compared to their other 
listings, and consequently increase average commission earned by approximately $1121. I also 
find that agents are 24% less likely to list a home with negative quality descriptors when listing 
for affiliates. Interestingly, I find evidence suggesting that these effects increase in magnitude 
with the strength of affiliation, and disappear altogether when congregation boundaries are 
unexpectedly changed. 
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While these findings suggest that transacting with affiliates results in higher quality and 
more valuable transactions on average for agents, I also find evidence suggesting clients use a 
distinct selection process in choosing agents when social affiliations are present. My results 
suggest clients are significantly more likely to choose affiliated agents than non-affiliated agents, 
and that affiliations substitute for the positive selection benefits of agent experience and previous 
performance. Moreover, my results suggest franchise brokerages are less likely to be chosen 
when affiliations are present, and fit considerations are less important. These results have 
striking implications for firms, as they imply different competition and entry effects. For 
instance, my results suggest that while agents typically list more expensive homes as experience 
increases, leading to disadvantages for new entrants, when listing for affiliates agents can list and 
sell more expensive homes at low levels of experience. Moreover, agents receive the same 
positive benefits of experience when listing for affiliates compared to listing for non-affiliates. 
Thus, this selection process favors socially-affiliated agents, and not simply the most 
experienced agents or firms, and leads to potential entry benefits. 
Finally, my results suggest that listing for affiliates creates a feedback loop where agents 
leverage affiliations to gain experience and reputation, which then allows them to secure more 
valuable transactions with non-affiliated clients in the future. I find that a 50% increase in the 
number of listings for affiliates in a given year leads to a 1.3-3.25% increase in the average 
listing price of homes for that agent in the subsequent year. Moreover, I find that this effect is 
larger for new entrants, again suggesting entry benefits through the use of social affiliations.  
These results contribute to a variety of literatures, and have important theoretical 
implications. First, they suggest that affiliations can erode benefits from reputation, status, or 
experience, which often act as entry barriers to young firms and lead to Matthew effects where 
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more established or reputable firms are able to procure the most valuable transactions. My results 
suggest that the benefits of transacting with affiliates can potentially substitute for these 
observables, and result in an alternative selection process. Similarly, these results provide 
empirical evidence in showing an additional avenue through which trustworthiness can lead to 
heterogeneity in firm performance (e.g., Barney & Hansen 1994). Finally, this study makes an 
empirical contribution by identifying affiliations in a way that avoids many of the endogeneity 
issues noted in previous studies, which result from individuals choosing to affiliate with similar 
others (e.g., Mouw 2006). In this study affiliations are assigned geographically based on church 
congregation boundaries, which change over time and encompass small geographic areas.  
These results also have important managerial implications. First, these results suggest 
firms can potentially enter crowded markets, or enter markets that heavily reward reputation or 
previous experience, through employee social affiliations with clients. This is a previously 
under-researched human capital resource that can be used to improve firm performance. Second, 
and relatedly, these results suggest managers should take such considerations into account when 
making hiring and staffing decisions. For instance, firms may realize important benefits from 
hiring new employees that can leverage social affiliations in valuable markets related to the 
current strategy of the firm. Finally, these results suggest that managers should craft policies to 
encourage and support employee experts transacting with affiliated clients, as this leads to higher 
quality and more valuable transactions that positively impact firm performance. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
2.2.1 Defining Social Affiliations 
In this study I investigate the impact of social affiliations between employee-experts and 
clients on the selection process, and the types of transactions firms engage in. I define social 
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affiliations as current shared memberships in formal social institutions, through which 
individuals interact and experience common identity, norms, and values. Formal social 
institutions may include churches, alumni organizations, corporations, clubs, charitable 
organizations, schools, or other groups. Affiliations through formal institutions may differ in 
strength, with some becoming close friendships and others remaining simple acquaintances 
through the common social structure.  
When social affiliations are present they have the potential to influence transactions in 
important ways. First, they may influence information flows between members, and allow for 
increased transmission of quality information between affiliates, including private, tacit, and 
fine-grained information (Coleman 1988; Krackhardt & Hanson 1993; Uzzi 1997; Reagans & 
McEvily 2003; Granovetter 2005). Improved information flows stem both from more frequent 
interactions through the social institution, as well as from increased information sharing by 
members under lessened concerns of opportunism. 
Second, social affiliations may lead to greater trust and goodwill in transactions. This 
stems both from shared norms, expectations, and obligations from the social structure 
(Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1988; Arrow 2000; Granovetter 2005), as well as from in-group 
preferences and biases activated by the social affiliation (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; 
Falk & Zehnder 2007). This increased trust and goodwill can potentially be used to improve 
performance and create competitive advantages (Barney & Hansen 1994; Gubler, 2015), and to 
decrease transactions costs (e.g., Ben-Porath 1980; Coleman 1988; Greif 1993; Granovetter 
2005; Uzzi & Lancaster 2004; Lancaster & Uzzi 2012). Moreover, it is supported by the desire 
of affiliates to maintain social reputation and avoid social punishments (Granovetter 1985; 
2005). 
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Finally, social affiliations may activate social preferences in affiliates. Such preferences 
are defined as concern for the welfare and monetary outcomes of other affiliates, and often lead 
affiliates to take actions that decrease their own monetary gains but lead to improved outcomes 
for other affiliates (Charness & Rabin 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; Andreoni & Miller 2002; 
Bandiera et al. 2005). Such preferences may also lead affiliates to consciously act in ways that 
benefit the social community, such as through paying a premium to engage in transactions with 
other affiliates.  
2.2.2 Affiliations and Access to Valuable Transactions 
There are two competing views surrounding the impact of social affiliations on the types 
of transactions firms engage in. The first view argues that firms will experience negative impacts 
from affiliations, as they lead to obligations and social or in-group preferences that lock firms 
into less valuable transactions. Social obligations are borne of common norms and expectations 
in the social structure, as well as a desire to maintain social reputation (Granovetter 1985; 2005). 
Such obligations may also drive employee-experts to engage in less valuable transactions in 
order to “help out” socially-affiliated clients (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Similarly, social 
and in-group preferences create incentives for employee-experts to act in ways that benefit social 
affiliates monetarily, even to the potential detriment of the firm. While such behaviors may be 
utility maximizing for the employee-expert, it may result in inferior economic outcomes for both 
the employee-expert and the firm. However, a desire to maintain social reputation and to benefit 
affiliates and the social community may drive employee-experts to engage in such transactions 
and behaviors. Overall this view argues that affiliations lead firms to engage in less valuable 
transactions, and to become a “relief organization” (Uzzi 1997) for socially-affiliated clients in 
markets where information is incomplete (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). 
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 The second view contrasts with the first, and argues social affiliations lead to significant 
selection benefits from affiliations, as they create information and solidarity benefits that allow 
firms to identify and engage in more valuable transactions. Solidarity benefits from greater trust 
and goodwill (Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002), as well as in-group preferences (Sherif et al. 
1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; Falk & Zehnder 2007), lead consumers to prefer transacting with 
affiliates when quality is difficult to assess and monitoring costly. This preference stems from 
the expectation by consumers that the expected outcome from transacting with affiliates will be 
higher than transacting with non-affiliates (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Information advantages 
from affiliations similarly provide benefits to identifying and securing valuable transactions. 
Such informational benefits may include access to private or tacit information about potential 
affiliate-clients, including their goals and desired outcomes, as well as the timeline for the 
transaction (Uzzi 1997). This provides firms first-mover advantages in marketing to clients and 
allows them to present themselves in the best possible light, given client goals. Information 
advantages also assist firms in avoiding less-valuable transactions and transacting with difficult 
or dishonest people. Thus, information advantages help in the timely identification of valuable 
transactions, and solidarity benefits lead to consumer preferences that benefit affiliates in 
securing such transactions. This consequently allows firms and employee-experts to improve 
performance by leveraging affiliations to engage in more valuable transactions.  
2.2.3 A Distinct Selection Process Imposed by Affiliations 
 In addition to influencing the types of transactions firms and employee-experts engage in, 
social affiliations may also influence the selection process used by clients in choosing firms and 
employee-experts to transact with. Large literatures have focused on the potential for reputation 
(e.g., Shapiro 1983; Fombrun & Shanley 1990; Fombrun 1996) or status (Podolny 1993; 
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Benjamin & Podolny 1999) to signal quality and act as barriers to entry. When clients have 
access to quality information they select firms to transact with based on relevant observables, 
such as historic performance. However, as these observables become hard to assess consumers 
may rely more on indirect measures of performance, including reputation or status (Podolny 
1993). This selection process consequently allows for sustained heterogeneity in firm 
performance (e.g., Rao 1994; Roberts & Dowling 2002), as it generates “Matthew Effects” 
where established firms engage in more valuable transactions due to their better reputations, 
higher levels of experience, or higher levels of status (Merton 1968; Roberts & Dowling 2002). 
Such a process makes it difficult for new or less-experienced firms to enter markets. Similarly, it 
makes it difficult for them to secure valuable transactions, as there is more at stake in these 
transactions and clients consequently prefer transacting with more proven experts.   
When information is incomplete, and monitoring difficult, historic performance, 
reputation, or status provide only noisy signals to consumers about firm quality. Moreover, in 
such cases there is often heightened potential for opportunism or unethical behavior (e.g., 
Yenkey, 2015). Under these conditions, clients may choose to transact with social affiliates to 
decrease potential for opportunism (DiMaggio & Louch 1998), especially in valuable 
transactions where there is more to lose. Such a selection process differs from the process 
described above, and provides potential advantages to affiliates in securing valuable transactions 
or in working with more valuable clients. This may occur for at least two reasons. First, studies 
in social psychology have found that individuals tend to trust and have a positive bias towards in-
group individuals (e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Falk & 
Zehnder 2007). This positive bias and increased trust leads clients to prefer transacting with 
social affiliates, regardless of experience, status, or reputation, as they perceive their expected 
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outcomes as being more favorable when transacting with in-group members. Second, solidarity 
benefits from the social structure may reduce client concerns of opportunism and lead to 
increased trust (Granovetter 1985; 2005; Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002). This trust drives 
clients to prefer transacting with social affiliates, as they expect affiliates to behave less 
opportunistically than non-affiliates (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Such trust is supported by the 
desire of affiliates to maintain social reputation and avoid social punishments (Granovetter 1985; 
2005). Both of these mechanisms imply advantages for affiliates in securing valuable 
transactions when information is incomplete and risk of opportunism high, as affiliations 
substitute for reputation, experience, or status. Moreover, such a process supports the argument 
put forth by Barney and Hansen (1994) that trust can lead to sustainable competitive advantages.  
2.2.4 Creation of an Affiliation Feedback Loop 
Importantly, the distinct selection process outlined above provides potential for a 
feedback loop that may create significant benefits for young and inexperienced firms from 
transacting with affiliates. In many service industries firms engage in more valuable transactions 
based on their reputation, status, or experience. However, because clients may choose to transact 
with firms based on trust and goodwill from affiliations, this may allow firms to enter crowded 
or competitive markets at lower relative levels of experience, status, or reputation. The 
implication of such a selection process is that firms may leverage social affiliations to gain 
experience and build reputation by participating in valuable transactions with socially-affiliated 
clients. This subsequently allows them to engage in more valuable non-affiliate transactions in 
the future, which results in improved firm survival and long-term performance benefits. Such 
entry and competition benefits from social affiliations have been overlooked in the current 
literature, but are potentially of significant importance, as they can be used to erode entry 
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barriers and competitive advantages of rivals based on experience, status, or reputation. Figure 
2.1 illustrates this potential feedback loop. 
2.3 Empirical Setting 
The setting for this study is the residential real estate industry, which was described in 
detail in the first chapter of this dissertation. This industry is suitable to investigate the questions 
outlined above for a few reasons. First, this is an economically significant industry in the United 
States roughly equal in size to the brand name pharmaceutical industry, the hotel and motel 
industry, and the single-location full service restaurants industry (IBISWorld 2014). The chief 
productive resource is labor, and the industry employs over 1 million workers (IBISWorld 2014). 
Second, because the core of this industry is the real estate transaction, I am able to observe and 
measure the impact of valuable or higher quality transactions on agent and brokerage 
performance. Third, agents participate in many transactions over time, with heterogeneity in the 
presence of social affiliations, which allows me to estimate the impact of transacting with an 
affiliated home seller on selection outcomes for the agent, and consequently the firm. Finally, 
brokerage productivity and revenues directly increase with the dollar amount of real estate sold 
by agents. Agents are required to work for a licensed brokerage to sell real estate in Utah, and are 
typically compensated a percentage (3%) based on the final home sale price. This commission is 
then shared with the employing brokerage, such splits ranging from a 50/50 split to a 100/0 split 
(agent keeps full commission but pays a fixed desk fee). Consequently the link between agent 
and firm productivity is quite clear.  
In order to sell real estate in Utah, agents must belong to a licensed brokerage that 
oversees their work. The typical brokerage in my sample employs 23 agents a year, with the 
largest employing 178 and the smallest 1 (self-employed). Forty-three percent of the listings in 
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my sample are by nationally franchised brokerages, such as RE/MAX or Prudential, 49% are by 
independent brokerages, and 8% are by self-employed brokers. Agents often move between 
brokerages throughout their career, as they seek out better fit or opportunities. Because 
brokerage revenue is directly influenced by agent ability and the types of transactions agents 
engage in, it is or paramount importance for brokerages to identify, hire, retain, and support 
high-performing agents. 
Sellers use real estate agents for a variety of reasons. First, agents have access to valuable 
information. In Utah, many variables relating to real estate transactions, including final sales 
price, are not public information. While this information exists on the MLS database, it is not 
accessible through the county assessor or recorder offices, and is not used in tax assessments. 
Consequently, it is difficult for sellers or buyers to conduct independent market research, or to 
understand the local market, and thus drives clients to use agents. Second, listing agents have 
access to potential buyers through their professional network. These connections may allow 
sellers to sell their homes faster and at higher prices. Third, listing agents have experience that 
sellers rely on to price the home and develop a marketing strategy. Most sellers in Utah have 
only limited experience selling real estate. Given the economic magnitude of the transaction and 
the potential emotions involved, sellers often rely on real estate agents to help them make 
informed decisions.  
Fourth, listing agents have experience marketing homes, and can potentially provide 
valuable advice that will help the seller increase the sold price of the home and reduce time on 
market. This includes insight into the buyer’s mentality. For instance, real estate agents may 
know how to best present or stage a home to attract buyers, or what aspects of the home, if 
improved, would lead to a higher selling price. Fifth, listing agents negotiate final prices, and 
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may have more leverage to drive a “hard bargain” as an outside party. Finally, listing agents help 
sellers to navigate the closing process, including filling out necessary paperwork to legally 
transfer ownership of the home to the homebuyer. All these benefits from using an agent provide 
advantages to sellers that decrease time on market, increase sold prices, reduce stress, and avoid 
costly errors.  
However, using a real estate agent can also lead to problems of moral hazard for sellers. 
Because sellers have limited information about agents, comparable homes, and the market, 
agents may have incentive to use their knowledge advantages to engage in behaviors not 
beneficial to the seller. First, listing agents may lead sellers to underprice homes and sell them 
too quickly (Levitt & Syverson 2008; Rutherford et al. 2005; Hendel et al. 2009; Jia & Pathak 
2010). Such behavior follows from the relatively weak financial incentives faced by agents. For 
instance, the difference between a home selling for $300K and $315K is approximately fifteen 
thousand dollars for the seller. However, after splitting the commission with the buyer’s agent 
and the listing agent’s employing brokerage, this may translate into a difference of only $243 for 
the listing agent.19 Consequently, many listing agents may opt to sell homes quickly and reduce 
their cost of effort and increase probability of sale. Second, agents may have incentive to engage 
in dual agency (also called “limited agency”), where they serve as both the listing and buyer’s 
agent. This allows agents to capture the entire commission amount, but leads to potential 
conflicts of interest. Studies have found that homes sell for quicker and cheaper than they 
otherwise would under dual agency (Gardiner et al. 2007; Brastow & Waller 2013; Turnbull & 
Dombrow 2007). Finally, listing agents may have conflicting incentives that lead them to act in 
the interest of the buyer’s agent or the homebuyer. For instance, if the listing agent is socially 
                                                          
19 This assumes a 50/50 split with the cooperating broker, a 60/40 split with the listing agent’s broker, and a 6% 
franchise fee. 
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connected to the homebuyer they may act in ways not beneficial to the seller. While listing 
agents have fiduciary responsibility to the seller, social or financial incentives may lead them to 
act in ways undesirable for the seller. 
2.3.1 Selection in Real Estate and Acquiring More Valuable Listings 
In this setting I explore the impact of social affiliations through geographically-assigned 
LDS church congregation boundaries on the types of listings real estate agents engage in, and the 
overall selection process. The data used on social affiliations were outlined in detail in the first 
chapter of this dissertation. As members of the social structure, agents have access to private and 
tacit information. Such information may include insight into potential affiliate-clients, such as 
when they would need an agent, their goals for selling the home, the state of their finances, and 
their personality. This information may also include insight into the home, including the quality 
of the home, how easy it will be to show, and potential selling price. These information 
advantages provide listing agents relative advantages in choosing clients to work with, which 
houses to list, and how best to secure potential listings. Moreover, listing agents may have access 
to this information earlier than non-affiliated agents. Such access to private, tacit, and timely 
information may provide affiliated agents advantages in identifying and securing valuable 
listings with affiliates, compared to non-affiliated agents. 
In addition to impacting information flows, social structures also create social pressures 
and preferences. Such social factors may lead listing agents to represent clients they would prefer 
to avoid, or to attempt to sell homes they otherwise would not. For instance, in an effort to 
maintain social reputation and avert social punishments agents may feel obligated to help clients 
list homes that are difficult to sell, or that are in poor repair. Similarly, social preferences may 
lead agents to take on less valuable listings (in terms of sale price) as they seek to “help out” 
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affiliated sellers. Such obligations and preferences may drive agents to list less valuable or lower 
quality homes, resulting in inferior economic outcomes for the agent and the firm.  
Conversely, social factors may lead to solidarity benefits that allow agents to engage in 
more valuable transactions. In-group preferences and shared norms, obligations, and 
expectations reduce concerns of agent opportunism and increase seller confidence that listing 
agents will deal fairly, give quality advice, and ultimately sell their home at a high price. These 
benefits may lead sellers to prefer transacting with affiliated agents to avoid potential for agent 
opportunism. Additionally, social factors may allow listing agents to list more valuable homes at 
lower levels of experience or reputation. When information is incomplete sellers are unable to 
use observables, such as sale prices of previously sold homes, to select a listing agent. In such 
cases, sellers may use outside referrals or rely on indirect measures of agent quality, including 
agent reputation, status, or experience. However, such information provides only noisy signals of 
agent quality, and may not convey useful information about the listing agent’s propensity to 
engage in opportunistic behavior. In the face of these uncertainties and the risk for opportunism, 
sellers may opt to use socially-affiliated agents, regardless of agent experience or reputation. 
This may especially be the case when sale prices (and consequently potential losses) are higher. 
Using affiliated agents mitigates seller concerns of opportunism, as they rely on social pressures 
and agent social preferences, and leads them to believe that agents will provide additional effort 
and a higher quality of service to maintain social reputation.  
2.4 Data 
The data used in this study were outlined in detail in the previous chapter. However, there 
are a few notable differences relative to this study. First, the sample includes all listings from 
1998-2014, regardless of whether they sold or not. This also includes listings that expired prior 
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to being sold. Second, I include listings only for agents whose first listing was after 1997. This 
allows me to more accurately measure agent experience, as it excludes agents from the sample 
who had been selling homes previous to 1998, for which data is unavailable. It is important to 
note, however, that these agents are included in the relevant control variables, such as the 
measure of current brokerage size. Third, in contrast to the first chapter, I do not restrict this 
sample by house price. While the previous study removed homes that were in the top and bottom 
½ of 1% in order to focus on common real estate transactions, this study uses no such restriction, 
instead including luxury and very inexpensive homes. It is important to note, however, that my 
results are not sensitive to excluding these observations. Finally, while the previous study 
focused mainly on listings that sold and the resultant selling price, this study focuses on initial 
listings and the resulting listing price. Consequently, control variables are also measured using 
data from the initial listing. For instance, agent experience is measured as the number of homes 
listed to date, and time controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed. 
In addition to the variables outlined in the previous chapter, I construct new variables that 
are important to this study. First, I construct a variable that compares the predicted original list 
price, based on home observables, with the actual original listing price. This variable helps 
control for the fact that homes may be over/underpriced when affiliates are used/not used. 
Second, I construct a measure of low home quality using the 81 descriptive dummy variables 
(from the public comments) detailed in the previous chapter. To measure low quality I create a 
variable that indicates whether or not the agent referenced low quality (e.g., “fixer-upper”, “tlc”, 
estate sale”, etc.) in the listing comments. Relatedly, I construct an additional measure of low 
quality that is the count of references to low quality. Finally, I include a subset of the 81 dummy 
variables as additional quality controls in many regressions.  
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2.5 Empirical Approach 
To investigate the impact of social affiliations from LDS congregation boundaries on 
selection, I use a variety of approaches and specifications. The first set of specifications treats the 
data as a cross-section, and explores the controlled correlations between affiliations and home 
listing price, size, and quality. The basic specification follows: 
Yh = α + β1*Xh + β2*Affiliationh + εh 
where Yh is the dependent variable, such as the log of original list price, Xh represents a vector of 
transaction controls, zip code dummies that act as geographic fixed effects, and year and month 
dummies that act as time fixed effects. Affiliationh is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the home is listed in the same ward or stake as the listing agent’s home address, 0 otherwise. I 
estimate this specification using ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression, with robust 
standard errors. The results of these models provide insight into the controlled correlations 
between social affiliations and the dependent variables. 
 The second set of models are “within” models, and investigate the impact of social 
affiliations on home listing price, size, and quality for a given agent or brokerage. These models 
are related to the first set of models, but include agent and/or brokerage fixed effects to 
investigate the within effect of listing for a social affiliate. The basic specification is: 
Yihj = αi + β1*Xh + β2*Affiliationih + ηj + εihj 
where Yihj is the dependent variable, such as the log of list price, for listing agent i selling house 
h while employed in brokerage j. Xh represents a vector of transaction characteristics, time fixed 
effects, and zip code dummies that act as geographic fixed effects. αi are listing agent fixed 
effects, ηj are listing brokerage fixed effects, and εihj are error terms. The unit of analysis is the 
agent/listing, or the brokerage/listing when agent fixed effects are omitted. These specifications 
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are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered by listing agent or listing 
brokerage. For discrete choice models I present results from OLS as they avoid bias from the 
incidental parameters problem (Neyman & Scott 1948). However, logistic regression results for 
each specification provide qualitatively similar results.  
 The third set of models used are similar to McFadden’s consumer choice models 
(McFadden 1973; McFadden 1980), and investigate the factors influencing the client’s choice of 
which listing agent to use. These models require the specification of a choice set, which can be 
thought of as the agents available to be chosen by clients for each listing. In such models 
specification of the choice set is important to the estimation and results, and consequently I 
specify this choice set in numerous ways. The primary results specify the choice set as those 
agents that live in the same zip code as the client selling their home (median=30 agents). 
Additional future analyses will specify the choice set as those agents that live in the same census 
tract, or within 2 or 5 miles of the client selling their home. These models then regress a dummy 
variable indicating the choice of agent on agent and brokerage characteristics, including presence 
of a social affiliation, agent experience, agent previous performance, typical agent listing price, 
geographical distance between the agent’s home address and the listing address, and brokerage 
characteristics. I also include interactions between the affiliation indicator and the agent and 
brokerage characteristics to estimate how affiliations influence the impact of each variable. The 
models are estimated as conditional logits, with robust standard errors clustered by listing. 
Because these models include listing fixed effects, the results are interpreted as the impact of 
affiliations and agent and brokerage characteristics on the probability that an agent in the choice 
set is chosen to list a home. The key assumptions are that the choice set is correctly defined, and 
that the choice of agent maximizes client utility.  
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 The last specification moves the unit of analysis to the agent/year level. This specification 
investigates the impact of the number of listings listed for affiliates in the previous year on the 
average price of listings listed by a given agent in the subsequent year. After controlling for time, 
agent success, and experience, this model provides insight into the feedback loop created by 
listing for affiliates in the recent past. The model is as follows: 
Log(Yit) = αi + β1*Log(Experienceit) + β2*Log(Affiliate Listingsit-1) + β3*Log(#Soldit-1) + 
β4*Log(#Soldit) + γt + εit 
where Yit
 is the average listing price for agent i in year t, Experienceit is the median level of 
experience for agent i in year t, Affiliate Listingsit-1 is the number of homes listed by agent i for 
affiliates in the previous year, #Soldit-1 and #Soldit are the number of homes listed by agent i in 
the previous/current year, αi are agent fixed effects, and γt are year fixed effects. This model is 
estimated using OLS, with the errors clustered at the agent level, and estimates the impact of the 
previous year’s number of affiliated listings on the current year’s average listing price for a given 
agent.  
It is important to note that a key aspect of this setting is that affiliations are imposed 
based on small geographically-assigned congregation boundaries. While not perfect, this allows 
me to largely avoid the endogeneity problem encountered in many related studies that occurs 
because affiliates are endogenously chosen (e.g., Mouw 2006). Given the small geographic areas 
of the congregations, and the difficulty in choosing certain wards or stakes to live in as they may 
change unexpectedly over time, the affiliations in this study are more exogenous than those 
encountered in many other studies. Moreover, many of these affiliations are formed through 
church interactions, or through church responsibilities. Consequently, interactions are often 
imposed on individuals, instead of chosen, and affiliates may differ significantly in preferences 
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or characteristics. While some affiliations will lead to friendships, many affiliations will likely 
remain acquaintances.  
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analyses. The 
average home in my sample lists for approximately $267,000, has 2723 square feet, and stays on 
the market 130 days. Eleven percent of homes are listed by agents that share a ward or stake with 
the home seller, and homes are listed on average for close to the predicted list price, based off 
home observables. About 8% of homes are short sales and 9% of homes are defined as low 
quality. The average agent has listed 84 homes. Table 2.2 provides these same statistics by 
affiliation, including T-tests for differences. The results of this table suggest that when social 
affiliations are present in a transaction homes are significantly more expensive, larger, and of 
higher quality. Interestingly, agents and brokerages appear significantly less experienced on 
affiliate listings. Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics and T-tests on the 81 quality and 
descriptive dummies constructed from the public comments. Each T-test reports the difference 
between a given quality or descriptive indicator when an affiliation is present, compared to when 
it is not. The results of this table provide detailed insight into quality differences by affiliation, 
and suggest that social affiliations are correlated with higher quality listings. 
Figures 2.2-2.6 graphically represent the differences between affiliate and non-affiliate 
listings. Figure 2.2 shows homes are typically more expensive when listed by affiliates, as 
evidenced by the distribution being shifted to the right. Results are similar when using final sale 
price. Figure 2.3 shows homes have fewer negative quality indicators when listed by affiliates, 
again suggesting listings for affiliates are higher quality. Figure 2.4 shows sellers typically use 
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smaller brokerages to list their home when affiliations are present, and Figure 2.5 shows that 
chosen agents are also significantly less experienced. Figure 2.6 shows that affiliations are 
correlated with higher listing prices for agents regardless of experience level. Moreover, the 
returns to experience appear similar when affiliations are present compared to when they are not. 
Consequently, the overall picture that emerges is that higher quality and more expensive homes 
are listed by social affiliates, on average, but that chosen affiliated agents typically work for 
smaller brokerages and are much less experienced. However, as these results do not include 
relevant controls, more complex analyses are needed.   
2.6.2 Acquiring More Valuable Listings 
I investigate the overall correlation between social affiliations and home price, size, and 
quality first using cross-sectional between effects models. Table 2.4 presents the results. After 
controlling for geography and geographical distance, time, agent experience, and other 
transaction differences, I find that social affiliations are associated with homes listing and selling 
for nearly 14% more than non-affiliated homes. Moreover, social affiliations are associated with 
11% larger homes, and higher quality homes. These results provide support to the results 
presented from the descriptive statistics, and again suggest that social affiliations may lead to 
better listings for agents and firms. However, because these analyses are between effects models 
they do not hold constant important variation within agents or brokerages that may lead to 
unobserved selection effects. The next results presented use fixed effects to investigate the 
correlations between home price, size, and quality within brokerages and agents. 
Table 2.5 presents results including brokerage fixed effects, with errors clustered by 
brokerage. These results can be interpreted as the within brokerage change in average listing 
price, home size, and home quality based on the presence of a social affiliation. I find that the 
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results are similar to the between models. These results suggest brokerages list 13% more 
expensive homes when listing for socially-affiliated clients, list larger homes, and are less likely 
to list low quality homes. Table 2.6 builds on these results by including agent fixed effects. 
These results are interpreted as the within agent change in average listing price, size, and quality 
when listing for affiliates. Again, these results are similar to the previous results. Agents list 
nearly 14% more expensive homes when listing for affiliates, list 14% larger homes, and list 
homes with 25% fewer negative quality attributions. Taken together, these results suggest that 
agents and brokerages list more expensive, larger, and higher quality homes when listing for 
socially-affiliated clients.  
To test the robustness of these results I ran multiple additional tests. The first test 
included a measure of distance in linear feet between the agent’s home address and the listing 
address. This variable more accurately controls for the impact of geographic distance between 
agent and client home addresses. The results from these analyses are similar to the results 
presented. However, because I am unable to accurately geocode all addresses results are 
presented from the zip code specifications to avoid reductions in sample size. For the second set 
of robustness tests I reran the models including a control for the ratio of the predicted list price to 
the actual list price. This variable controls for the over or underpricing of homes when affiliated 
agents are used. The results from these analyses are also similar to the presented results, 
suggesting that the observed increase in list price is not due simply to agents listing homes at 
higher prices. Overall, the results of multiple robustness checks indicate that the relationships 
presented in Tables 2.4-2.6 are robust to alternative specifications and the inclusion/exclusion of 
multiple control variables, including geographic distance.  
2.6.3 A Different Selection Process 
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I next investigate the difference in the selection process when social affiliations are 
present. Table 2.7 presents these results, which are estimated using conditional logit 
specifications with odds ratios reported. These models regress the probability that an agent is 
chosen to list a home on agent and brokerage characteristics. The results in column 1 suggest that 
both previous experience and social affiliations significantly increase the odds of an agent being 
chosen to list a home. However, the effect on affiliation is much larger, and the interaction 
between affiliation and experience is negative. Column 2 includes previous agent experience as 
an explanatory variable. The results for this model again suggest experience and affiliations have 
positive impacts on selection. However, it also suggests that previous agent performance is 
positively correlated with selection, and that there is a negative impact of affiliation on previous 
performance. Overall, these models suggest that affiliations lead to selection benefits and 
substitute for agent experience and previous performance. 
The third column of Table 2.7 includes a variable for brokerage size, a dummy for 
franchise brokerages, and a variable that measures the overall fit between agents and homes 
based on the difference between a given home’s price and the previous average home listing 
price for the agent. After including these variables the results again suggest there are significant 
positive effects from experience and previous performance, which are mitigated by affiliations. 
Additionally, the results suggest that franchise brokerages are more likely to be chosen by 
clients, but that the affect is again mitigated by affiliations. Finally, the fit variable suggests that 
as fit decreases (moves away from zero) agents are less likely to be chosen. However, the 
opposite occurs for affiliated agents. Even when fit is low they are more likely to be chosen.  
 The last column presents results that include a measure of linear distance between each 
agent and the home being listed. While this significantly decreases the sample size, due to the 
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current difficulty in accurately geocoding addresses for agents and homes, the estimated results 
are unchanged. Even after controlling for distance affiliated agents are significantly more likely 
to be chosen than non-affiliated agents. Moreover, the negative impacts on experience and 
previous performance from affiliations remain. 
2.6.4 Creation of a Feedback Loop 
Finally, I investigate whether agents can secure more valuable listings at lower levels of 
experience when listing for affiliates. Table 2.8 presents these results. The results in column 1 
suggest that agents generally list more expensive homes as experience increases. Column 2 
provides additional insight, showing that agents list homes that are 2.7% more expensive when 
they move into the lower middle 25% of the experience distribution, 4.4% more expensive 
homes when they move into the upper middle 25% of the distribution, and 5.3% more expensive 
homes when they move into the top 25% of the experience distribution. Interestingly, however, I 
find that agents list 12-14% more expensive homes when listing for affiliates, even after 
controlling for the effect of experience. Moreover, the results in column 3 suggest that agents list 
more expensive homes on average at low levels of experience when listing for affiliates than 
they do when listing for non-affiliates at the highest levels of experience. The results in column 3 
similarly show that agents don’t receive any additional penalty or benefit from experience when 
listing for affiliates than when listing for non-affiliates. This suggests agents may be able to 
leverage affiliations to list more expensive homes at low levels of experience. Moreover, it 
implies agents may be able to use such benefits to enter competitive markets. 
Table 2.9 presents results investigating the impact of listing for affiliates on subsequent 
average home list prices. These models regress the log of the average listing price for a given 
agent in year t on the log of the number of homes listed by that agent in the previous year, t-1. 
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Additionally, these models control for agent experience and the number of homes listed overall 
by the agent in the current and previous year. Columns 1 and 3 present results without agent 
fixed effects, and columns 2 and 4 results with agent fixed effects. The primary results, shown in 
the first two columns, suggest that listing homes for affiliates leads to a significant increase in 
the average agent list price of homes in the subsequent year. I find that a 50% increase in the 
number of homes listed for affiliates leads to a 1.3-3.25% increase in the average home listing 
price for agents in the subsequent year. Column 3 presents results restricting the sample to the 
first two years for each agent. The results from this analysis suggest that the effects are even 
larger for new entrants. Agents see an increase of over 3.5% in average home listing price for a 
50% increase in the number of homes previously listed for affiliates. Finally, the model in 
column 4 omits affiliate listings in year t from the calculation of the average list price. The 
estimated results are similar to those presented in column 2. Overall, the results of Table 2.9 
suggest that listing for affiliates has a significant positive impact on future home list prices, and 
provides support in favor of the feedback loop. Moreover, these findings suggest that affiliations 
can be leveraged as a resource to build experience and reputation, which then carries over to 
future transactions with non-affiliates. 
2.7 Robustness and Identifying Mechanisms 
Table 2.10 provides results from two additional sets of models. The first set of models 
estimates the impact of previous social affiliations on agent home list price and quality. As noted 
in the first chapter, congregation boundaries are often unexpectedly changed because of church 
growth or a need to rebalance church units. When such changes occur individuals do not relocate 
geographically, although the new boundaries significantly alter the social structure, including 
social interactions. In columns 1 and 2 I explore the impact of such shifts on the types of homes 
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agents list. I find that when listing for previous affiliates agents do not list homes that are 
significantly more expensive or that are of higher quality. This suggests that strong current social 
affiliations, and not simply geographic proximity, are driving the main results.  
The second set of models estimate the impact of affiliation strength on the types of homes 
agents list. As shown in the previous chapter (see Table 1.1 of Chapter 1), individuals in wards 
interact much more frequently that individuals affiliated only through the stake. Consequently, 
information and solidarity benefits are much stronger at the ward level than the stake level. It is 
important to note, however, that geographic distance between stake affiliates is still quite small 
on average. My results in columns 3 and 4 show that the selection effects are largest when 
affiliations are strongest. Agents list homes that are nearly 15% more expensive when listing for 
ward affiliates, and list homes that are approximately 9% more expensive when listing for stake 
affiliates (T-test p-value<0.01). The results in column 4 show that agents are no less likely to list 
low quality homes at the ward level compared to the stake level. Overall these results suggest 
that strong affiliations are driving the observed selection results.  
2.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter has investigated the impact of social affiliations between real estate listing 
agents and clients on the types of transactions agents engage in and the underlying selection 
process. The results suggest that affiliations lead to agents listing more expensive, larger, and 
higher quality homes. Moreover, agents list more expensive homes even at low levels of 
experience, and social affiliations substitute for the positive impacts of experience, previous 
performance, brokerage reputation, and fit in the selection process. Additionally, the results 
suggest that transacting with social affiliates generates a feedback loop that positively impacts 
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future transactions with non-affiliates, implying that agents can leverage affiliations to build 
valuable experience and reputation.  
Theoretically, this chapter makes a few key contributions. First, the results imply that the 
Matthew Effect and the positive benefits of status and reputation can be eroded by strong social 
affiliations between firms and clients. This suggests that incomplete information plays an 
important role in understanding the benefits of status and reputation, including their potential to 
lead to sustainable performance advantages, as it also may drive clients to prefer transacting with 
social affiliates. Second, and relatedly, while the literature has argued that those with strong 
reputation benefit most from social structures, the results of this chapter suggest that this is not 
the case under conditions of incomplete information. Finally, this research highlights the 
importance of understanding the link between trust, status, and reputation in explaining firm 
performance. 
This chapter similarly has important implications for firms. First, this study suggests that 
firms can potentially leverage social affiliations to enter crowded or competitive markets. Thus, 
managers need to carefully assess the potential impact of affiliations between employee-experts 
and clients when making hiring and staffing decisions. Second, these results suggest that 
allowing service experts to transact with socially-affiliated clients can lead to significant 
performance benefits for the firm. Instead of creating a “relief organization”, these affiliations 
provide key advantages to firms that can be leveraged as a resource to improve firm 
performance. Finally, this study suggests that sustained performance differences between firms 
in service industries may be driven, at least in part, by social affiliations between employees and 
clients.  
 99 
 
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, while my setting allows me to 
improve upon the endogeneity problem encountered in many network or social capital studies, 
which is inherent from individuals choosing who to affiliate with (e.g., Mouw 2006), the 
affiliations in this study are still not truly exogenous. Agents chose where to live, and agents and 
clients choose whether or not to engage in a transaction together. Second, as noted in the 
previous chapter, I am unable to measure the strength of affiliation (aside from the ward vs stake 
comparisons), or to identify which individuals are members of the LDS church. Finally, while 
the data include numerous elements that give insight into the selection process, many 
characteristics of agents and clients are unobserved. This includes variables such as age or 
gender. Including such variables may improve the selection model and provide added insights.  
Moving forward there is significant potential to extend this work. For instance, future 
work should investigate how varying levels and types of incomplete information influence the 
selection process, as well as returns to status or reputation. Future work could also more deeply 
investigate the competitive and entry implications from social affiliations. For instance, such 
work could focus on how access to valuable transactions at entry influences the emergence of 
superstar agents. The results of this chapter suggest that continued research focusing on the role 
of social structures in individual and firm performance is a worthwhile endeavor. 
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2.10 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of Potential Feedback Loop Created by Social Affiliations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Affiliations Correlated with Higher List Prices 
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Figure 2.3: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Listing Low Quality Homes 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Brokerage Size 
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Figure 2.5: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Agent Experience 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Correlation between Original List Price and Agent Experience, by Affiliation 
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Table 2.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Original list price 49823 266837 243415 5500 14.9 MM 
Square feet (sqft) 49823 2723.36 1447.12 500 28260 
Low quality (count) 49823 0.10 0.33 0 4 
Low quality (dummy) 49823 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Predicted list price/original list price 49823 1.00 0.20 0.55 2.15 
Predicted sold price/original list price 22637 1.05 0.18 0.66 1.90 
Sold 49823 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Days on mkt 49823 129.78 99.59 1 730 
Affiliation 49823 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Previous affiliation 49823 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Same ward agent/house 49823 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Same stake agent/house 46562 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Franchise brokerage 49823 0.42 0.49 0 1 
# list to date, agent 49823 84.01 188.51 1 1758 
# list to date, brokerage 49823 1087.81 1316.40 1 6219 
Short sale 49823 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Immediate possession 49823 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Co-agent present 49823 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Comments length 49785 201.61 62.75 0 244 
Year 49823 2007 3.73 1998 2014 
Month 49823 6.14 3.24 1 12 
Zip 49823 84306 297.78 84003 84664 
 
Table 2.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Affiliation  
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev T-Tests 
 
No Affiliation Affiliation P-value 
Original list price 258863 240714 331650 255290 0.000*** 
Square feet (sqft) 2664.29 1416.47 3203.55 1596.58 0.000*** 
Low quality (count) 0.11 0.34 0.06 0.26 0.000*** 
Low quality (dummy) 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.000*** 
Predicted list price/original list price 1.00 0.20 1.01 0.20 0.000*** 
Predicted sold price/original list price 1.05 0.18 1.07 0.18 0.000*** 
Sold 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.000*** 
Days on mkt 128.35 96.29 141.47 122.55 0.000*** 
Franchise brokerage 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.020** 
# list to date, agent 85.63 190.75 70.84 168.57 0.000*** 
# list to date, brokerage 1094.2 1320.59 1035.83 1280.77 0.002*** 
Short sale 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.000*** 
Immediate possession 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.000*** 
Co-agent present 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.410 
Comments length 200.31 63.49 212.32 55.13 0.000*** 
 
N= 44365 N= 5458 
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Table 2.3: Difference between House Quality Indicators for Affiliates and Non-Affiliates 
Quality Indicators Mean Difference P-value Quality Indicators Mean Difference P-value 
TLC † 0.008 -0.0030 0.010*** Custom ‡ 0.077 0.0369 0.000*** 
Needs Updating † 0.001 -0.0013 0.023** Unique 0.007 0.0011 0.331 
Estate Sale † 0.001 -0.0002 0.664 Maple 0.022 0.0152 0.000*** 
Foreclosure † 0.003 -0.0017 0.024** Newer ‡ 0.041 -0.0080 0.005*** 
Handyman † 0.001 -0.0005 0.261 Hurry/Will Not Last ‡ 0.290 -0.0108 0.000*** 
As-Is † 0.009 -0.0054 0.000*** Pride ‡ 0.002 0.0013 0.047** 
Rehabber † 0.0003 -0.0003 0.206 Clean ‡ 0.053 -0.0099 0.002*** 
Bank-Owned † 0.005 -0.0033 0.001*** Quiet ‡ 0.077 0.0007 0.848 
Priced to Sell 0.020 -0.0004 0.825 Dream ‡ 0.010 0.0021 0.151 
Motivated 0.030 -0.0006 0.799 Block 0.139 -0.0035 0.038** 
Potential † 0.012 -0.0030 0.052* Huge 0.098 0.0126 0.003*** 
Close 0.190 -0.0224 0.000*** Deck 0.062 0.0181 0.000*** 
! 0.440 -0.0104 0.145 Mint ‡ 0.001 -0.0009 0.040** 
New ‡ 0.294 -0.0282 0.000*** Hardwood 0.073 0.0079 0.035** 
Spacious 0.068 0.1450 0.000*** Views 0.124 0.0458 0.000*** 
Elegance ‡ 0.007 0.0018 0.146 New Roof/New Shingles ‡ 0.013 -0.0012 0.485 
Beautiful ‡ 0.208 0.0352 0.000*** Upgraded/Updated ‡ 0.153 0.0056 0.282 
Remodeled/Renovated ‡ 0.049 -0.0078 0.011** Vaulted 0.116 0.0043 0.351 
Historic/Vintage 0.003 -0.0027 0.001*** Floor plan 0.111 0.1709 0.000*** 
Maintained/Well-Cared ‡ 0.025 -0.0036 0.107 Award ‡ 0.002 0.0006 0.408 
Wonderful ‡ 0.056 0.0131 0.000*** Hot Tub 0.019 -0.0000 0.995 
Fantastic ‡ 0.029 0.0035 0.152 Tile 0.132 -0.0209 0.000*** 
Charming 0.013 -0.0007 0.652 Cul-de-sac 0.042 0.0112 0.000*** 
Stunning ‡ 0.009 0.0031 0.022** Jetted Tub 0.053 0.0072 0.026** 
Amazing ‡ 0.034 0.0048 0.062* Park 0.140 0.0644 0.000*** 
Granite 0.087 0.0331 0.000*** Brick 0.036 0.0046 0.084* 
Immaculate ‡ 0.031 0.0036 0.148 Value † 0.030 -0.0119 0.000*** 
Breathtaking ‡ 0.005 0.0038 0.000*** Windows ‡ 0.047 -0.0018 0.543 
Neighborhood 0.137 0.0303 0.000*** Mother-in-law 0.029 0.0052 0.031** 
Spectacular ‡ 0.013 0.0089 0.000*** Stainless 0.032 0.0039 0.119 
Landscaped ‡ 0.100 0.0124 0.004*** Theater 0.028 0.0524 0.000*** 
Stained (Art) Glass 0.001 0.0004 0.177 Surround Sound 0.010 0.0043 0.002*** 
Built-in ‡ 0.028 0.0081 0.001*** Pickiest ‡ 0.007 0.0001 0.927 
Tasteful 0.003 0.0003 0.688 Rare ‡ 0.008 0.0023 0.069* 
Must See ‡ 0.079 -0.0010 0.792 Starter † 0.033 -0.0153 0.000*** 
Fabulous ‡ 0.144 0.0024 0.168 Master 0.164 0.0073 0.167 
Leaded † 0.001 -0.0004 0.344 Cute 0.017 -0.0061 0.001*** 
Delightful 0.001 -0.0009 0.043** Warranty ‡ 0.022 0.0042 0.050** 
Move-In ‡ 0.031 0.0002 0.922 Temple 0.009 0.0052 0.000*** 
Gourmet ‡ 0.010 0.0052 0.000*** Fenced 0.082 -0.0025 0.520 
Corian 0.005 0.0017 0.099* N=49823 
Note: “Difference” if the difference in means, computed by subtracting the mean for non-affiliate houses from the mean for affiliate 
houses for each variable. P-values are from T-tests with the null hypothesis that the difference between affiliate and non-affiliate 
homes for each variable is zero. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † indicates variables used in the low quality 
measure. Quality controls in the tables below include all variables denoted with either † or ‡. 
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Table 2.4: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality 
Homes  
  (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: 
Log(List 
Price) 
Log(List 
Price) 
Log(Square 
Feet) 
Low 
Quality 
Pr(Low 
Quality) 
Affiliation 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.109*** -0.041*** 0.594*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.037) 
Log(# of houses listed to date) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.114*** -0.003*** 0.965*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) 
Owner agent 0.021** 0.023*** 0.038*** -0.005 0.966 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.072) 
Co-agent present 0.007 0.005 0.036*** -0.009*** 0.928** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.034) 
Immediate possession -0.033*** -0.016*** 0.007 0.023*** 1.188*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.043) 
Short sale -0.045*** -0.045*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 1.613*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.090) 
Comments length    0.0002*** 1.002*** 
    (0.0000) (0.0001) 
      
Constant 12.185*** 12.163*** 7.824*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) 
 
     
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Quality Controls N Y N N N 
Brokerage Fixed Effects N N N N N 
Agent Fixed Effects N N N N N 
R2 0.327 0.419 0.207 0.016 0.025 
Observations 49823 49823 49823 49785 48776 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Models 1-4 are estimated using OLS, and Model 5 using Logistic 
regression with odds ratios reported. Difference in observation numbers in Model 5 is due to a zip code predicting 
failures perfectly. Results for Model 4 are robust to estimating using count models. Time controls include year and 
month dummies for when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code dummies; Quality controls include 
low quality descriptive indicators as well as the other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.5: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality 
Homes (Within Brokerage)  
  (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: 
Log(List 
Price) 
Log(List 
Price) 
Log(Square 
Feet) 
Low 
Quality 
Pr(Low 
Quality) 
Affiliation 0.130*** 0.109*** 0.109*** -0.033*** -0.029*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log(# of houses listed to date) 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.116*** -0.004* -0.004** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Owner agent 0.029** 0.026** 0.037*** -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) 
Co-agent present 0.006 0.002 0.025** -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Immediate possession -0.027** -0.011 0.011 0.032*** 0.024*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) 
Short sale -0.040*** -0.040*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) 
Comments length    0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
Constant 12.180*** 12.159*** 7.837*** 0.070*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.013) (0.022) 
 
     
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Brokerage Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Quality Controls N Y N N N 
Agent Fixed Effects N N N N N 
R2 0.380 0.462 0.265 0.063 0.068 
Observations 49823 49823 49823 49785 49785 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Models 1-5 are estimated using OLS. Results for Model 4 are 
robust to estimating using count models. Time controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed; 
Geographic controls include zip code dummies; Quality controls include low quality descriptive indicators as well as the 
other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.6: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality 
Homes (Within Agent and Brokerage) 
  (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: 
Log(List 
Price) 
Log(List 
Price) 
Log(Square 
Feet) 
Low 
Quality 
Pr(Low 
Quality) 
Affiliation 0.135*** 0.112*** 0.139*** -0.025*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(# of houses listed to date) 0.016** 0.010* 0.018*** -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Owner agent 0.032** 0.034*** 0.028** -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) 
Co-agent present 0.024* 0.022* 0.024* -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005) 
Immediate possession -0.033*** -0.021*** 0.002 0.033*** 0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Short sale -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
Comments length    0.0002*** 0.0001*** 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
Constant 12.217*** 12.191*** 7.87*** 0.127*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.045) (0.030) (0.026) 
 
     
Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Brokerage Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Agent Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Quality Controls N Y N N N 
R2 0.480 0.547 0.372 0.164 0.176 
Observations 49823 49823 49823 49785 49785 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing brokerage. Models are estimated using OLS. 
Results for Model 4 are robust to estimating using count models. Time controls include year and month dummies for 
when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code dummies; Quality controls include low quality 
descriptive indicators as well as the other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.7: Investigating how Affiliations Impact the Selection Process- Conditional Logit 
Models  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Pr(Chosen) Pr(Chosen) Pr(Chosen) Pr(Chosen) 
Affiliation 6.735*** 7.803*** 8.074*** 6.799*** 
 
(0.380) (0.608) (0.755) (0.768) 
Log(Avg. # homes sold overallt) 1.549*** 1.272*** 1.286*** 1.274*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.036) 
Affiliation X Log(Avg. # homes sold overallt) 0.905*** 0.930** 0.930** 0.931* 
 
(0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.039) 
Log(# homes sold in yeart-1)  1.575*** 1.517*** 1.498*** 
  (0.040) (0.039) (0.058) 
Affiliation X Log(# homes sold in yeart-1)  0.858*** 0.862*** 0.725*** 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) 
Franchise brokerage   1.125***  
   (0.041)  
Affiliation X Franchise brokerage   0.829***  
   (0.049)  
Log(# of agents in brokeraget)   0.967**  
   (0.013)  
Affiliation X Log(# of agents in brokeraget)   0.974  
   (0.021)  
Difference from avg. list price   0.328***  
   (0.019)  
Affiliation X Difference from avg. list price   1.170**  
   (0.088)  
Linear distance between agent and home    0.999*** 
    (0.000) 
     
Listing Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.101 0.102 0.114 0.122 
Observations 389438 256622 256622 69551 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing. Odds ratios reported. Choice set is specified as all 
agents that live in the same zip code as the home being sold. Future models will include additional specifications of the choice set. 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.8: Social Affiliations and Relationship with Experience or Reputation  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log(List Price) Log(List Price) Log(List Price) 
Affiliation 0.123*** 0.135*** 0.123*** 
 
(0.030) (0.019) (0.016) 
Log(# of houses listed to date) 0.015**   
 (0.006)   
Affiliation X Log(# of houses listed to date) 0.004   
 (0.011)   
# of houses listed to date (lower middle 25%)  0.027** 0.026*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
# of houses listed to date (upper middle 25%)  0.044** 0.039** 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
# of houses listed to date (top 25%)  0.053* 0.053* 
 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Affiliation X # houses (lower middle 25%)   0.008 
   (0.023) 
Affiliation X # houses (upper middle 25%)   0.043 
   (0.037) 
Affiliation X # houses (top 25%)   -0.002 
   (0.073) 
    
Constant 12.218*** 12.241*** 12.244*** 
 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) 
 
   
Geographic Controls Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y 
Brokerage Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Agent Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y 
R2 0.480 0.480 0.480 
Observations 49823 49823 49823 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing agent. Models are estimated using OLS. 
Time controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code 
dummies. Transaction controls include dummy variables for owner agents, presence of a co-agent, immediate 
possession, and short sales. Results are similar to including quality controls. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.9: Feedback Loop Generated by Listing for Affiliates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: 
Log(Average 
List Price)t 
Log(Average 
List Price) t 
Log(Average 
List Price) t 
Log(Average 
List Price) t 
Log(# of homes listed for affiliates)t-1 0.065*** 0.026** 0.071*** 0.024* 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.026) (0.014) 
Log(# of homes listed to date, median for year) t 0.034*** 0.043** 0.033 0.055** 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.042) (0.024) 
Log(# of homes listed total)t-1 -0.045*** -0.012* -0.031 -0.024* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.034) (0.014) 
Log(# of homes listed total)t 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.034 0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013) 
     
Constant 11.952*** 11.893*** 11.942*** 11.869*** 
 
(0.040) (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) 
 
    
Time Controls Y Y Y Y 
Agent Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
R2 0.152 0.615 0.180 0.599 
Observations 7032 7032 1809 6602 
Sample All Years All Years First 2 Years All Years 
Note: Unit of analysis is the agent/year. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing agent. Column 4 omits 
affiliation listings in year t from the calculation of the mean list price. Difference in observations is due to years where agents listed 
exclusively for affiliates. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 2.10: Selection Effects Largest with Strong Affiliations and Disappears with 
Affiliations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log(List Price) Low Quality Log(List Price) Low Quality 
Affiliation 0.113*** -0.025***   
 (0.016) (0.006)   
Previous affiliation 0.032 0.008   
 (0.038) (0.024)   
Same ward agent/house   0.147*** -0.024*** 
 
  (0.020) (0.008) 
Same stake agent/house   0.087*** -0.027*** 
 
  (0.019) (0.008) 
     
Constant 12.190*** 0.127*** 12.188*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.051) (0.030) (0.049) (0.029) 
     Geographic Controls Y Y Y Y 
Time Controls Y Y Y Y 
Brokerage Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Agent Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Transaction Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quality Controls Y N Y N 
R2 0.547 0.164 0.552 0.157 
Observations 49823 49823 46562 45574 
Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing agent. Models are estimated using OLS. Time 
controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code dummies; 
Quality controls include low quality descriptive indicators as well as the other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Transaction 
controls include dummy variables for owner agents, presence of a co-agent, immediate possession, and short sales. Significance 
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
This chapter proposes and tests a theoretical framework on how workplace awards affect 
employee motivation and performance, arguing that award programs have complex 
consequences that critically depend on individual differences in motivation across tasks. Our 
theory builds on the existing literature's focus on the direct, positive effect of awards on 
employees who previously lacked motivation for the now-awarded task, and argues that awards 
can have deleterious effects on performance for employees with high pre-existing task 
motivation. Most novelly, the theory predicts that these employees also suffer reduced 
motivation and performance in tasks not included in the award program. Data from an attendance 
award program implemented at one of five industrial laundry plants shows evidence consistent 
with our theory. The program improved performance for employees with attendance issues prior 
to award introduction, but this effect disappeared once an employee lost award eligibility, and 
was achieved partly by gaming the award rules. In contrast, workers with perfect pre-program 
attendance suffered worse attendance after losing eligibility. This employee group also lost 8% 
efficiency in daily laundry tasks after introduction. Our chapter suggests that even purely 
symbolic awards can generate gaming and crowding out costs that may spill over to other 
important tasks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
A large literature in management, social psychology, and economics has focused on how 
monetary reward policies such as pay for performance can motivate employee productivity 
(Prendergast 1999; Gerhart et al. 2009; Larkin et al. 2012). Although monetary rewards can 
powerfully motivate productive behavior (Eisenberger et al. 1999; Prendergast 1999), they also 
can generate dysfunctional consequences (Lepper and Green 1978; Gneezy et al. 2011). 
Multitasking theory holds that workers who engage in multiple tasks will focus on rewarded 
tasks at the expense of others (Milgrom and Roberts 1991), leading to costly gaming that 
increases an individual’s pay while harming the organization (Kerr 1975; Obloj and Sengul 
2012). The introduction of monetary rewards, which increase extrinsic motivation for a task 
(Amabile 1993), may also “crowd out” an employee’s intrinsic or other non-reward based 
motivation (Deci et al. 1999). 
These and other costs of monetary rewards are one reason that managers often use 
nonmonetary but still extrinsically oriented rewards such as status and prestige (Silverman 
2004). Corporate award programs are one of the most common nonmonetary extrinsic rewards in 
firms (Frey 2007). One recent survey suggests that over 80% of corporations use award 
programs such as “employee of the month,” “top sales club,” and awards for innovative ideas or 
suggestions (Garr 2012). Although practitioners have long argued that awards extrinsically 
motivate employees without the financial or psychological costs of formal compensation (e.g., 
Davidson 1999), academics have only recently studied such programs (Frey and Neckermann 
2008). The small but growing awards literature has focused almost exclusively on the benefits, 
arguing that awards motivate employees through mechanisms that include status-based 
competition and social comparison (Markham et al. 2002; Moldovanu et al. 2007; Kosfeld and 
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Neckermann 2011), increased self-esteem (Kuhnen and Tymula 2010), and strengthened 
identification with the employer (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Neckermann et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, this literature argues that corporate awards and performance recognition programs 
achieve this motivation with little or no cost (Besley and Ghatak 2008; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 
2011), avoiding the costs associated with monetary rewards by habituating positive behavior 
through mechanisms such as increased organizational loyalty (Frey and Neckermann 2008; 
Neckermann et al. 2014). 
In this chapter, we argue that existing work on awards largely ignores three dimensions 
that are critical to a comprehensive theory of award-based motivation. First, the literature seldom 
considers individual differences in employee motivation and thus ignores the impact of an award 
on employees who were already highly motivated towards the now-awarded task. Second, the 
literature almost exclusively examines the impact of the award on the task for which it is given, 
and not on other tasks. Finally, the literature does not consider the effect of losing eligibility for 
an award during the program, which is common in awards based on specific, well-defined rules 
(Garr, 2012). Our theory suggests that awards carry costs beyond the simple prize money and 
program implementation costs, and can even negatively affect the motivation of some employees 
on certain tasks. While the net impact of an award program may still be positive, it is crucial to 
consider not just the direct effect of awards on the intended employees and tasks, but also the 
indirect effects previously ignored by the literature. Our chapter builds a comprehensive theory 
that combines these direct and indirect effects. Given the widespread use of corporate awards 
and the growing scholarly interest in them, we see the need for a more nuanced and realistic 
theory—one that incorporates task, employee, and eligibility.  
We address this need by integrating theories of multitasking and crowding out to 
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construct a theory of how employees with heterogeneous levels of motivation towards a task 
react to the introduction of an award, with respect to both the awarded task and other tasks. Our 
theory also builds predictions about how losing the opportunity to win an award affects these 
same employee-and-task pairs. Crucially, we hold that an employee’s response to the 
introduction of a task-specific award will depend on her pre-existing motivation for that task. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that a corporate award will increase performance of the awarded 
task by employees who had previously performed it poorly, and who therefore had low task 
motivation in the absence of formal rewards. We classify these workers as “reward-motivated.”  
However, drawing from multitasking theory, we hold that these reward-motivated 
employees will strategically respond to the formal program rules and only take actions that 
directly increase their chances of winning. We further argue that multitasking theory implies that 
once a reward-motivated employee loses award eligibility, her performance will return to pre-
reward levels. These hypotheses directly contrast with arguments in the existing awards literature 
that awards enhance organizational loyalty and habituate positive behavior.  
We also build hypotheses about how the introduction of a task-specific award affects 
employees who were already performing that task well. Research in social psychology and 
economics suggests a host of reasons that employees might be motivated to perform a given task 
well, even without a formal reward, and strong individual differences in which of these reasons 
primarily motivates an employee (Grant, 2007; Sauermann and Cohen 2010). These primarily 
“internal” mechanisms include pure intrinsic motivation, prosocial motivation, social pressure, 
and others. We classify workers with such motivations as “internally motivated,” identifying 
them by high task performance in the absence of a formal financial or nonmonetary reward. We 
argue that with the institution of an award program, internally motivated employees will suffer 
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from motivational crowding out, manifesting as reduced performance when they lose their 
eligibility.  
Our most novel contribution is to extend and combine the theories of crowding out and 
multitasking to predict that the introduction of an award will lead to the crowding out of internal 
motivation in domains other than the awarded task. Although multitasking theory does consider 
indirect spillovers that reduce performance on nonrewarded tasks, the mechanism for this 
reduction is a rational decrease in effort due to an overall effort constraint and not due to a 
decrease in intrinsic motivation. We argue that the introduction of a task-specific award will lead 
to negative motivational spillovers, whereby an employee who had been internally motivated for 
the awarded task will lose motivation for a different task, even without the effort constraint 
central to multitasking theory. We argue that negative motivational spillovers result from the 
award program violating a psychological contract between the firm and its internally motivated 
employees that is based on perceptions of fairness and equity. The award program, by offering 
recognition to employees who had previously shown little concern for the task, insufficiently 
acknowledges the prior contributions of those who had already been doing the task well for non-
reward based reasons.  
We empirically test our theory by studying an attendance award program implemented in 
an industrial laundry plant in the Midwestern United States. In March 2011, the managers at one 
of the company’s five plants independently—but systematically and carefully—implemented a 
monthly attendance award program that recognized all employees with perfect attendance, and 
awarded one such employee, randomly selected from all those with perfect attendance in that 
month, a $75 gift card. Perfect attendance was defined to cover both punctuality and a lack of 
unexcused absences. The independent implementation of the award at only one plant allows us to 
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investigate its effect in a quasi-experimental way, using employees at the other four plants as a 
quasi-control group for the single “treated” plant.  
In line with both our theory and the previous literature, we find that the award improved 
the attendance of employees with previously poor attendance. However, consistent with 
multitasking theory, there is clear evidence that employees took actions to stay eligible for the 
award, even if those actions ran contrary to the spirit of the award. For example, employees were 
far more likely to take unplanned “single absences” by calling in sick, likely on days when they 
anticipated arriving late for work. Before the award was introduced, these employees were likely 
to simply arrive late, but the award appears to have caused them to call in sick so as not to lose 
their eligibility for the award. Furthermore, once an employee became disqualified for the award 
in a given month, she immediately reverted to her pre-award level of attendance and punctuality, 
suggesting that the award did not increase baseline motivation for good attendance.  
We also find significant evidence that employees who were already highly motivated for 
attendance before the award program suffered from crowding out once it was introduced. 
Employees with perfect attendance and punctuality in the pre-award period were 5.5 times more 
likely than similar employees in the control group to have a second attendance issue in a given 
month once an initial event had disqualified them from the award. This is consistent with 
crowding out theory, which argues that the introduction and then removal of an extrinsic 
motivator will reduce an employee’s intrinsic motivation for the task. 
Most strikingly, we find evidence for negative motivational spillovers from the award. 
Employees with perfect pre-award attendance and punctuality reduced their average laundry task 
productivity by 8% after the introduction of the award. In contrast to the direct crowding out of 
motivation for attendance, which occurred only after an employee was disqualified for the award 
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in a given month, this indirect crowding out of work productivity occurs from the start of the 
month, when the employee is still eligible for the award. Notably, attendance and punctuality do 
not affect the company’s measure of productivity, so this result cannot be from traditional 
multitasking based on effort allocation decisions.  
Overall, this chapter builds and tests a theory of negative motivational spillovers that 
bridges the multitasking notion of reduced performance on an uncompensated task and the 
crowding out idea that extrinsic rewards can reduce intrinsic motivation. By considering 
heterogeneity across task, employee type, and eligibility for the award, we build and test a 
nuanced theory of the impact of awards on employee and corporate performance. 
3.2 Theoretical Development 
3.2.1 A Taxonomy on Motivation from Awards 
Figure 3.1 presents the theoretical framework developed in this section, which is based on three 
dimensions that are critical to predicting the effects of awards: employee motivational type, task 
type, and eligibility. In our framework, employees are defined as either “internally-motivated” 
(performing highly on the awarded task absent the award) or “reward-motivated” (only 
performing highly with the extrinsic award program). Tasks are divided between those that are 
awarded and those that are not. At any given time, employees are either still eligible to win the 
award or are no longer eligible, depending on their performance on the awarded task and the 
rules of the award program.  
Our paper’s theoretical design begins with the one combination presented in existing 
literature—the performance of eligible, reward-motivated employees on the awarded task. We 
term this the “direct effect” of an award, and argue that there are two direct effects. First, as 
existing empirical studies demonstrate, reward-motivated employees improve performance on 
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the task while eligible under the program rules. Second, as implied by multitasking theory but 
not shown in prior work, reward-motivated employees strategically game program rules to 
improve chances of winning, even when this undermines the spirit of the program. 
We then extend existing award theory by arguing that award programs have “indirect 
effects” on motivation and productivity based on the three incomplete assumptions in prior 
studies on direct effects: 1) that all employees lack full motivation for the awarded task absent 
the award; 2) that the award only affects motivation and performance on the awarded task; and 3) 
that the award’s impact is constant once introduced, regardless of a given employee’s eligibility 
based on the program’s rules. This chapter’s unique theoretical contribution is to explain and 
empirically show that these indirect effects of award programs from employee heterogeneity, 
motivational spillovers to other tasks, and eligibility produce substantial economic costs.  
Like most of the empirical literature on motivation, throughout the chapter we use task 
performance absent formal rewards as a proxy for internal motivation. Therefore, in our setting, 
we classify those employees with high task performance without formal rewards as “internally 
motivated” towards that task, compared to those with low task performance absent formal 
rewards who we earlier designated as “reward-motivated” towards that task. As we note in the 
chapter’s empirical section, an important component of our empirical setting is the absence of 
long-term career-based rewards such as promotion, which might extrinsically motivate high 
performance even without short-term formal rewards. 
3.2.2 Direct Effects of Awards on Motivation  
Direct effects on effort: Although monetary rewards remain important for extrinsic motivation, 
scholars have long been interested in the effect of nonmonetary rewards on effort, motivation, 
and job performance. Large bodies of theoretical literature in sociology, economics, and 
 123 
 
psychology explain why nonmonetary extrinsic rewards motivate employees through desire for 
status and social recognition among peers and employers (Blau 1964; Greenberg 1988; Grant 
and Gino 2010) and for social approval (Akerlof 1980; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Andreoni and 
Bernheim 2009). Sociologists (Olson 1965; Sewell et al. 1969) and, more recently, economists 
(Frank 1985; Frey 2006; Ariely et al. 2009; Ederer and Patacconi 2010) have also noted that 
individuals are motivated by the prospect of prestige, rank, and respect.  
Award programs, perhaps the most prominent example of formal, nonmonetary extrinsic 
motivation policies in firms, have been understudied by academic researchers despite their 
widespread use (Frey and Neckermann 2008). Although no standard definition exists for 
“award,” scholars note that corporate awards contain four fundamental traits: they involve a 
formal program set up by managers; they involve public recognition for performance; they 
involve the award of something valuable, such as money, a certificate or trophy; and they 
involve scarcity or competition, since not everyone can win (Frey and Neckermann 2008). 
An emerging body of empirical research on awards is almost universally positive about 
their effects on employee performance. Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), for example, show a 
short-term motivational effect in experiments with students, while Neckermann et al. (2014) 
found that unannounced symbolic awards in a call center increased performance on nonawarded 
tasks for both award recipients and nonrecipients. Notably, Neckermann et al. (2014) is the only 
paper, to our knowledge, that has considered the possibility of spillovers across tasks and it only 
examines positive spillovers. Other studies have found award programs to improve motivation 
for critical but typically uncompensated employee behaviors such as attendance (Scott and 
Markham 1982; Markham et al. 2002).  
Although most research does not cleanly identify the precise mechanism behind the 
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motivational increase from award programs, the empirical settings almost all involve significant 
peer recognition for the award. Interestingly, for awards involving a small financial reward 
(ranging from $5 to $100), the size of the reward does not affect the size of the improvement in 
employee response (Frey and Neckermann 2008), suggesting that the primary motivational 
benefit from the award is often not financial. A small number of laboratory (Huberman et al. 
2004) and field (Larkin 2010) studies even suggest that some employees are willing to pay for 
the peer recognition that stems from winning an award. Recognition and status amongst peers 
appears to be the largest source of motivation from corporate awards, an argument previously 
advanced in behavioral economics (Frey 2006). 
The implication of this literature is that employees who lack motivation in the absence of 
formal rewards, and thus exhibit low performance absent an extrinsic reward, will have the 
greatest increase in motivation and productivity due to the extrinsic motivation of an award. The 
literature on awards almost always makes a critical and usually unstated assumption that 
employees are capable of improving their performance on the awarded task. This, in turn, 
implicitly assumes that employees whose performance improves due the award had previously 
lacked the motivation—rather than the ability—to perform that well, since the introduction of an 
award does not change employee skill. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: The introduction of an award program for a previously 
unrewarded task improves performance on that task for employees who had 
previously performed poorly on it (that is, reward-motivated employees). 
Direct effects on gaming: The existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the direct 
effect of awards presented in Hypothesis 1a—task-specific motivation for reward-motivated 
employees. Yet a second and under-studied direct effect is that employees will strategically 
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respond to corporate reward systems by carefully following the formal rules to maximize their 
reward, even when these actions are costly to the employer. Gaming of award program rules 
stems directly from multitasking theory in economics (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). In 
multitasking theory, the use of extrinsic rewards for a task inherently draws away effort and 
attention from other, nonrewarded tasks, creating negative performance spillovers on the second 
task (Prendergast 1999). It is in practice highly difficult to design reward programs that perfectly 
align employee action to the interests of the firm, and firms therefore use reward systems that are 
prone to distortive, manipulative behavior by workers (Kerr 1975). Empirical research 
demonstrates that such gaming behavior is rampant in many commonly-used monetary reward 
systems, and that this behavior is highly costly to employers (Oyer 1998; Obloj and Sengul 2012; 
Larkin 2014). 
 In empirical work, multitasking and gaming have been almost exclusively applied to the 
use of monetary rewards. However, the predictions from the multitasking literature naturally 
extend to any type of formal extrinsic reward system used in corporations. Indeed, formal 
economic models of nonmonetary rewards effectively treat these rewards as equivalent to 
monetary rewards in terms of the mechanisms by which they affect motivation (Benabou and 
Tirole 2006).  
Although the existing literature has not examined multitasking and gaming in an awards 
setting, we believe that the predictions from the multitasking literature apply directly to the use 
of awards. As noted above, awards represent a strong motivational tool for reward-focused 
agents not otherwise motivated for the task at hand. It is natural to expect awards to lead to 
dysfunctional multitasking behavior where agents focus on the rules rather than the spirit of the 
award program. If employees at least partially respond to awards rationally and strategically, as 
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predicted by multitasking theory, we should expect them to manipulate rules to improve their 
probability of winning. 
Hypothesis 1b: Reward-motivated employees who respond to an award with 
increased performance will on average achieve some of this increase by 
manipulating the rules of the system.  
In terms of our taxonomy, both Hypotheses 1a and 1b represent direct effects of the 
award program, since they focus on the effect of the award on the awarded task for reward-
motivated employees. Hypothesis 1a serves as a concise summary of the empirically-supported 
hypotheses in the vast majority of existing work on awards, and provides a useful summary of 
the existing theory in the taxonomy of our theory. We would therefore expect our empirical 
findings to corroborate this well-known result. Hypothesis 1b, while new to the awards literature, 
follows directly from the vast literature on multitasking and gaming. 
3.2.3 The Indirect Effect of Awards 
We next present the effect of award introduction when at least one of the criteria classifying the 
direct effect does not hold; that is, when employees are internally-motivated, when they are no 
longer eligible for the award, and/or when they work on non-awarded tasks. 
Motivation reversion after lost eligibility: Multitasking theory holds that employees pay 
careful attention to the rules of a reward program. In an award setting, one of the most important 
sets of rules involves exactly how the award winners are determined. Although not always the 
case, awards are commonly based on ex-ante criteria specifying the process by which the award 
winners will be selected, and these criteria usually imply that, at some point, employees who lack 
sufficient performance on the award criteria become ineligible for the award, even before the 
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winners are determined (Garr, 2012).  
Multitasking theory predicts that agents care only about the rules governing the reward 
program, not its spirit. If employees respond to awards by gaming the rules to increase their 
chance of winning, they logically will respond to the loss of eligibility by ceasing to be 
motivated by the award program. It is notable that much of the research on nonmonetary 
extrinsic motivators posits that these rewards can provide a subtle habituation of desired 
behavior through mechanisms such as increased organizational loyalty or the learning of positive 
habits (Frey and Neckermann 2008; Acland and Levy 2012; Allcott and Rogers 2014). Our 
theory predicts the opposite – that the loss of award eligibility will cause a motivation reversion 
such that reward-motivation employees return to their pre-award level of motivation. Formally: 
Hypothesis 2: Reward-motivated employees who respond to an award with increased 
performance will revert to their lower pre-award performance once ineligible for the 
award. 
Crowding out internal motivation: Social psychologists and management scholars have long 
recognized that some employees may have strong task-specific motivation that stems from 
sources other than external rewards. Intrinsic motivation, the value a worker receives simply 
from enjoying the task itself (Amabile et al. 1994), is the most widely studied alternative to 
motivation based on extrinsic rewards. Psychologists have demonstrated that it can generate 
learning, creativity, enjoyment, and effort (Deci 1971, 1975; Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and 
Deci 2000) and ultimately lead to improved productivity (Shamir 1991; Grant 2008). Workers 
who receive no formal extrinsic rewards for particular tasks may also be motivated through 
extrinsic social mechanisms such as prosocial motivation, peer image, and social pressure and 
through psychological mechanisms such as gratitude (Deci 1971; Hackman and Oldham 1975; 
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Benabou and Tirole 2006; Grant 2007; Mas and Moretti 2009; Grant and Gino 2010; 
Wrzesniewski et al. 2014). Although separating these motivational mechanisms is difficult, we 
note that our theory is not dependent on a high level of internal motivation stemming from purely 
intrinsic factors. 
It is critical to note that the research on intrinsic and other internal motivations has found 
them to be person-task traits, not person-specific traits that apply to all tasks (Fehr and Falk 
2002; Grant 2007; Grant and Berry 2011). Employees with internal motivation toward one task 
may require extrinsic rewards to perform highly on another.  
Many social psychologists and an increasing number of economists argue that the 
introduction of extrinsic rewards can substitute for—or crowd out—intrinsic motivation through 
a number of mechanisms (Deci and Ryan 1985; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Desire for 
competence on the job, for example, is one of the leading mechanisms for intrinsic motivation in 
self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2002), and can be “crowded out” as an external reward 
shifts the lens through which an employee views a behavior. Prior to the introduction of an 
extrinsic reward, the employee may pursue a behavior because she perceives it as what a 
competent employee does, but once a reward has been introduced, she may instead perceive that 
behavior as something that gets her a reward (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a). Later research has 
focused on the role of image in crowding out (Benabou and Tirole 2006; Grant and Mayer 2009; 
Lacetera and Macis 2010), a critical mechanism because of the importance of image in 
motivating prosocial behavior. Although the lens by which peers view and judge one’s actions is 
an extrinsic factor, intrinsically motivated actors can become demotivated if they feel others will 
view their actions as opportunistic or extrinsically motivated (Ariely et al. 2009). This might 
occur, for instance, if the external perception of the motives behind a given worker’s prosocial 
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behavior shifts from “a desire to be a ‘good’ employee” to “a desire to win an award and receive 
social recognition.” 
Laboratory and field evidence on crowding out abounds. However, as Prendergast (1999) 
notes, only a few papers provide any empirical evidence on crowding out in firms (Holmas et al. 
2010; Bareket-Bojmel et al. 2014; Hossain and Li 2014). In some ways, this is unsurprising: 
firms more often track performance data for tasks that they reward than for nonrewarded tasks. 
Also, previous research has not examined the introduction of a reward for an unrewarded activity 
and the subsequent removal of it. Even if crowding out exists, the effect of the reward 
introduction on overall motivation is ambiguous because it depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the gain in extrinsic motivation and the drop in intrinsic motivation. The net effect of introducing 
an extrinsic reward therefore crucially depends on its size (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b). Our 
theory, therefore, does not yield a prediction about the direct effect of an award on the awarded 
task for internally motivated employees. While the award is in place, these employees will have 
increased extrinsic but decreased intrinsic motivation, yielding an ambiguous overall effect on 
performance. 
However, adding the award eligibility dimension provides a clear prediction of the effect 
of an award on internally-motivated employees. Specifically, crowding out theory 
unambiguously predicts reduced motivation and performance once a reward is introduced and 
then removed (Deci et al. 1999). The reward’s removal eliminates the extrinsic motivation but 
the intrinsic motivation does not return. Our earlier hypotheses suggest that the increased 
extrinsic motivation brings increased focus on the award program rules, including those around 
eligibility. If the award introduction increases the extrinsic motivation of an internally-motivated 
employee but reduces her internal motivation, then by the same logic underlying Hypothesis 2, 
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the employee’s loss of eligibility will lead to reduced extrinsic motivation. The net effect on 
motivation for internally-motivated employees from ineligibility following award introduction is 
therefore unambiguously negative, compared to the period before the award was introduced. This 
is because the introduction of the extrinsic reward reduced internal motivation, but the loss of 
eligibility eliminates any increase in extrinsic motivation from the award. Formally:   
Hypothesis 3: Performance on the now-awarded task by internally-motivated 
employees will be lower than pre-award performance after the employee loses 
eligibility. 
Negative motivational spillovers on nonawarded tasks: Although the introduction of an award 
should most directly affect the awarded task, it may also impact other tasks. Multitasking theory 
predicts that extrinsic rewards should only reduce effort and performance on other tasks if there 
is a direct tradeoff in effort required; otherwise, it predicts that a reward for one task should have 
no impact on another. Most studies in economics and social psychology on employee 
performance have little to say on such possible interactions in the absence of effort constraints, 
instead focusing on the performance of individual tasks. Crucially, we focus on why tasks 
without a tradeoff in effort allocation might still incur negative motivational spillovers from the 
introduction of an award on one task but not the other. This part of the theory therefore combines 
elements of multitasking from economics and crowding out from social psychology. 
Why might the motivations for two tasks be related? The theory of psychological 
contracts holds that employees form an implicit exchange agreement with employers that 
governs their overall relationship and influences their individual day-to-day actions (Levinson et 
al. 1962; Rousseau 1989; Rousseau and Greller 1994). Notably, some employee actions are 
governed by transactional considerations such as the exchange of compensation for productive 
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effort. Transactional considerations can play a crucial supporting role in sustaining the deeper, 
longer-lived relational contract between employee and employer (MacNeil 1985). However, 
most employee actions are relational and are governed not by explicit rewards, but by a more 
complex implicit contract involving shared values (MacNeil 1985). The implication of this is that 
if an award or other nonmonetary extrinsic reward for one relational task undermines the 
employee-employer relationship, then this, in turn, is likely to affect the performance of other 
relational tasks.   
The introduction of a reward might change the implicit contract between employees and 
employer because it might affect perceptions of fairness and equity, which are critical for 
maintaining psychological contracts (Robinson and Rousseau 1994). In equity theory (Adams 
1965), individuals compare the ratio of their rewards to their contributions with those of others, 
the comparisons tending to be unfavorable due to individuals overestimating their own 
contributions (Festinger 1954). Perceptions of inequity are known to both decrease effort and 
productivity as well as increase counterproductive behaviors such as cheating and dishonesty 
(e.g., Greenberg 1990; Gino and Pierce 2009; John et al. 2014; Edelman and Larkin 2014). 
Introducing an award for a task which an internally-motivated employee previously 
considered part of the relational contract with the employer could engender feelings of 
unfairness. This occurs because employees who previously were not motivated to perform well 
on the task are able to gain peer recognition by changing their behavior and winning the award. 
Since internally-motivated employees had previously exhibited the now-awarded behavior 
without receiving any reward or special recognition, the implementation of an award program 
creates feelings of inequity in their minds by failing to recognize (reward) these prior 
contributions. Furthermore, the award introduction would reclassify high performance as 
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transactional rather than relational (Feldheim 1999) by introducing formal recognition for strong 
performance, causing internally-motivated employees to feel that their psychological contract 
with the employer had been violated.  
Because an employee’s relational contract with the employer is complex and governs all 
nontransactional noncompensated portions of her work (Rousseau and Parks 1993), the literature 
on breach of psychological contract focuses on reductions in aggregate measures such as loyalty, 
commitment, and overall job motivation (Cullinane and Dundon 2006). However, we 
hypothesize that a violation of a psychological contract by transactionalizing a task with an 
award will reduce an employee’s nonreward motivation for nontransactional tasks governed by 
the relational contract. The impact of this breach on internal motivation—and thereby on task 
performance—will occur only for internally motivated employees who were highly motivated 
for the now-awarded task. This idea, which we term negative motivational spillovers, is 
formalized by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Introducing an award for a task will cause employees who are internally 
motivated for that task to perform other tasks less well than they did in the pre-award 
period. 
Crucially, the negative motivational spillovers from an award introduction are not 
dependent on award ineligibility. According to our theory, the mere introduction of the reward 
will reduce motivation and performance on the non-awarded task for internally-motivated 
employees, even when an employee is eligible for the award on the awarded task. Empirically, of 
course, we must distinguish this reduced performance from the more standard multitasking 
argument; in the next section, we discuss how the two tasks in our study do not involve an effort 
tradeoff, which is the theoretical mechanism behind multitasking in economics.  
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We also note that Hypothesis 4 will hold for any nonawarded task for which the 
employee who is internally motivated for the awarded task also has some motivation outside the 
formal rewards system. The nonawarded task may be formally rewarded by the firm, but our 
hypothesis is contingent on the employee also having some nonreward motivation for it. 
In contrast to negative motivational spillovers for internally-motivated employees, our 
theory does not predict negative spillovers for employees who are reward-motivated for the 
awarded task. This is because the relational contract between these employees and the firm is not 
violated by the introduction of a reward on a task for which they do not have pre-existing 
motivation.  
3.2.4 Summary of Theory and Hypotheses 
 Figure 3.1 outlines the three dimensions by which our theory extends the existing 
literature on the impact of awards on employee motivation and performance: employee-task 
motivation, task, and eligibility. Notably, our theory incorporates existing empirical findings 
(Hypothesis 1a) and theoretical implications (Hypothesis 1b) on the direct effect of awards for 
reward-motivated employees. More novelly, it builds three new hypotheses on the indirect effect 
of corporate awards that combine multitasking theory from economics (Hypothesis 2), crowding 
out theory from the literature on motivation (Hypothesis 3), and equity theory from social 
psychology (Hypothesis 4).  
3.3 Empirical Setting 
Our setting is an industrial laundry cleaning company in the Midwestern United States, which we 
will refer to as LaundryCo. LaundryCo is a leading regional provider of work uniforms, 
professional work apparel, and commercial laundry cleaning services. Their services primarily 
include the selling, cleaning, and repairing of work uniforms and small workplace items such as 
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mats, towels, and mop heads. Nearly all of the cleaning services occur at five plants, which are 
similar in layout, machinery, staffing positions, and products.  
The production process at LaundryCo is complex. Each day, route-service representatives 
drop off soiled uniforms, which go through a complex process with many interdependent tasks 
before they are returned to customers. The process involves sorting garments by type and soil 
level, washing with a specific temperature and chemical mix, drying and pressing, inspecting to 
ensure that garments with missing buttons or other problems are fixed, and sorting for the quick 
loading of clean garments to return to customers. Non-uniform items undergo a similar process, 
but extra steps are often involved, such as rolling laundered floor mats or folding and bundling 
hand towels. Workers are cross-trained on many tasks, but tend to specialize in a few, amongst 
which they alternate throughout each day. As with most labor-intensive service operations, 
LaundryCo is highly dependent on worker efficiency. Inefficiency results both from mistakes, 
such as incorrect sorting, and when the productivity of upstream workers lags, leaving 
downstream workers idle.  
Each plant is supervised by two managers who focus on efficiency and worker 
productivity. These managers enjoy substantial autonomy in the policies they implement to 
increase efficiency. Each plant has about 35 employees. To facilitate the transfer of garments 
though each stage of the cleaning process, LaundryCo attempts to give each plant an open and 
uncluttered layout. One consequence of this layout is that employees can clearly observe each 
other’s behavior. They can see, for example, who is late or absent, and they interact frequently as 
they switch between tasks. In addition to formal work interactions, LaundryCo also puts 
significant effort into building a “friendly” workplace through programs such as birthday 
recognition, company barbeques, fundraisers, and “alumni” reunions.  
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LaundryCo tracks individual productivity, measuring how many garments a worker 
processes for each task each day. The company then uses the task’s time-studied rate, determined 
by corporate headquarters, to calculate the employee’s productivity on that task. Scores are 
normalized such that a score of 100 reflects performance that meets expectations. For example, 
the time-studied rate for pressing dress shirts is 50.4 seconds, meaning an employee would have 
to press over 71 shirts in an hour to earn a score of 100. For each worker, the system computes 
overall daily productivity, equal to the weighted average (by time spent) of the worker’s 
productivity scores on each task that day. For example, a worker who spent two hours pressing 
dress shirts with an efficiency score of 80, two hours rolling mats with a score of 140, and four 
hours sorting cleaned clothes with a score of 160 would have a final daily productivity of 135. 
LaundryCo workers are paid using a piece-rate bonus system, with a guaranteed base 
hourly rate and hourly wage bonuses for daily productivity above the expected 100, up to a 
maximum bonus at 140. The bonus system differs slightly across plants, although the 
productivity cutoffs are the same across all plants. The study’s treatment plant uses a linear 
increase in hourly pay as productivity increases from 100 to 140. The four other plants give 
employees discrete wage increases at 120 and 140. Interviews with management suggest that 
because workers do not know their precise productivity while working, the two compensation 
systems are similar in their incentive effects. Daily efficiency is normally distributed around a 
mean of 115, with high performers in the 130-150 range, and low performers between 80 and 
100 (see Appendix 2).  
Given the externalities generated by the plant’s upstream-downstream nature, arriving 
consistently and on time is essential to operational efficiency. Tardiness and unexpected absence 
both contribute to inefficiency, since one section of the plant may be understaffed. Even if the 
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plant manager finds a substitute for that section, that substitute must abandon another task and 
will likely not be as efficient in the job as the missing worker, which can lead to downstream 
idling time. LaundryCo therefore has relatively detailed policies concerning tardiness and 
attendance. Repeated tardiness first precipitates a written warning from the plant manager. The 
third warning in a year results in suspension from work and the fourth results in termination. 
However, LaundryCo leaves the administration of this policy to individual plant managers, who 
are usually lenient towards slight or occasional tardiness. The difficulty and cost of finding and 
training replacement workers discourages managers from terminating such employees. 
Attendance policies allow workers to take excused absences for sickness or vacation. To 
be counted as excused, an absence must be scheduled with the company. Sickness is considered 
excused if the employee notifies the manager even a few minutes before the start of the shift. 
Each employee is given a fixed number of paid time-off (PTO) days each year that can be used 
for any absence, excused or unexcused. Although the nature of the absence does not affect the 
use of PTO days, LaundryCo does track unexcused absences and plant managers may issue 
formal warnings and eventually terminate an employee with too many. Interviews with 
management revealed that employees often call in right before their shift to excuse an absence.  
3.3.1 Attendance Award Program  
In an effort to encourage fewer unexcused absences and less tardiness, the general and plant 
managers at one LaundryCo plant (hereafter referred to as “Plant 1” or “the treatment plant”) 
implemented an award program that recognized the employees who had perfect attendance in a 
given month and awarded one of them, randomly selected, a $75 gift card to a local restaurant or 
store. Perfect attendance was defined as having no unexcused absences and no “tardies.” An 
unexcused absence was defined as an absence of which the employee did not notify the plant 
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management in advance, while a “tardy” was defined as being more than five minutes late for a 
shift. The names of all award-eligible employees in a given month—those with perfect 
attendance according to the rules—were announced at a monthly plant-wide meeting early in the 
following month. The previous winner randomly selected the new winner by drawing a name out 
of a hat.  
The plant manager announced the program in mid-February 2011 and it began on March 
1. It lasted 10 months and was terminated by corporate headquarters, with the last award given 
for December 2011. In an average month 20 employees were eligible, meaning that the expected 
value of the award was less than $4, the equivalent of about 20 minutes of work. The expected 
monetary value of the award is therefore negligible.  
In the course of our research, we carried out a series of interviews with LaundryCo 
managers about their experience with the attendance award program.20 The managers at the 
treatment plant stated that they decided to introduce the award because certain employees’ 
punctuality and attendance problems were affecting plant productivity and because they “hadn’t 
really tried out awards as incentives too much.” Crucially, the managers stated that they did not 
feel that their plant’s punctuality, attendance, or performance problems differed from those of the 
other plants. Interviews with managers from other plants corroborate that the treatment plant did 
not differ on attendance and punctuality.  
Managers of the treatment plant did not discuss their plan with the executive team at 
LaundryCo or with managers of other plants. They believed the award would be a cost-effective 
way to improve attendance and punctuality. The managers also believed that the close-knit plant 
culture and the fact that many employees had worked together for so many years would make the 
                                                          
20 The appendix (Appendix 2) contains more details from our interviews and managers’ interpretation of our study’s 
results. 
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competition and the chance for any employee with perfect attendance to win motivational. In 
short, the managers felt that even if the plan failed, $75 in gift cards per month was a small 
investment and the maximum expected cost of the program (apart from the minimal managerial 
time needed to run the program).  
Senior executives at LaundryCo informed us that, while they believe in the motivational 
benefits of incentives and awards, they do not believe that “employees should be rewarded for 
something they are supposed to be doing anyways [coming on time to work each day].” They 
therefore terminated the award program after hearing about it in a company human resource 
meeting in early December 2011. The treatment plant managers were disappointed when the 
award was shut down. While they understood top management’s objections, they also felt that a 
large number of employees liked the program and that it had improved attendance and 
punctuality. They did state that while they had heard some “grumblings” from employees about 
the fairness of the award program, they hadn’t considered the impact this might have on 
motivation or productivity, apart from better punctuality and attendance by employees with a 
checkered history and the potential downstream benefits on productivity.  
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy  
The introduction of the award at one plant and the existence of several similar plants without 
awards represent a type of quasi-experiment that is frequently used to estimate policy effects 
(Gertler et al. 2011). We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) design to assess the impact of the 
attendance award on the punctuality, attendance, and productivity of Plant 1’s workers. The DiD 
design treats LaundryCo’s other four plants as a quasi-control group. The DiD strategy 
“differences out” fixed differences between Plant 1 and the control group plants and uses post-
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treatment changes at the control group plants as a counterfactual for what would have happened 
at Plant 1 had it not introduced the award.  
3.4.2. Data 
We use a 21-month panel of daily worker-level data that spans two periods: the period before 
Plant 1 introduced the award, which we call the “pre-award” period (12 months), and the period 
when Plant 1 had the award program in place, which we call the “award period” (9 months). 
These data include punctuality and attendance measures, as well as measures of daily worker 
productivity for 218 workers in five plants between March 1st, 2010 and November 30th, 2011. 
The typical observation details an individual worker’s daily record, including clock-in and clock-
out times, information on items worked on, productivity ratings for each item, overall daily 
productivity output, whether the employee was absent or not, and demographic variables such as 
tenure, age, gender, and marital status.  
Employees generally had set shift times, but these sometimes shifted slightly due to 
seasonal demand. We did not have access to LaundryCo’s employee schedules and therefore 
inferred a worker’s shift from her observed clock-in and clock-out times and the list of actual 
shift times. We shared our coding with the plant manager at Plant 1, and he agreed that our 
manual coding was both appropriate and accurate for normal weekday shifts. Since our manual 
coding was less accurate on days when the worker arranged to come in late, switched shifts with 
other workers, or worked extra hours, we restricted our analysis to weekdays, dropped 
observations in which an employee worked less than 7.5 hours of an 8.5 hour shift, and dropped 
observations that indicated a worker was more than an hour early or late for a shift. This affected 
less than 1% of the weekday observations, and our results are qualitatively similar to including 
these observations.  
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3.4.3 Dependent Variables 
We use five main dependent variables. The first three (tardy, minutes late, absent) are 
performance metrics that the plant managers hoped to improve through the attendance award 
program. Tardy is a dummy variable indicating that a given worker showed up more than five 
minutes late on a given day and is one metric for disqualification in the award program; the other 
disqualifying event is an unexcused absence. Minutes late is a continuous measure of the minutes 
and seconds late an employee showed up to work; it has a negative value if the employee 
clocked in early. Absent is a dummy variable indicating that the worker was absent from work 
for reasons other than public holidays, workers compensation days, suspensions, family medical 
leave, and funerals. However, we do not observe whether an absence was excused or unexcused. 
Single absence is a dummy variable similar to absent, but it only takes the value of 1 if an 
employee was absent on a given day but not absent the previous or following workday. The last 
dependent variable, daily worker efficiency, is the worker’s productivity efficiency number for a 
given day. We winsorized this variable to two standard deviations from the mean because 
managers suggested that severe outliers were likely errors. Using the nonwinsorized data does 
not significantly change our results.  
3.4.4 Validity of Difference-in-Differences Approach 
DiD strategies do not require that treatment and control groups be the same, and are explicitly 
designed to allow comparison of treatment and control groups that are different in observable 
ways (Gertler et al. 2011). Any difference in the two groups that does not change 
contemporaneously with the treatment event does not affect the statistical estimates of treatment. 
In our case, however, the treatment and control plants are very similar on most dimensions. All 
five plants work on the same range of tasks, use the same production technology, and share a 
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common floor layout. Also, two of the control group plants are geographically proximate to Plant 
1 (32 and 34 miles), and therefore help control for local shocks, such as weather, that might 
affect tardiness. All five plants had the same attendance policies and enforcement procedures.  
The biggest difference between Plant 1 and the control group plants is that Plant 1 is 
unionized. This leads to some clear differences between the treatment and control groups, as seen 
in Table 3.1 (see Appendix 2 for employee-level statistics). Although employees in both groups 
are similar in age, those at Plant 1 have higher tenure and wages, and include more males. 
However, employees at Plant 1 had levels of tardiness and attendance similar to those of control 
plant employees. Also, there is no evidence of differential time trends in employee tenure, 
wages, or other key variables. Since DiD studies “difference out” fixed differences between 
treatment and control group units, only differences which change across time can bias the results 
(Gertler et al. 2011). In our case, the differences in the makeup of the treatment and control 
plants appear stable and therefore do not affect our statistical estimates. 
3.4.5 Empirical Specification 
We use a standard DiD specification to estimate the impact of the award on the dependent 
variables:  
Yit = αi +β1* TREAT_GRPi +β2* POSTTREATt +β3* TREAT_GRPi*POSTTREATt + ϒt +εit 
where Yit is the dependent variable, TREAT_GRP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is 
in the treatment group and 0 otherwise, POSTTREAT is a dummy variable equal to 1 for dates 
after the award program went into effect and 0 otherwise, and TREAT_GRP*POSTTREAT is the 
interaction of the two previous variables. The coefficient on this interaction (β3) estimates the 
treatment effect; to conserve space, we simply label this variable as treatment in the results 
tables. Our specification takes advantage of the panel nature of the data by introducing a full set 
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of fixed effects, including worker fixed effects (αi), which account for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity, and time fixed effects (ϒt), which account for time trends across months, days in 
the month, and days of the week. In specifications with worker fixed effects, the variable 
TREAT_GRP is absorbed. Similarly, POSTTREAT is absorbed by the time fixed effects.   
All the regressions reported in the chapter were estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Three of the five dependent variables are binary, but logit or probit models perform 
poorly when predicting rare events such as the ones in this study (King and Zeng 2001). In 
contrast, OLS specifications result in unbiased coefficient estimates (Stewart 2009) but incorrect 
standard errors. However, DiD models typically underestimate standard errors regardless of the 
specification (Bertrand et al. 2004), so we bootstrap standard errors for all regressions in the 
study. Therefore, OLS is appropriate for coefficient estimation for all five of our dependent 
variables. In contrast to other approaches, such as the rare events logistic model, OLS is also 
convenient in terms of time required to bootstrap and in ease of coefficient interpretation. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Basic Treatment Effects 
Table 3.2 shows the regression results of the average treatment effect for the five dependent 
variables that represent performance in the study. The award caused substantial improvement on 
two of the three performance metrics that the managers attempted to influence (tardy, minutes 
late, and absent). There was a 1.5-percentage-point reduction in tardiness at Plant 1, or a 45% 
reduction from the pre-award baseline of 3.3%. In addition, the average worker clocked in nearly 
a minute earlier, a reduction in minutes late of about 39% from the pre-award baseline of -2.03. 
We do not observe a statistically significant treatment effect on absences, although the use of 
single absences increased by nearly 40% from a baseline of 1.5%, a result we discuss later. 
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Finally, the award did not lead to overall changes in laundry task efficiency.  
DiD models are known to produce false positives due to serial correlation issues 
(Bertrand et al. 2004). Random assignment of treatment groups and dates can lead to significant 
effects some 45% of the time. While bootstrapping standard errors helps alleviate this problem, 
we present placebo tests on our main results in the appendix (Figure A2.3 and Table A2.1) that 
demonstrate our results are unlikely to be spurious. 
Two other typical confounds in DiD models are that an unobserved contemporaneous 
change led to the identified effects and that the results stem from simple mean reversion. 
Although it is impossible in field studies to definitively disprove these confounds, plotting the 
effect over time can help alleviate the concern (Gertler et al. 2011). If the identified effect 
happens exactly upon treatment, then it is less likely that the effect is due to an unobserved 
change or to mean reversion. Figure 3.2 shows treatment effects from a regression using 
individual treatment-month dummies. As seen in the figure, the treatment effect is largest and 
most statistically significant in the month just after the award is introduced. Figure 3.2 therefore 
lends evidence to the argument that the award introduction causally leads to the identified 
effects. In fact, Figure 3.2 also suggests that the effect of the award may dampen over time, a 
finding we discuss in the final section of the chapter.  
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Employee Response: The Direct Effect of Awards 
While the award program appears to have led to at least some of the behavior desired by the 
managers who implemented it, our hypotheses all involve heterogeneous responses by 
employees based on their motivation towards attendance and punctuality. To examine worker 
heterogeneity in pre-existing motivation for the awarded task, for both treatment and control 
plants we split workers into groups based on their propensity for tardiness before the award was 
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put in place. Nearly 32% of workers had no tardies during the twelve-month period before the 
award was implemented, while nearly 20% of workers were tardy once a month or more. 
Between these extremes, just over 10% of workers were tardy once every six months or less, 
12% of workers were tardy once every four to six months, and 26% of workers were tardy every 
month to three months.  
In the results shown below, we split the sample into “low tardy” and “high tardy” groups 
at the median level of pre-award tardiness, or one tardy every four months. This yields 116 
workers in the “low tardy” group, and 102 in the “high tardy” group. The “low tardy” group 
corresponds to the internally motivated employee group in our framework, since they exhibited 
high performance on punctuality without any formal reward for this task. The “high tardy” group 
corresponds to the reward-motivated group in our theory, and exhibited frequent tardiness in the 
pre-award period. We note that some of the “high tardy” group workers may also demonstrate 
some internal motivation towards attendance. We also repeated our models using alternative 
group definitions. The results are robust to any definition of “low tardy” up to one tardy every 
four months, including only using employees with no pre-award tardies in the “low tardy” group. 
Our results are also robust to splitting the sample into “no tardy,” “low tardy,” and “high tardy” 
workers. 
There are two common methods for comparing heterogeneous treatment effects that are 
equivalent when implemented properly (Fink et al. 2012): interaction effects and subsample 
analysis. Because the treatment effect in DiD models is already an interaction term, we report 
subsample analyses to avoid difficulty in interpretation from triple interactions (Gelman and 
Pardoe 2007). It is important to note that these subsample analyses, like all the statistical tests in 
this chapter, are done relative to the relevant control group of employees. A subsample analysis 
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focusing on, for example, the effect of the award on employees with perfect attendance before 
the award program compares the behavior of employees with perfect pre-award attendance at the 
treatment plant with employees with perfect pre-award attendance at control group plants. 
The effect of the award on tardy and minutes late is shown in Table 3.3. The “high tardy” 
group decreases its rate of tardiness by 2 percentage points, or about 36% from a baseline of 
5.6%, although they do not decrease minutes late significantly. This is initial evidence for 
Hypothesis 1b – that reward-motivated employees game the award eligibility rules by clocking 
in no later than five minutes late, rather than by truly improving punctuality on the average day. 
This effect can be seen more clearly in Figure 3.3, which shows the percentage change for “high 
tardy” workers in the treatment and control plants for employees clocking in at various intervals 
on the minutes late scale. In the treatment plant there was a large reduction in employees 
clocking in seven or more minutes late, but nearly all of the change goes into the mass of 
employees clocking in between four and five minutes late. Employees in the treatment plant are 
over 50% more likely to clock-in just before this five minute cutoff compared to the control 
group after award introduction. There are no other improvements in minutes late when 
comparing to the control group, except for this shift.  
Table 3.4, which shows the treatment effect on the absence and single absence variables, 
contains further evidence on gaming of the award system. The positive and significant results on 
single absence for “high tardy” employees suggests they were significantly more likely to take a 
single day off in a given week. Our interviews suggest this result was caused by “high tardy” 
employees calling in sick on days they otherwise would have arrived late. It is inconceivable that 
the award caused employees to become sick more often, but is consistent with our hypotheses 
that the award would cause an employee to call in sick in order to maintain award eligibility. By 
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strategically taking a sick day, these employees were able to maintain eligibility for the award.  
It is telling, and consistent with our theory, that we find corresponding evidence of 
manipulation by the “low tardy” workers, as our theory suggests they might also experience 
increases in reward motivation. While the overall performance for the “low tardy” group on 
tardy and minutes late did not change, the award appears to have caused previously internally-
motivated employees to view perfect attendance through a reward-oriented lens, since they 
apparently began gaming the eligibility system in ways similar to reward-motivated employees. 
Overall, the subsample analysis strongly supports our theory on the direct effect of 
awards. Hypothesis 1a, which states that employees not motivated prior to the award will 
perform better on the awarded task, is directly supported by the large reduction in tardiness. 
Hypothesis 1b, which states that some of the better performance will come via rule manipulation, 
is supported by the lack of an effect on minutes late, and the results on single absences. Our 
results therefore corroborate the existing literature as to the direct effect of awards, and suggest 
that awards cause both positive improvements and gaming behavior. 
3.5.3 Motivation Reversion after Loss of Eligibility 
The above results suggest a conscious response to the award by reward-motivated employees—
those with low performance on the awarded task before the award program began. Hypothesis 2 
predicted that the loss of eligibility for the award would cause reward-motivated employees to 
revert to their previous poor performance. We test this hypothesis by splitting the treatment 
dummy variable into two separate dummy variables. A pre-fail dummy indicates that, as of the 
start of the day in question, an employee has not yet had a disqualifying event in the month in 
question. A post-fail dummy indicates that, as of the start of the day in question, the employee 
has already been disqualified for the current month’s award due to a tardy or an unplanned 
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absence. For each treatment day, one or the other of these variables equals 1. 
 The results for the tardy dependent variable are shown in Table 3.5. The “high tardy” 
group reduces its level of tardiness while eligible for the award (as shown by the negative and 
significant coefficient on the pre-fail dummy). However, their degree of tardiness is no different 
than it was in the pre-award period once they are no longer eligible for the award in a given 
month (as shown by the insignificant coefficients on the post-fail dummy). Similarly, Table A2.3 
in the appendix shows that the average employee arrives nearly a minute earlier while still 
eligible for the award, but after she loses eligibility, her minutes late is not different from pre-
award levels. Hypothesis 2b, stating that the behavior of reward-motivated employees will revert 
to pre-award behavior once they lose eligibility for the award, is supported. 
3.5.4 Crowding Out Internal Motivation 
Table 3.5 also has direct evidence for Hypothesis 3, which states that nonreward motivation for 
the awarded task will be crowded out for the subgroup of employees with high pre-award task 
motivation. This can be seen in the positive and significant coefficient on the post-fail dummy 
for the “low tardy” group. Once a “low tardy” employee has become disqualified for the award 
in a given month, she is 5.5 times more likely than “low tardy” employees in the control group to 
have a second failure in attendance or punctuality. The award caused employees who had 
previously had good punctuality to have significantly worse punctuality once the extrinsic 
reward was removed, which clearly suggests crowding out. Again, the lack of an effect in the 
pre-fail period is also consistent with our theory, which argues that the presence of the extrinsic 
reward leads to an ambiguous overall effect on an internally motivated employee’s performance 
as long as she is still eligible for the award.  
3.5.5 Negative Motivational Spillovers on Nonawarded Tasks  
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We next examine the effect of the award on employee performance on a separate task 
domain. LaundryCo employees are assigned one or more laundry tasks over a workday. Since 
the efficiency measure is based on actual working hours, their performance on the laundry task is 
not affected by their punctuality or attendance. This is because making a greater or lesser effort 
to be punctual does not make their assigned laundry tasks easier or more difficult. This is 
especially true because punctuality on a given day generally does not affect take-home pay, 
because employees clocking in seven or less minutes late are paid as if they started on time. In 
only 1.8% of observations do employees clock in eight or more minutes late. Our results are not 
affected by using only the 98.2% of observations in which an employee is no more than seven 
minutes late. Therefore, any change in laundry task performance is not resulting from effort 
towards punctuality. 
We first analyze the direct effect of the award on employees’ productivity on their 
assigned laundry tasks. The results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 4, internally motivated “low tardy” employees suffer a drop in productivity of over 9 
points, a reduction of over 8%. The productivity of “high tardy” employees does not change due 
to the award, which is consistent with our supposition that reward-motivated employees would 
not feel that the award violated their psychological contract. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 show 
the same results broken down by award eligibility. As predicted, the productivity reduction 
appears larger while the “low tardy” employee is still eligible for the award; the result on the 
post-fail dummy is also positive, but with a p-value of only 0.17, likely because there are few 
employee-days for the “low tardy” group in the post-fail cell. The coefficients for the pre- and -
post-fail dummies are nearly identical. Consistent with our theory, the reduced laundry task 
productivity from the award occurs immediately and is not due to loss of eligibility for the 
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award. 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study builds a more sophisticated and realistic theory of the effect of corporate awards on 
employee motivation and subsequent performance. We hypothesized that the almost universally 
positive nature of the empirical literature on awards is due to its focus on a single case—
employees who had previously lacked the motivation for high performance. By integrating 
theory from economics and social psychology—most notably the theories of multitasking, 
motivational crowding out, and psychological contracts between employers and employees—we 
hypothesized that the introduction of a corporate award would have heterogeneous effects on 
employee-task pairs, depending on an employee’s pre-award level of motivation towards the 
awarded task.  
Our empirical results are corroboratory of both existing studies and the extensions 
presented in our theory. Indeed, at face value, the award used in the study was effective at 
motivating the average employee on the awarded task, in that it reduced average tardiness and 
encouraged workers to show up earlier for their shifts. This direct result of the award is highly 
consistent with the existing awards literature. However, these gains were driven entirely by the 
subset of reward-motivated workers who lack the internal motivation for consistent attendance 
and punctuality. Furthermore, these employees appear to have improved at least partially by 
manipulating the rules of the award system. Finally, the performance improvement of reward-
based employees disappears once an employee becomes ineligible for the award in a given 
month. 
More worryingly, we find strong evidence of crowding out of motivation among 
internally-motivated employees. This was most clearly seen in the fact that employees who had 
 150 
 
previously had perfect attendance became over five times more likely than their comparison 
group at other plants to have a second attendance problem after losing eligibility for the award. 
Most strikingly, we find evidence of negative motivational spillovers that affect performance on 
a completely separate task. The mechanisms underlying this result may appear to be subtle, but 
as we document below, the significant productivity decrease by the plant’s previously punctual 
employees was by far the statistical effect with the largest economic consequence in the study. 
This finding of negative motivational spillovers is remarkable because it suggests that awards for 
one type of behavior might crowd out internally motivated behavior not only on the awarded 
task, but also on other tasks.  
Our findings complement Neckermann et al.’s (2014) study, which shows positive 
spillovers after the introduction of a series of corporate awards. A comparison of the two studies 
may help explain why their results differ and why more nuanced theory on corporate awards is 
needed. The awards reported in Neckermann et al. (2014) were given for positive behavior 
identified by managers, with the criteria announced to workers only after the award was given. 
Thus, reward-motivated employees could not change their behavior in order to win. Also, the 
positive spillovers documented in that study may simply have been employees inferring what 
behaviors managers would choose to reward next. In our study, however, the criteria for winning 
were known in advance. As noted by Larkin (2010) and Garr (2012), both types of awards—
those that recognize ex-post behavior on categories not known to employees and those that are 
governed by established ex-ante rules—are widely used.  
 Our results suggest that the award had a significant negative impact on net plant 
productivity. Aggregating the coefficient estimates allows a high-level estimation of the total 
effect on plant efficiency of introducing the award. Depending on the exact assumptions used, 
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the award introduction reduced overall plant efficiency by 1.4 to 3.1%. The small increase in the 
number of minutes worked raised overall productivity by 0.12%, but the various sources of 
productivity losses reduced productivity by 1.4 to 2.5%, depending on whether results with only 
marginal significance are included. In addition, the increased use of single absences reduced 
overall efficiency by another 0.6%, although we note that these absences may simply substitute 
away a future PTO day for the worker. Even if this is the case, however, interviews suggested 
that any absence given with short notice is costly. A reduction in overall plant efficiency of 1.0% 
is approximately equivalent to the loss of one-third of a worker, so the magnitude of the effect is 
quite large.  
The plant managers anticipated that the award’s direct cost of $75 per month would 
easily “pay for itself” as better attendance would mean fewer bottlenecks and thus higher 
productivity. At worst, if there were no improvement the cost would be a mere $75 a month, the 
cost of the gift card. However, our results suggest the monthly cost of the award program was at 
least $1,497, which is equal to 1.4% of the plant’s total monthly labor cost (wages, retirement, 
insurance and payroll taxes), plus the $75 gift cards. The award was therefore approximately 20 
times more costly than anticipated by Plant 1’s managers. Using the higher end of our estimates, 
the total monthly cost of award introduction was $3,302. These results clearly indicate that 
awards can be far more costly than anticipated and can significantly and negatively impact 
overall firm performance. 
3.6.1 Limitations 
Like many studies of this type, ours has several limitations. First, worker assignment to treatment 
and control groups was not random and there were differences between the two groups, such as 
the non-union status of the four control plants. These fixed differences, along with any other pre-
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existing differences between groups, are “differenced out” by the DiD methodology. However, 
this approach does assume common time trends across groups. We interviewed managers at the 
treatment and control plants and, apart from an annual health screening offered to control plant 
employees in April 2011,21 managers reported no policy or management changes near the 
introduction of the award. We also note that the monthly treatment effect model (Figure 3.2) 
indicates that the largest effects occurred in the month after treatment. This suggests that neither 
the health intervention nor any other unobserved change not exactly correlated with treatment 
could explain our results.  
 It could also be that our results are simply due to poor planning or program 
administration and not a problem with the program itself. But our interviews suggest that the 
plant managers carefully considered and administered the program, and our interviews with 
corporate management reflected their high confidence in the competence of the Plant 1 
managers. Even more informative is that the positive direct effects of the program were seen 
immediately upon implementation, suggesting that the program was working as the plant 
managers intended. Still, in studies like ours, it is impossible to completely separate the effect of 
the program design, which has large external validity, from the effect of the management or 
implementation. 
Furthermore, we cannot definitively prove the mechanism by which the attendance award 
negatively affected some workers’ productivity. The explanation that the award crowded out 
intrinsic motivation is theoretically appealing, especially given the strong laboratory evidence on 
crowding out. However, as in most field studies, this interpretation is speculative, since we 
cannot directly measure intrinsic motivation and do not know the mechanism that led some 
workers to perfect attendance and punctuality even when neither was required or compensated. 
                                                          
21 See Gubler and Pierce (2014). 
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There are several alternative explanations besides intrinsic motivation, such as individual 
differences in responsiveness to social pressure or individual prosocial tendencies. Our results do 
show, however, that whatever the motivational mechanism was, the award reduced it for some 
employees. 
 Finally, our results consider a single type of award program while in practice, award 
programs vary widely across and even within organizations. They differ, for example, in whether 
or not employees know in advance which behaviors will help them win the award. The 
attendance award in our setting randomly rewarded only one of the many employees who 
qualified each month. Many awards are restricted to a limited number of employees, such as 
“Employee of the Month” or “circle of excellence,” which recognizes the top 10% of 
employees—common for salespeople (Larkin 2010). Other awards are given to anyone who 
meets the criteria. As with monetary incentives, there are many ways in which award programs 
can vary, as can their costs and benefits. We therefore suggest caution in applying the study’s 
empirical results to all types of award.  
3.6.2 Theoretical Implications 
Economists have only recently started to consider the psychological effects of incentive 
programs. On the other hand, social psychologists have traditionally been focused on the 
response of individual employees to different incentive programs, rather than on questions of 
firm-level effects or optimal incentive design (Nickerson and Zenger 2008; Larkin et al. 2012). 
This study provides further evidence that scholars need to incorporate the strengths of both 
approaches: the holistic, cost-benefit lens of economics and the realistic social psychology model 
of human behavior, incorporating biases and emotions.  
Given the heterogeneity in the types of awards used in corporations, we hope one 
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contribution of our theory is to allow scholars and practitioners to design award programs more 
systematically. We believe that many corporate award programs are not designed to account for 
heterogeneity in employee motivation or for an employee’s multiple daily tasks. Nor do they 
account for the possibility that formal recognition of improved performance on a given task may 
seem unfair to employees who don’t need to improve that much because they were motivated all 
along to perform well. Our theory suggests that using awards to improve behavior should likely 
be limited to cases in which most employees lack internal motivation for the task in question; 
obviously, this conjecture requires further empirical validation.  
Although our study does not directly show crowding out (Deci 1975; Deci and Ryan 
1985), it does suggest that employees who previously behaved in ways that were not explicitly 
rewarded or compensated—namely, showing up early for their shift—cut back on this behavior 
due to the introduction of the reward. The notion of crowding out is usually applied to monetary 
rewards (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b), with recent work suggesting that nonmonetary 
rewards do not, for example, reduce prosocial blood donations (Goette and Stutzer 2008; 
Lacetera et al. 2012). In contrast, our results suggest that crowding out may also apply to 
extrinsic but nonmonetary rewards such as corporate awards. In addition, crowding out is usually 
focused on reduction in motivation for actions that are compensated. Our results suggest that 
compensating one action can also lead to crowding out in a completely different realm, the first 
evidence of such negative motivational spillovers of which we are aware. Existing research 
further suggests that the long-term costs from demotivation, particularly following program 
termination, may be even greater than what this study’s time-range of data can show (Gneezy 
and Rustichini 2000a; Meier 2007).  
Our results also suggest that the direct effect of an award is more like a monetary 
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incentive than a subtle nudge toward positive behavior. While social psychologists and 
behavioral economists have long been interested in small interventions that can imperceptibly 
alter behavior, the fact that awards usually do not carry great monetary value does not mean they 
are only a subtle influence on worker behavior. A job award is, after all, a formal program 
designed by a manager and not simply a small difference in framing.  
Finally, our study suggests that the antecedents of negative motivational spillovers 
require further research. Awards are commonly used for tasks deemed less important than the 
workers’ primary tasks, which are more often rewarded with monetary compensation (Garr 
2012). In our setting, the less-important awarded task was attendance and the more-important 
compensated task was productivity. Even if the two tasks are not linked in terms of employee 
effort, our theory and empirical results suggest that a reward introduced for a less important task 
may spill over to the more important task. It is important that future work unpack the 
mechanisms underlying negative motivational spillovers because, as our study demonstrates, the 
economic costs in the form of individual and organizational performance can be substantial.  
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3.8 Figures and Tables 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics at Worker/Day Level 
TREATMENT Pre-Award Award Period 
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max Obs Mean Sd Min Max 
Tardy 7126 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0 5742 0.03 0.16 0.0 1.0 
Minutes late 7126 -1.73 5.37 -59.7 54.0 5737 -2.19 5.10 -49.0 58.2 
Total absences 7846 0.04 0.19 0.0 1.0 6318 0.05 0.21 0.0 1.0 
Single absences 7846 0.01 0.07 0.0 1.0 6318 0.01 0.11 0.0 1.0 
Daily efficiency 6576 125.6 32.4 54.5 218.0 5669 124.7 36.2 54.5 218.0 
Late 7126 0.15 0.35 0.0 1.0 5742 0.10 0.29 0.0 1.0 
Monthly absences 7861 0.79 1.65 0.0 8.0 6339 1.03 1.80 0.0 10.0 
Total hrs worked 7861 8.25 1.64 0.0 23.7 6339 8.17 1.69 0.0 13.1 
Tenure 7861 3373 2681 176 9262 6339 3186 2708 176 9262 
Age 7861 43.51 10.05 21.0 62.0 6339 43.63 9.84 21.0 62.0 
Male 7861 0.43 0.50 0.0 1.0 6339 0.43 0.49 0.0 1.0 
Base salary 7861 25695 845 19240 28600 6339 25495 1363 19240 28600 
           
CONTROL Pre-Award Award Period 
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max Obs Mean Sd Min Max 
Tardy 23600 0.03 0.17 0.0 1.0 14081 0.02 0.15 0.0 1.0 
Minutes late 23600 -2.12 4.73 -59.4 59 14081 -1.88 5.07 -59 59 
Total absences 27449 0.05 0.22 0.0 1.0 16300 0.05 0.22 0.0 1.0 
Single absences 27449 0.02 0.13 0.0 1.0 16300 0.02 0.12 0.0 1.0 
Daily efficiency 22320 120.3 34.7 54.5 218.0 14148 125.3 35.6 54.5 218.0 
Late 23600 0.17 0.38 0.0 1.0 14081 0.14 0.34 0.0 1.0 
Monthly absences 27684 1.06 1.76 0.0 15.0 16474 1.13 1.78 0.0 12.0 
Total hrs worked 27684 8.01 1.38 0.0 44.0 16474 8.09 1.25 0.0 16.37 
Tenure 27684 1720 1920 4 8566 16474 1754 1992 60 8566 
Age 27684 39.36 12.88 18.0 69.0 16474 39.87 12.79 19.0 69.0 
Male 27684 0.34 0.47 0.0 1.0 16474 0.32 0.47 0.0 1.0 
Base salary 27522 19850 4899 8320 48526 16474 197334 5167 8320 48526 
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Table 3.2: Basic Treatment Effect 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
Variable: Tardy Minutes Late Absent 
Single 
Absence Efficiency 
Treatment -0.015*** -0.801** 0.007 0.006*** -1.992 
 
(0.006) (0.343) (0.006) (0.002) (3.193) 
Constant 0.020*** -2.057*** 0.051*** 0.023*** 117.353*** 
 
(0.006) (0.214) (0.009) (0.005) (9.036) 
      
Time Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Worker FE Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.008 
# of employees 218 218 218 218 206 
Observations 50,549 50,544 57,913 57,913 48,713 
Note:  Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400 repetitions. 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The variable “Treatment” is the 
interaction of the treatment group and post award introduction dummies, and represents the 
estimated effect of the introduction of the award. The post award introduction dummy is 
coded as missing for observations after the award was removed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Sub-sample Analysis on “Tardy” and “Minutes Late” 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable: Tardy Tardy Minutes Late Minutes Late 
Sample: Low Tardy High Tardy Low Tardy High Tardy 
Treatment 0.001 -0.020*** -1.144 -0.319 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.730) (0.341) 
Constant 0.002 0.035*** -2.872*** -1.348*** 
 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.301) (0.261) 
     
Time controls Y Y Y Y 
Worker FE Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.007 
# of 
employees 116 102 116 102 
Observations 23,502 27,047 23,502 27,042 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400 
repetitions. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3.4: Sub-sample Analysis on “Absence” and “Single Absence” 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable: Absence Absence Single Absence Single Absence 
Sample: Low Tardy High Tardy Low Tardy High Tardy 
Treatment 0.021*** 0.000 0.006** 0.006** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
     
Time controls Y Y Y Y 
Worker FE Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 
# of 
employees 116 102 116 102 
Observations 27,114 30,799 27,114 30,799 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400 
repetitions. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Effect of Losing Award Eligibility on Tardiness 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Tardy Tardy Tardy 
Sample: ALL Low Tardy High Tardy 
Pre-fail treatment -0.017*** -0.002 -0.021** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009) 
Post-fail treatment -0.010 0.045** -0.016 
 
(0.009) (0.021) (0.010) 
Constant 0.020*** 0.002 0.035*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.010) 
    
Time controls Y Y Y 
Worker FE Y Y Y 
R² 0.004 0.005 0.007 
# of employees 218 116 102 
Observations 50,549 23,502 27,047 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block 
bootstrapped with 400 repetitions. Significance: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3.6: Treatment Effects on Efficiency by Employee Type 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
Sample: Low Tardy High Tardy Low Tardy High Tardy 
Treatment -9.551*** 2.052   
 
(3.273) (4.415)   
Pre-fail treatment   -9.815*** 2.018 
   (3.431) (4.535) 
Post-fail treatment   -9.327 3.152 
   (6.735) (4.011) 
Constant 97.725*** 125.307*** 118.871*** 127.393*** 
 
(22.685) (8.822) (3.016) (3.388) 
     
Time controls Y Y Y Y 
Worker FE Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.016 
# of employees 109 97 109 97 
Observations 22,450 26,263 21,303 24,822 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400 
repetitions. Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Figure 3.1: Study Taxonomy and Summary of Hypotheses 
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Figure 3.2: Monthly Treatment Effect on Minutes Late 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Change in Minutes Late After Award Implementation for “High Tardy” Group 
 
Note: Percentage changes represent changes from the initial baseline clock-in frequency for each minute interval. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has investigated the role of social structure and financial incentives in 
individual productivity and organizational performance. Drawing on unique data from two 
distinct service settings, it has explored how heterogeneity in social factors and motivations at 
the individual level influence individual productivity, choices, opportunities, and behaviors. 
Moreover, it has investigated how such effects scale up to influence organizational-level 
outcomes. The key takeaway from the three chapters is that social structures and factors, which 
vary at the individual-level, combine with financial concerns to significantly influence individual 
and organizational outcomes. Moreover, when properly managed, such factors can be leveraged 
to improve performance and generate advantages for firms. 
The results of these chapters have important theoretical implications. First, they suggest 
the need for future work that explores micro-macro links in strategy. The key assumption 
underlying the microfoundations view is that individuals are heterogeneous. Thus, firm 
heterogeneity in performance outcomes is impacted by individual mobility, productivity, and 
value appropriation, and some firms may generate advantages relative to rivals because of their 
unique ability to attract, motivate, and retain key individuals. The results from these chapters 
support this view, and suggest that further work that investigates the interplay between 
individuals and firms is needed. Second, the results from this dissertation suggest a more 
nuanced view of social structure. In particular, these studies suggest that individual choice, as 
well as elements of the context, are important to understanding the impact of social structures on 
individuals and organizations. Finally, the results of this dissertation provide support for Simon’s 
argument that we need a more comprehensive “model of man” (Simon 1957). Such a model must 
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include the response of individuals to social factors and financial incentives, as well as their 
interplay. Moreover, it must continue to explore how elements of the context or organization 
influence individual choice. Such an avenue moves beyond the current literatures in human 
capital or human resources, and provides a fruitful area for additional research.   
The results of this dissertation similarly have important managerial implications. First, 
they suggest that individual heterogeneity in social structures and motivations are important to 
firm outcomes. This is a previously understudied yet important aspect of human capital. Firms 
can potentially improve employee and firm performance by understanding how to best manage 
this heterogeneity. Second, these results imply that hiring and staffing policies are critical to 
organizational outcomes. Moreover, understanding the complementarity between individuals and 
organizations is key to effectively creating and sustaining advantages from labor. Finally, these 
results suggest that it is critical for managers to craft policies that leverage social factors to 
improve performance of employees and the firm. Moreover, it is important for managers to take 
social and psychological factors into account when devising such policies.   
There is much potential to build upon and extend this work. In each chapter I have 
concluded with thoughts for related future work. To conclude this dissertation, however, I 
provide some overarching thoughts about potential future directions. First, this dissertation 
suggests there is significant potential in investigating heterogeneity between organizations in 
their ability to leverage social factors to improve performance and generate sustainable 
advantages compared to competitors. This includes exploring how social structures can be 
leveraged strategically over time, as organizations are founded, grow, and compete with rivals. 
Second, I believe future research should continue to investigate the impact of micro-level factors 
on macro-level outcomes. While a significant amount of work has focused on the firm or 
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industry levels, significantly less work has explored the link between individual and 
organizational-level factors. Yet, as evidenced by these chapters, such factors can be critical to 
understanding organizational performance and success. Finally, I believe there is much potential 
in focusing on how strategy theories and findings apply to service industries, whose chief 
productive resource is labor. While such industries comprise a large percent of the US economy, 
surprisingly much of the research in strategic management has shied away from these industries. 
Future theoretical and empirical work should continue to investigate how service settings differ 
from more traditional strategy settings. Such an approach necessitates embracing individuals—
their productivity, skills, motivations, abilities, and potential for mobility—as key resources of 
organizations.   
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APPENDIX 1: Appendix to Chapter 1 
Table A1.1: House Description and Quality Indicator Dummies from Public Remarks 
Quality Indicators Mean Std. Dev. Quality Indicators Mean Std. Dev. 
TLC 0.01 0.09 Custom 0.06 0.24 
Needs Updating 0.002 0.04 Unique 0.01 0.08 
Estate Sale 0.002 0.04 Maple 0.02 0.14 
Foreclosure 0.002 0.05 Newer 0.06 0.23 
Handyman 0.001 0.03 Hurry/Will Not Last 0.03 0.17 
As-Is 0.01 0.11 Pride 0.002 0.05 
Rehabber 0.0002 0.01 Clean 0.07 0.25 
Bank-Owned 0.01 0.08 Quiet 0.08 0.27 
Priced to Sell 0.02 0.14 Dream 0.01 0.09 
Motivated 0.02 0.14 Block 0.02 0.13 
Potential 0.01 0.12 Huge 0.09 0.28 
Close 0.19 0.39 Deck 0.06 0.24 
! 0.40 0.49 Mint 0.002 0.04 
New 0.33 0.47 Hardwood 0.07 0.26 
Spacious 0.07 0.25 Views 0.10 0.30 
Elegance 0.01 0.08 New Roof/New Shingles 0.02 0.13 
Beautiful 0.19 0.39 Upgraded/Updated 0.09 0.29 
Remodeled/Renovated 0.05 0.22 Vaulted 0.11 0.31 
Historic/Vintage 0.003 0.06 Floor plan 0.09 0.28 
Maintained/Well-Cared 0.03 0.17 Award 0.001 0.04 
Wonderful 0.05 0.22 Hot Tub 0.02 0.14 
Fantastic 0.03 0.17 Tile 0.12 0.33 
Charming 0.01 0.12 Cul-de-sac 0.05 0.21 
Stunning 0.01 0.10 Jetted Tub 0.05 0.22 
Amazing 0.02 0.15 Park 0.14 0.35 
Granite 0.06 0.24 Brick 0.05 0.21 
Immaculate 0.04 0.19 Value 0.03 0.16 
Breathtaking 0.01 0.05 Windows 0.05 0.22 
Neighborhood 0.14 0.34 Mother-in-law 0.02 0.15 
Spectacular 0.01 0.10 Stainless 0.02 0.15 
Landscaped 0.09 0.29 Theater 0.01 0.12 
Stained Glass/Art Glass 0.001 0.02 Surround Sound 0.01 0.10 
Built-in 0.03 0.17 Pickiest 0.01 0.07 
Tasteful 0.003 0.05 Rare 0.01 0.08 
Must See 0.07 0.26 Starter 0.04 0.20 
Fabulous 0.01 0.12 Master 0.15 0.36 
Leaded 0.001 0.04 Cute 0.02 0.16 
Delightful 0.001 0.04 Warranty 0.03 0.16 
Move-In 0.03 0.17 Temple 0.01 0.07 
Gourmet 0.01 0.08 Fenced 0.10 0.30 
Corian 0.01 0.07   
  
 
Note: These house characteristic and quality dummies take the value of 1 if they (or their common derivatives) are referenced in the 
public comments section of the listing, 0 otherwise.  
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Figure A1.1: Flow Chart of a Typical Real Estate Transaction for Listing Agents 
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Figure A1.2: Map of Utah County with Listing Agent Home Addresses 
 
Note: This map of Utah County shows the approximate locations of home addresses for real estate agents living in Utah County 
that listed a home during my sample period. The red stars represent a single agent’s home.  
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APPENDIX 2: Appendix to Chapter 3 
Site interviews on empirical results  
 After analyzing the productivity and attendance data, we presented our results to the 
executive team at Laundry Co and to the managers of Plant 1. They found many of our results 
unsurprising, including the improvement in punctuality and attendance from the award program. 
They were not surprised at the use of single absences to retain eligibility. They told us they had 
suspicions that employees might be using absences strategically, as they seemed to notice many 
calls right before shift start times from employees during the period of the award. Neither were 
they surprised that it was primarily the workers with previous punctuality problems who drove 
the improvements in punctuality and attendance; that had been the point all along.  
 They were somewhat surprised by the disqualification results, but did note that they had 
observed some changes in employee behavior based on whether or not the employee was still 
eligible for the award. One manager observed: “There seemed to be this feeling among 
employees that once you are disqualified, ‘what the heck, might as well revert back to what I was 
doing, and then I’ll try again next time.’” They noted that the need for perfect punctuality and 
attendance was difficult for many employees, but that “quite a few employees were able to go six 
months or more without being disqualified.”   
 What really surprised them was the decrease in productivity. While they had noticed 
fairness concerns about the award program, they hadn’t linked it to decreased performance. One 
manager noted: “We did hear some grumbling. The ones that were showing up on time [before 
the award was introduced] were wondering why everyone was now being rewarded for 
something they were already doing… [These individuals were saying,] ‘We have been doing this 
all along, but haven’t got anything special.’” Another manager noted: “Employees were divided 
 [176] 
 
about the program. It was about 50/50 on who seemed to like the program.” The plant managers 
also noted that the “low tardy” employees expressed increased expectations of winning the 
drawings: “These were the people that usually came on time anyways, and so were always in the 
hunt [to win].” However, most of the winners were members of the “high tardy” group, which 
may have deepened feelings of unfairness among internally motivated “low tardy” workers. The 
senior corporate management took our results as a confirmation of their feeling that employees 
shouldn’t be rewarded for things that they are expected to do anyways, as it creates fairness 
problems amongst workers.  
 Plant management did not allow us to interview production workers who had participated 
in the program, as they did not want to “bring back the topic [for discussion].”     
 
 
Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics at the Worker/Month Level 
 
 
 
TREATMENT Pre-Award Award Period 
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max Obs Mean Sd Min Max 
% time tardy per month 33 0.07 0.08 0.0 0.37 33 0.06 0.06 0.0 0.19 
# minutes late per month 33 -2.64 3.17 -11.4 3.74 33 -3.63 2.91 -9.67 0.21 
% time late per month 33 0.20 0.17 0.0 0.59 33 0.16 0.15 0.0 0.47 
% time absent per month 33 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.08 33 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.11 
% time single absent per month 33 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.03 33 0.03 0.02 0.0 0.11 
Average efficiency 32 122.1 22.4 87.5 168.0 32 122.9 25.8 75.0 169.4 
           
           
CONTROL Pre-Award Award Period 
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max Obs Mean Sd Min Max 
% time tardy per month 185 0.04 0.06 0.0 0.33 106 0.05 0.11 0.0 1.0 
# minutes late per month 185 -2.09 2.19 -13.33 5.4 106 -1.51 2.45 -10.5 8.31 
% time late per month 185 0.20 0.22 0.0 0.95 106 0.24 0.20 0.0 1.0 
% time absent per month 185 0.05 0.08 0.0 0.50 106 0.06 0.06 0.0 0.42 
% time single absent per month 185 0.03 0.05 0 0.50 106 0.03 0.03 0 0.11 
Average efficiency 174 110.0 30.3 54.5 217.8 99 122.3 29.5 66.9 218.0 
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Table A2.2: Placebo Tests 
Variable Random Treatment Group (50) 
Random Treatment Group and 
Date (50) 
  
Mean 
Coefficient 
p < 
0.1 p <0.05 
Mean 
Coefficient p < 0.1 p <0.05 
Tardy -0.0006 6% 4% -0.0003 14% 6% 
Minutes late -0.1182 2% 2% -0.0969 12% 4% 
Single absence 0.0015 6% 4% 0.0025 12% 8% 
Note: The average results of the placebo tests are shown above. For both types of placebos, the 
mean coefficient is both close to zero and significantly smaller than the corresponding coefficient 
from Table 3.3. Also, across the placebos the results are significant at close to the expected rate. We 
present the point estimate and 95% confidence intervals for each placebo regression of minutes late 
in Figure A2.1, which show that our point estimate has the smallest standard error of any of the 
individual placebos. Placebo regressions for our other models produced similar results. Overall, the 
placebo test results suggest that the treatment effects shown in Table 3.3 were actually a result of 
the treatment. The award program encouraged improved attendance behavior for workers in Plant 
1, supporting Hypothesis 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the employee level. 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
 
Table A2.3: Pre- and Post-Fail for Minutes Late 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Minutes late Minutes late Minutes late 
Sample: ALL Low Tardy High Tardy 
Pre-fail treatment -0.883** -1.165 -0.453 
 
(0.357) (0.755) (0.327) 
Post-fail treatment -0.469 -0.872 0.061 
 
(0.357) (0.969) (0.422) 
Constant -2.046*** -2.870*** -1.326*** 
 
(0.215) (0.303) (0.262) 
    Time controls Y Y Y 
Worker FE Y Y Y 
R² 0.006 0.015 0.007 
# of employees 218 116 102 
Observations 50,544 23,502 27,042 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block 
bootstrapped with 400 repetitions. Significance: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Figure A2.1: Plant Process Flow Chart 
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Figure A2.2: Histogram of Daily Efficiency for All Workers 
 
 
Figure A2.3: Eligible Months by Worker 
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Figure A2.4: Placebo Regressions for Minutes Late 
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Figure A2.5: Change in Minutes Late After Award Disqualification 
 
Note: Percentage changes represent changes from the initial baseline clock-in frequency for each minute interval. Values above 
bars indicate the baseline frequency for prefail clock-ins. 
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